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forward as an instrument to combat the climate crisis. 
Environmental and climate organizations have taken 
up the discourse and tools of human rights to address 
climate change issues, using human rights arguments 
in court cases and public campaigns. In December 2019  
the Dutch Supreme Court rejected the government’s 
cassation appeal against a 2015 landmark decision of 
the Hague District Court, ordering the state, as requested 
by the Urgenda Foundation, to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 25 per cent (compared to 1990) 
by the end of 2020. The Supreme Court’s decision was 
based on the Paris Agreement and on the Dutch state’s 
obligations to protect the life and well-being of its 
citizens, particularly under Article 2 (the right to life) and 
Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). These state 
obligations include taking suitable measures if a known 
real and immediate risk to people’s lives or welfare exists. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that the ECHR in 
its Article 13 provides that national law must offer an 
effective legal remedy against (imminent) violations of 
the Convention and that therefore national courts must be 
able to provide effective legal protection. In other words, 
the courts had not inappropriately entered the political 
domain – as the state had argued –, they just properly 
circumscribed it. 
Human rights organizations, meanwhile, are turning their 
attention to the climate crisis. There is now a wide-
spread consensus that the enjoyment of human rights 
will be both directly and indirectly affected by climate 
Over the past decade there has been increasing  
recognition at the multilateral level of the human rights 
implications of climate change. The Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the 
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) have 
addressed the relationship between human rights and 
climate change and have called for a human rights-
based approach to guide measures addressing climate 
change (see e.g. UNHRC 2009; OHCHR 2009; OHCHR 
2010; OHCHR 2015). In its Fifth Assessment Report in 
2014, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), building on previous reports, clearly linked climate 
change to human activities and detailed the various ways 
climate change adversely affects human well-being. In 
2016 the Paris Agreement entered into force, and within 
a year counted 195 signatories, signifying their commit-
ment to combating climate change. However, only three 
years later, the United States announced its intention to 
withdraw from the Agreement.   
 The intervening years were beholden to growing climate 
crisis protests, new climate justice movements, and civil 
disobedience in protest against governmental actions 
on climate change that allegedly were too little, too late. 
Others demonstrated against the alleged unjust distribu-
tion of the costs of climate change measures. The effects 
of climate change and the efforts to prevent or adapt to 
its effects are strongly contested, with specific efforts to 
combat climate change being denounced by one side or 
another, including authoritarian leaders. 
 The human rights framework is increasingly brought 
Introduction
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The first two essays examine the opportunities, threats, 
and difficulties at the nexus of human rights and climate 
change. The authors discuss the applicability of the 
human rights framework to the problems that arise with 
climate change. Several environmental organizations have 
taken up the language and framework of human rights 
to further their goal. While many have welcomed this 
development, it invites scrutiny as well. 
Ashfaq Khalfan and Chiara Liguori set out how climate 
change impacts human rights, from vulnerable popula-
tions to intergenerational inequity, and make a case for 
action from the human rights movement. “The climate 
crisis threatens a huge range of human rights. It exacer-
bates inequalities and its effects are disproportionately 
felt by those who are more vulnerable, marginalized 
and/or subject to discrimination.” The benefits of a 
human rights lens, they argue, are threefold. First of all, 
it strengthens the climate justice movement. Second, 
they argue that international human rights law provides 
more extensive legally binding obligations than environ-
mental law, which will help states design ambitious and 
effective policies. It also keeps the focus on states and 
corporations, rather than individuals. The third benefit is 
the range of human rights tools of both pursuing action, 
and monitoring outcomes. The accountability and remedy 
mechanisms of human rights law are stronger than 
those of environmental law and will be more effective in 
obtaining results. 
Providing a counterpoint, Eric Posner’s essay warns 
that rather than providing an extra stimulus to combat 
climate change, the human rights framework brings its 
own problems. He points out that the current approach to 
climate policy, given the unique nature of the problem, 
is through the framework of international agreements. 
Introducing the human rights framework might negatively 
affect existing efforts of combating climate change. The 
lawful basis for a human rights approach is missing, and 
applying the human rights framework is “more likely to 
distract from the effort to combat climate change than 
advance it.” It might even damage existing efforts, as 
major polluting countries, such as China, might find 
grievances with a more human rights-based approach: 
change. Common examples are sea level rise, temper-
ature increases, and extreme weather events affecting 
the rights to health, food, water and life amongst others. 
These effects will not be felt equally: the more vulnerable 
segments of the global population will be hit hardest. 
Indeed, UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston, in a report on 
climate change and poverty (UNHRC 2019), highlighted 
an “increasing risk of climate apartheid”. Alston linked 
the growing threat of climate change to risks to civil and 
political rights, and even to democracy and the rule of 
law. As the effects of climate change worsen, community 
discontent, inequality, and deprivation increase. 
With the worlds of climate crisis activism and human 
rights protection becoming increasingly intertwined, their 
value for and impact upon one another deserve closer 
inspection. The language, policies and (campaigning) 
strategies around climate change and human rights are 
still in development. As the need for action becomes more 
urgent and climate change issues become more dire, it is 
important to critically examine the role of human rights in 
climate change policies and activism.  
A prominent question arising from the alleged conver-
gence of these policy areas is whether human rights 
activists should take a proactive or a reactive approach to 
climate change and related issues. Some see the dangers 
of a climate crisis as an all-embracing threat neces-
sitating an all-hands-on-deck approach and close cooper-
ation of civil society to secure the protection of justice 
and human rights, including those of future generations. 
Others advocate a more traditional, reactive approach, 
arguing that the human rights framework is better 
suited to protect against actual or imminent violations in 
specific situations. 
These approaches do not exclude each other but do play a 
central role in current debates for human rights organiza-
tions and activists around the world. What is clear is that 
regardless of one’s position, the worlds of human rights 
and climate change are increasingly engaging with each 
other, leading to new insights, (re)definitions, and new 
challenges for human rights and environmental activists.  
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often prepared to go much further than the nation state 
in combating climate change”. Particularly, the impact 
cities could have on effectiveness, legitimacy, and 
appropriateness of climate action are noted. However, 
as Oomen points out, local and regional human rights 
responsibilities are usually not addressed in international 
law. This might be changing as “today’s world abounds 
with ‘frontier cities’ seeking to explicitly assert responsi-
bility for international human rights law”. Oomen divides 
the subnational authorities in the ‘more-than-willing, 
the willing and the less-than-willing’ to combat climate 
change. The more-than-willing are showcases for what 
is possible, providing avenues that might strengthen 
human rights law in relation, but not exclusive, to climate 
change. The willing cities are targets, where large gains 
could be made through networks and alliances. For the 
less-than-willing entities, Oomen argues that explicating 
the responsibilities of subnational authorities by human 
rights and climate change activists is especially impor-
tant to ensure compliance and timely action. 
Sara Seck’s essay discusses the role of multinational 
business enterprises by charting the evolution of the 
responsibilities of businesses regarding climate and 
human rights. Starting with the 2007 Caring for Climate 
initiative, guidance for businesses on human rights 
and climate change is emerging and will continue to 
develop, regardless of the involvement of human rights 
actors. Noting that “it is crucial that human rights NGOs 
not ignore the emergence of business guidance tools 
in the climate context”, engagement to further develop 
these tools by human rights actors might determine the 
strength of social norms and in turn, inform legal respon-
sibilities. Seck draws attention to the fact that the human 
rights community “has for the most part utterly failed to 
meaningfully engage in efforts to develop useful tools”, 
due to their scepticism over non-binding guidance tools. 
In her essay on climate change litigation and its limita-
tions, Annalisa Savaresi discusses the accelerating trend 
of using human rights in strategic climate litigation. 
Human rights are turned to as “a gap-filler to provide 
remedies where other areas of the law do not”. So far, the 
focus of these cases is on states, with only a few cases 
“These countries, and others like them, will not only resist 
the use of human rights language, but, more practi-
cally, they will worry that if a climate treaty is seen as 
a vindication of human rights, or an implementation of 
human rights commitments, then claims based on those 
underlying human rights will be more difficult to resist.”  
Posner furthermore points out that the instruments used 
by human rights organizations are ill-equipped to combat 
climate change. There is a role for human rights however: 
Posner suggests focussing on the human rights abuses 
that are the result of states responding to the challenges 
of climate change. 
Where the first two essays focus on whether climate 
change is and should be a human rights concern, the 
following four examine recent human rights approaches to 
climate change issues in specific policy areas: displace-
ment and migration, subnational entities, companies, and 
(strategic) litigation.  
Jane McAdam and Sanjula Weerasinghe illustrate some 
of the difficulties around the interactions between climate 
change and human movement (used here as an umbrella 
term for displacement, migration, and relocation), and 
critically examine concepts such as the term ‘climate 
refugee’. Their essay charts the normative developments 
regarding climate change and human movement, and the 
duties of states when movement occurs within and across 
borders. The accumulation of knowledge and awareness 
has led to two instruments adopted by the UN in 2018: the 
Migration Compact and the Refugee Compact. McAdam 
and Weerasinghe conclude that there are existing 
frameworks and tools that can prevent movement where 
possible and manage it where unavoidable. The stand-
ards offered by the human rights framework can assist 
in assessing risk and policy responses related to climate 
change. 
Barbara Oomen suggests that subnational entities, 
especially cities, are important stakeholders and should 
be targeted by human rights actors. Charting the 
growth and importance of subnational authorities for 
the global problem of climate change, she notes that: 
“it is clear that all types of subnational authorities are 
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to claim their rights and seeking redress in the face of 
massive injustice. 
Elizabeth Dirth’s essay examines the interlinkages 
between the impact of climate change, social justice, and 
human rights. Noting the tension between these concepts, 
Dirth highlights three examples, arguing that “in the 
face of these new and diverse challenges resulting from 
climate change and how we deal with it, perhaps utilizing 
a human rights framework does not go far enough to 
understand the injustices caused or exacerbated by 
climate change”. So how can socially just solutions be 
found? Dirth suggests that two fundamental challenges 
have to be overcome. First is the necessity to fully 
understand what climate change problems and solutions 
entail, and to acknowledge the complex on-the-ground 
realities behind abstract solutions. The second challenge 
is that in order to incorporate justice into climate policies 
and programmes, they need to be locally relevant and 
context-sensitive. Indeed, Dirth states that “the fact that 
justice is a word with fluid and dynamic meanings, means 
that it has come to incorporate environmental needs, 
struggles and climate injustice in a way that human 
rights narratives and groups have struggled with”. 
Anna Schoemakers points out that the notion of ‘climate 
justice’ is expanding and is now being used by young 
people around the world to fight for a secure future. In 
her essay, Schoemakers discusses how the term climate 
justice is being coopted and redefined by a young climate 
movement: “Climate justice matters because today’s 
generation is the last generation that can take steps to 
avoid the worst impacts of climate change.” Schoemakers 
further makes the case that the burgeoning movements 
for social and climate justice might be game changers, 
as the reasons for their existence will only grow as 
climate change effects become more visible and have 
higher impacts. So how can human rights actors support 
these new movements? Schoemakers suggests it is best 
to facilitate the movements, sharing experience and 
resources where possible. Organizations such as Amnesty 
International and Greenpeace can operate from their 
own strengths and provide space and expertise for the 
activists where possible. 
targeting non-state actors only. Savaresi notes that in 
recent years “human rights arguments have been increas-
ingly used to prop up those based on private or public 
law”. In some cases, the emphasis has been placed on 
a failure to act resulting in human rights violations. 
Analyzing some key cases, Savaresi states that “far 
from treating climate change as a series of individual 
transboundary harms, therefore, applicants (…) are 
arguing that climate change should be averted because 
it systematically threatens the enjoyment of human 
rights”. Although human rights are used as an avenue of 
exploration in the courts, Savaresi notes several limita-
tions. While several court cases have been won, this has 
not always led to tangible results on the ground. Human 
rights law is “no replacement for effective legislation 
concerning climate change mitigation, and human rights 
remedies are no replacement for tort-like liability for 
climate change impacts”. 
A central theme coming out of the discussions on climate 
change and human rights is the concept of climate 
justice. How should it be defined, and what is its relation 
to human rights? The final four essays center on justice, 
focusing on social justice and climate change, the poten-
tial for new justice movements, and the emerging concept 
of intergenerational justice. 
In his essay on justice delayed Stephen Humphreys 
considers how climate change is changing the landscape 
of time, justice, and the experience of living in a world 
of uncertainty. Indeed, it is the delay between cause 
and effect, between our actions and their outcomes, and 
between harms and redress, that has formed the obstacle 
to the achievement of justice and redress with regard 
to climate change. So where do we find climate justice? 
Humphreys looks at the notion of equity and its history, 
arguing that “[t]he emerging law of climate equity cannot 
and will not by itself bridge the expansive sea between 
climate justice, however we conceive it, and a law that 
remains fundamentally supportive of the pollutive and 
distributive effects of climate change”. It is here that 
human rights might supplement equity, since we have 
reached the point where once speculative harms are now 
palpable, with a growing number of actors standing up 
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In the final essay Bridget Lewis examines the turn from 
intra-generational justice towards intergenerational 
justice: “Given that future generations have not contrib-
uted to greenhouse gas emissions and have no say in how 
we choose to combat global warming, limiting their ability 
to enjoy their human rights and forcing them to deal with 
the consequences of our actions represents intergener-
ational injustice.” But is the human rights framework a 
fitting instrument for this? Theoretically, argues Lewis, 
there are duties that correspond with the consequences 
of our past and current actions that could be expanded 
towards future generations. However, these rights and 
duties of future generations are currently not enshrined 
in international or domestic (human rights) law. Further-
more, one of the more important tools of the human rights 
framework – its claims-based approach – does not fit the 
intergenerational nature of climate change: “The cumula-
tive, transnational and long-term impacts of greenhouse 
gas emissions create challenges for proving that a 
particular state’s conduct has caused a given interfer-
ence with human rights.” While the existing human rights 
framework will struggle with these claims, Lewis outlines 
possible ways forward. Through expanding the scope of 
states’ duties for example, or through expanding rules 
of legal standing on behalf of future persons. A notable 
development is that human rights language and princi-
ples are already being employed, particularly by young 
people. As with Schoemakers’ showcase of burgeoning 
movements, these are developments that have been set in 
motion and will continue to progress, requiring adaptation 
by human rights actors.      
The essays in this volume were written in 2019, before 
the Dutch Supreme Court announced its judgement in the 
matter between The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Climate Policy) and the Stichting 
Urgenda (Urgenda Foundation). 
The views expressed in the contributions that follow are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
positions of Amnesty International, its Dutch section or 
the Strategic Studies Team. The editors wish to thank 
Jeroen Teitler for his editorial assistance. 
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Ashfaq Khalfan & Chiara Liguori *
Amnesty’s approach to climate change  
and human rights 
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developed countries since the industrial revolution, its 
harshest effects are and will be felt mainly by people in 
developing countries. 
In this essay, we will describe the extent of the threat the 
climate crisis poses to human rights. We will then discuss 
key features of states’ obligations under human rights 
law to prevent the situation from getting worse, to help 
those affected and to provide remedy. We will address the 
corporate human rights responsibilities in the context of 
the climate crisis. We will then move from a legal analysis 
to one of strategy. Why should we take a human rights 
lens to climate change? Why should Amnesty itself get 
involved, and if so: how? 
Climate change’s human rights impact
Climate change has made extreme weather events such 
as heatwaves, storms and drought much more likely 
(Carbon brief 2019). It also causes, or contributes to, 
environmental changes that occur gradually over the 
course of a prolonged period of months to years, such 
as desertification, sea level rise, glacial melt and ocean 
acidification (UNFCCC 2012). These effects undermine 
human rights such as the rights to water, food, housing, 
health, adequate standard of living, and life. In 2019, 
cyclones in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe killed 
more than a thousand people, and almost 4 million were 
affected, being displaced and losing access to schools, 
hospitals and sanitation (see Chagutah 2019; OCHA 
2019a). If unchecked, climate change will continue to 
blight the lives of hundreds of millions of people. 
The climate crisis is one of the most critical threats 
to human rights faced by humanity. The human rights 
movement, including Amnesty, has a significant 
contribution to make to the wider climate justice 
movement.
Introduction 
It is a truth not yet universally acknowledged that climate 
change poses a severe threat to human rights. This is 
something Amnesty, and our partners in the human rights 
movement, need to change. Not only that, but we need to 
bring our perspectives, our constituencies and our tools to 
the struggle to protect humanity from the climate crisis, 
to ensure that we come out of this crisis with a world in 
which all parts of humanity can not only survive, but also 
thrive. 
The climate crisis threatens a huge range of human 
rights. It exacerbates inequalities and its effects are 
disproportionately felt by those who are more vulnerable, 
marginalized and/or subject to discrimination. While it 
is mostly caused by the emission of greenhouse gases by 
*  The authors would like to thank Ajay Taheem for his 
research assistance, Iain Byrne, Lucy Graham, Mark Dummett, 
Clare Algar and the editors for their review of this essay, the many 
colleagues from the Amnesty movement, Amnesty’s external 
Reference Group on Climate Change and Human Rights which 
provided inputs on Amnesty’s policy, and  partners in the Human 
Rights and Climate Change Working Group who blazed this trail 
many years before Amnesty and whose insights we have built 
upon. 
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The World Health Organization (WHO) projects that 
climate-caused undernourishment is expected to lead 
to 7.5 million children suffering from stunted growth 
by 2030, rising to 10 million by 2050 (WHO 2014: 80). 
The World Food Programme expects that climate change 
could lead to a 20 per cent increase in global hunger and 
malnutrition by 2050 (WFP 2016: 1). 
A 2°C rise in global temperature would lead to more than 
1 billion people suffering from a severe reduction in water 
resources (IPCC 2014). A temperature rise to 1.5°C – which 
is currently the ‘least worst case’ scenario – would reduce 
this number by half but still leave hundreds of millions 
affected (IPCC 2018a: 179). The WHO predicts that 
climate change is expected to cause 250,000 additional 
deaths per year between 2030 and 2050 due to malaria, 
malnutrition, diarrhoea and heat stress (WHO 2014). 
Climate change disproportionately affects those already 
subject to discrimination including, for example, on the 
basis of gender, class, ethnicity, age, and disability (IPCC 
2014). Women are on average fourteen times more likely 
than men to die or be injured due to a natural disaster 
– although this discrepancy is lower in situations where 
women face lower levels of gender inequalities (UN 
Women 2014). Children bear a disproportionate burden 
of climate-related impacts, for example with 88 per cent 
of the diseases attributable to climate change affecting 
children under the age of five (WHO 2009: 46). Because 
Indigenous peoples heavily rely on the natural environ-
ment for their livelihoods, housing, medicines and cultural 
identity, and because they often live in areas prone to 
climate-related disasters due to a history of expropri-
ation and forced evictions, they are among the groups 
suffering the most from climate impacts (UNHRC 2017). 
People with disabilities have a heightened vulnerability to 
climate disasters compared to people without disabilities 
and their needs and voices are generally neglected in 
disaster risk reduction strategies. For example, a recent 
survey found that almost 80 per cent of people with disa-
bilities wouldn’t be able to evacuate immediately without 
difficulty following a disaster (UN 2018: 15).
Climate change will have clear intergenerational inequi-
ties. Current generations of children and youth, as well 
as future generations will live in a world that is more 
precarious for their rights, and they will bear the costs of 
coping with the damage.  
Climate change will perpetuate the effects of coloni-
alism. In spite of decolonization, the empires (and their 
offshoots) struck back; effectively colonizing much of the 
atmosphere. The USA, UK and Germany have per capita 
greenhouse gas emissions, between 1751 and 2018, that 
are six times or more the global average. Russia, Canada 
and Australia have 4-5 times the global average (Hansen 
& Sato 2016).
As a result of climate change, the economic output of the 
warmest countries has significantly reduced: India’s by 
31 per cent compared to what would have been the likely 
case without climate change. At the same time, some of 
the coldest countries have benefitted, for example Norway 
by a 34 per cent increase in economic output, while the 
figure for the Netherlands is 7.9 per cent (Diffenbaugh & 
Burke 2019). 
The above projections of the impacts on human rights 
are based on an increase of up to 2°C over pre-industrial 
temperatures. It is not the worst-case scenario, nor is it 
even the most likely outcome based on current projec-
tions. Unless there is a rapid phase-out of fossil fuels 
and other sources of greenhouse gas emissions, current 
projected national plans (officially termed ‘Nationally 
Determined Contributions’ under the Paris Agreement), 
even if fully implemented, would put us on a course to 
reach a 2.9 to 3.4°C increase by 2100, and continue to 
rise (WMO 2019). Given that governments often cannot 
be trusted to implement their plans, we may be looking 
at apocalyptic consequences. A world that, for example, 
reaches 4°C warming may make large parts of the world 
uninhabitable, such as the tropics, southern Europe, 
low-lying islands and coastal regions.1 In such a  
1  See e.g. Vince (2019). It must be emphasized that given 
the uncertainties involved, including around potential feedback 
loops, this particular example can only be treated as a possible 
outcome, rather than an accurate prediction. The situation may 
well be better, or much worse.  
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situation, humanity would somehow have to completely 
revise its political, social and economic structures and 
accommodate itself primarily in densely populated cities 
in the relatively small number of countries in temperate 
zones that could sustain life. If it could not, billions of 
people would be facing unbearable conditions, often 
incompatible with life.2   
State obligations
States have three levels of duties relating to climate 
change. First, under international human rights law, 
states have obligations to protect people from harm 
caused by conduct or omissions within their territory or 
jurisdiction, whether committed by state or non-state 
actors, including businesses. The foreseeable adverse 
effects of climate change on the enjoyment of human 
rights give rise to states’ duties to take all reasonable 
steps to the full extent of their abilities to prevent this 
harm (UNHRC 2016). This means that states need to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions within the shortest 
possible time frame both nationally and through interna-
tional cooperation and assistance (CESCR 2018a; OHCHR 
2019a). A failure to do so represents a violation of states’ 
human rights obligations.
The IPCC has shown that it is feasible for states to 
collectively reduce greenhouse gases within thirty years 
to a level that would keep the global temperature to 
no more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (IPCC 
2018b). This requires that greenhouse gas emissions 
are reduced by 45 per cent globally from 2010 levels by 
2030, and to net zero by 2050. It would be unreasonable 
to demand that developing countries make this transition 
at the same pace as developed countries. Thus, developed 
countries, which currently emit approximately one third 
of global emissions and that have greater resources and 
2  Vince (2019) quotes Johan Rockström, director of the 
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research as saying: “It’s 
difficult to see how we could accommodate eight billion people 
or maybe even half of that. There will be a rich minority of people 
who survive with modern lifestyles, no doubt, but it will be a 
turbulent, conflict-ridden world.”
technological capacity,3 should therefore move to zero 
carbon emissions by 2030 or as soon as possible after 
that. This still requires developing countries to reduce 
their emissions by at least one third below 2010 levels by 
2030, and moving to net zero by 2050 – a deeply difficult 
task, for which many will require significant financial 
assistance and technical cooperation. Wealthier coun-
tries are required under their obligations of international 
cooperation (as per Article 2.1 of the ICESCR) to respond 
to developing countries’ requests for assistance to meet 
their own transition targets.4   
Second, all states must also adopt all necessary 
measures to assist affected people in adapting to the 
unavoidable effects of climate change, thus minimizing 
the negative impact on their human rights, as well as 
ensuring remedy for the harms caused. Three distinct 
but overlapping duties apply here: i) states that have 
a greater responsibility for the climate crisis – due to 
their higher than average per capita current and past 
emissions – are jointly responsible for ensuring remedy to 
affected people based on the extent of their contribution 
to this harm;5 ii) wealthier states are also responsible 
for providing assistance to people at risk or already 
affected by climate impacts on the basis of obligations 
of international assistance and cooperation; and iii) all 
states are responsible for the realization of rights of those 
living within their jurisdiction, and thus need to take 
steps to safeguard the rights of affected people, request 
the necessary assistance from other states and demand 
remedy from those most responsible.    
Third, respect for and protection and fulfilment of human 
rights must be central in the design and implementa-
3  Center for Global Development (2015)
4  For an elaboration of the legal basis for such obligations, see 
de Schutter et al. (2012).
5  The International Law Commission Articles on State 
Responsibility state that where several states separately carry 
out internationally wrongful conduct that contributes to causing 
the same damage – such as where several states contribute 
to polluting a river by the separate discharge of pollutants – 
“the responsibility of each participating State is determined 
individually, on the basis of its own conduct and by reference to 
its own international obligations” (ILC 2001: 125).
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such information and efforts public and to remedy human 
rights infringements and abuses.6 Such responsibilities 
extend to human rights harms resulting from climate 
change. One implication is that businesses are required 
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to the greatest 
extent feasible. In particular energy producers and 
providers must expeditiously phase out the use of fossil 
fuels in favour of clean energy produced in a manner 
consistent with human rights. Financial institutions 
should phase out investment in fossil fuel activities. 
Companies must also refrain from other human rights 
abuses linked to their operations, such as the use of child 
labour in supply chains for materials required for the 
production of rechargeable batteries needed for electric 
vehicles or energy storage (Amnesty International 2016). 
Why should we take a human rights lens?
A not entirely unreasonable question is what is the 
practical utility of taking a human rights lens to climate? 
Should we not just push for full implementation of 
international climate and environmental law, which more 
explicitly addresses climate issues than human rights 
law? Given the fact that many states already pay no more 
than lip service to their human rights obligations, is it 
really effective to link these with climate action?
We argue that there are at least three broad benefits of 
adopting a human rights lens. The first is to add numbers 
and pressure to the existing climate justice movement. 
Solving the climate crisis requires radical state action in 
a two- to five-year timeframe whilst overcoming one of the 
most deep-pocketed and powerful lobbies – the fossil fuel 
industry. It needs the world’s most powerful and diverse 
people’s mass movement ever assembled. Many people 
are deeply committed to values such as dignity, equality 
and justice for all, and a subset of such people specifi-
cally identify with human rights as the value system and 
vocabulary for such values. The climate crisis threatens 
these values, and indeed threatens to reverse many of the 
human rights gains of the last century. It makes a differ-
6  United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, Principles 22 and 31.
tion of all policies and measures aimed at addressing 
climate change. In particular, states must ensure that 
measures intended to protect people from the effects 
of climate change do not result in the violation of other 
human rights. They must avoid using the response to 
climate change to justify violations of human rights. And 
they must also ensure that the transition towards more 
resilient and zero-carbon societies safeguards the rights 
of affected workers and communities and is an opportu-
nity to correct existing imbalances in terms of enjoyment 
of and access to rights. For example, forest conservation 
projects must contribute to strengthening the rights of 
Indigenous peoples, not result in the eviction of forest 
dwellers from their ancestral land (Amnesty International 
2018). Carbon taxes must reduce inequalities rather than 
deepen them, thus putting the burden primarily on fossil 
fuel corporations and wealthier consumers whilst protect-
ing the access of low-income groups to affordable energy 
(Naidoo 2018; Amnesty International Canada 2019).
These examples also illustrate the importance for states 
to respect and facilitate the rights to information and 
participation in decision-making of all affected people, 
as well as their right to access effective remedies for 
human rights abuses. Ensuring that climate decisions 
are taken with the full and meaningful participation of all 
concerned people, and particularly those most affected 
by climate impacts or by proposed climate mitigation 
measures, will lead to more effective and ambitious 
action that responds directly to the needs and demands of 
those affected. 
Corporate responsibilities
States have an obligation to protect all persons against 
human rights harms caused by third parties, including 
businesses. States must adopt and enforce regulations 
on companies, do so without undue interference from 
corporate actors and ensure that corporations respect 
them. Alongside that, businesses themselves are also 
duty-bearers with a responsibility to respect human 
rights. These include extensive responsibilities to assess 
the impact of their activities on human rights, to put 
measures in place to prevent negative impacts, to make 
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address climate change, and have a wide range of options 
for doing so, human rights law helps in shaping ambi-
tious and effective policies by setting certain boundaries 
and minimum floors for these actions. 
Human rights law also helps to keep the main focus on 
governments and corporations, rather than on individual 
consumers. This, we argue, is beneficial. While individ-
uals obviously have moral and personal responsibilities 
to reduce their carbon footprint, it would be naïve and 
inequitable to put the burden mainly on them. Rather, 
those who have the power to design the systems we live 
in, to allocate public resources and to design regulations, 
should be held to account for their conduct, rather than 
individuals who often have limited control over how they 
can live their lives in a way that does not harm others, 
particularly if they are disadvantaged. 
The most important human rights perspective in this 
context is to help shape the content of climate action. 
As noted above under ‘State obligations’, climate action 
without attention to human rights has the potential to 
cause significant harm. By taking into account human 
rights values such as public participation, accounta-
bility, equality and non-discrimination, climate action is 
more likely to get buy in from the public and be effective, 
than if it takes a purely emissions-reduction focused 
approach. Human rights will also become increasingly 
important as a counterpoint to policy approaches and 
political narratives that use the threat of climate change 
as a justification to violate civil and political rights, such 
as freedom of expression and association, or adopt even 
more restrictive policies against particularly vulnerable 
groups such as refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers.
As the window of opportunity to limit even more cata-
strophic levels of global heating narrows with every 
passing day, it is possible that states will resort to 
desperate measures that could result in violations of 
human rights (UNHRC 2019: 65-66). In so doing, they 
could adopt the view that violating some people’s rights, 
for example those of Indigenous peoples to clear land for 
carbon removal projects, is a lesser evil that is justi-
fied for the greater good and grounded in the need for 
ence to some that government failures are characterized 
as human rights violations rather than simply bad policy 
or poor environmental stewardship, and it helps show who 
the villains and victims are. Therefore, to advocate on 
the basis of human rights – as opposed to environmental 
protection – and emphasizing the impact on people itself 
helps humanize the problem and motivate a segment of 
society to engage more deeply in climate activism. This 
may motivate some decision-makers to adopt decisions 
in favour of human rights consistent climate action, 
either due to the intrinsic argument we are making, or by 
showing that climate action has broad support in society, 
not just among environmentalists. 
Second, human rights perspectives can provide additional 
arguments to strengthen the climate justice struggle.7 
International human rights law provides more extensive 
legally binding obligations than environmental law, 
obligations that can be used to demand effective climate 
change policies and measures. For example, international 
environmental law does not oblige states to take any 
particular steps to substantively reduce emissions. Under 
the Paris Agreement, states determine themselves the 
extent of their commitment to reduce climate change by a 
particular amount. In contrast, as discussed under ‘State 
obligations’ above, under human rights law, states are 
required to take all feasible steps within their available 
capacity to reduce emissions, help people to adapt to 
climate change and ensure remedy for violations. Inter-
national human rights law thus, properly interpreted and 
applied, places reasonable boundaries on the margin that 
states have for discretion on issues ranging from emis-
sions reductions to paying for the losses and damages 
that people and countries suffer due to climate-related 
impacts.8 In other words, while states, and their voters 
(if they listen to them) can broadly determine how they 
7  The Climate Justice Syllabus, a project endorsed by the 
Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice, defines climate 
justice as the recognition that climate change is not only a 
question of emissions reductions and our physical environment, 
but also a political issue, an ethical issue, and a social issue (see 
https://demandclimatejustice.org/). 
8  For further information on loss and damage from a human 
rights perspective, see Amnesty International (2019a).
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ized countries that have benefitted economically for over a 
century from growing emissions - while suffering far less 
from its ill-effects – should not be content to be global 
freeloaders, with the costs borne by people in poorer 
countries. Rather, people living in such countries should 
insist that their governments act with decency and honour 
in doing the right thing for people elsewhere (Amnesty 
International 2019b).  
The third benefit of adopting a human rights lens is the 
range of human rights tools at our disposal, including 
litigation, supranational and domestic scrutiny by 
human rights bodies and monitoring through the use of 
rights-compliant indicators and benchmarks. Human 
rights accountability and remedy mechanisms are 
stronger than those available under environmental law, 
both with regard to procedural and substantive rights. 
For example, global and regional human rights mecha-
nisms provide for assessment of individual and/or group 
complaints and regular periodic review by independent 
treaty monitoring bodies, whereas most environmental 
treaty bodies do not. Human rights bodies have increas-
ingly been addressing climate change as a human rights 
issue.10 Relatedly, the human rights movement, often 
working with other disciplines such as scientists and 
economists, excels at determining whether state actors 
are responsible for particular forms of misconduct and 
what they need to do to make amends.
What is the relative weight of these three contributions? 
We posed this question in an audience survey at the 
Peoples’ Summit on Climate, Rights and Human Survival 
in September 2019, which brought together over 200 
activists from a range of regions and backgrounds. 23 
per cent of those responding selected ‘Numbers and 
pressure’, 47 per cent selected ‘Human rights perspec-
tives’ and 30 per cent selected ‘Human rights tools’. Time 
will tell as to who was right, but strategies that employ 
aspects of all three are likely to be more successful. 
Amnesty’s experience of working on human rights for 
nearly six decades has demonstrated that strong research 
10  For an overview of UN human rights treaty body statements 
on climate change, see CIEL & GI-ESCR (2019).
fast action. However, Amnesty opposes such utilitarian 
approaches based on the clear international law position 
that reducing emissions can and must happen in full 
compliance with human rights standards. While rapid 
emissions reductions will certainly require restrictions 
in some lifestyle areas and consumption, significant 
inconvenience and major policy shifts, such steps can be 
implemented in ways that impose burdens primarily on 
corporations and higher-income groups whilst restricting 
activities that are not essential for the realization of 
human rights. Similarly, governments can and must carry 
out emissions reductions in a way that ensures everyone 
has access to a reliable and sufficient supply of energy to 
realize their human rights. 
It should be recognized that many states, despite having 
become party to the relevant human rights treaties, will 
contest that these legal obligations apply to the climate 
crisis, or even in some cases exist at all. In these cases 
simply citing these obligations will not be sufficient. 
Sustained, patient pressure and coalition-building will 
be required. However, the fact that there is a strong legal 
basis for these demands is useful for advocacy purposes. 
It helps civil society groups align their advocacy across 
coalitions and indeed is a tool to ensure that we are 
consistent and principled in our advocacy, and therefore 
more credible and persuasive. A critical example is the 
Declaration of the Peoples’ Summit on Climate, Rights 
and Human Survival, which was signed by over 400 
organisations around the world representing diverse 
environmental, women’s rights, Indigenous, trade union, 
social justice and other human rights causes.9
Clearly, asserting legal claims alone would be foolhardy 
– much of the battle will be in the court of public opinion. 
But the moral underpinnings of these legal standards can 
be of great help in winning this battle. It is an intuitive 
argument to say that states should not harm people, both 
within and outside their borders. Nor should they allow 
companies under their regulation to do the same. Simi-
larly, it is a compelling argument that wealthy industrial-
9 For more information on the Declaration see https://www.
climaterights4all.com/
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one or more key policy changes related to climate miti-
gation together with a just and human rights-consistent 
transition. In so doing, our decision-making will be guided 
by an assessment of the most critical relevant issues in 
the country, and of where Amnesty is best placed to make 
a contribution as part of the wider climate movement. 
Such policy changes should be on issues where it is clear 
that lack of political will (rather than scientific or tech-
nical uncertainty) is the issue. Advocacy in developing 
countries will include demands on emissions reductions 
and just transition but will also focus on pushing the 
leaders to demand more concrete action and support from 
wealthy industrialized countries for mitigation, adaptation 
and address loss and damage. Amnesty has also engaged 
in international standard setting, for example through 
engaging in advocacy with others for the inclusion of 
human rights language into the Paris Agreement and for 
stronger human rights standards. It continues to advo-
cate for urgent, effective and human rights-consistent 
climate action at international decision-making forums 
on climate.  
Second, Amnesty will expose corporations which are 
fuelling the climate crisis, mobilize action to stop them 
and call on them to phase out fossil fuels. Amnesty will 
also continue to call for companies to ensure that the 
transition to clean energy is undertaken in a just fashion. 
In March 2019 Amnesty launched an Ethical Battery 
Campaign (Amnesty International 2019c). This campaign 
challenges industry leaders to ensure that the shift to 
green energy – which relies on batteries – does not cause 
or contribute to human rights abuses or environmental 
harm.11 The campaign aims for governments to legally 
require electric vehicle companies and battery manufac-
turers to produce an ethical battery by 2024, which does 
not harm human rights or the environment.
Third, Amnesty has started to mobilize its own supporters 
and people interested in human rights and sharing 
11  For example, companies must phase out any use of fossil 
fuels to produce batteries and must refrain from the use of 
child labour in the supply chain for materials required for the 
production of batteries. See Amnesty International (2016).
grounded in solid legal arguments and linked to effective 
campaigning, mobilization, litigation and advocacy can 
make a real difference.     
Why is Amnesty getting involved and how so?
In September 2019, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Michelle Bachelet warned the UN Human Rights 
Council that climate change is the greatest ever threat to 
human rights. Earlier in the year, the UN Special Rappor-
teur on human rights and extreme poverty had challenged 
the human rights community, including NGOs, to take 
much more bold and innovative steps to face the extraor-
dinary challenge of the climate crisis (UNHRC 2019).
Amnesty International, as the largest global human rights 
organization, with a supporter base of 8 million people 
and a presence in over 70 countries, including increas-
ingly in the Global South, must respond to this challenge. 
Since 2015 Amnesty has been escalating its level of 
engagement to work on the climate crisis, and it is now 
ready to fully throw its weight in support of the climate 
justice movement.
Amnesty’s strategy on climate change and environmental 
degradation, requested by the organization’s main  
decision-making forum in 2017 and adopted in April 
2019, is based on a theory of change that focuses on na-
tional strategies to pressure governments to uphold their 
obligations, weaken the power of the fossil fuel industry, 
defend the right to peaceful protest and participation, 
and support a just transition to a new energy economy 
that protects human rights and leaves no one behind.
As a result, Amnesty is working to achieve four main 
objectives. First, it has commenced work to pressure 
national governments, through research, campaigning, 
litigation and advocacy, to reduce emissions in a fast 
and fair (i.e. human rights consistent) way. In particular, 
Amnesty is planning to escalate the pressure on wealthy 
industrialized countries which bear most responsibility for 
the climate crisis and have the most available resources 
to address it. In some of these countries and in partner-
ship with other groups, Amnesty will identify and demand 
Changing perspectives on human rights
Climate Change, Justice and Human Rights
Amnesty’s approach to climate change  and human rights
20
Conclusions 
The climate crisis is one of the most critical threats 
to human rights faced by humanity. The human rights 
movement, including Amnesty, has a significant contri-
bution to make to the wider climate justice movement. 
Simply framing the crisis as a human rights crisis will 
by itself make only a modest difference. However, with 
determination, sound strategy and humility we can use 
our strengths to support and be guided by those who are 
at the front line of the climate crisis, and who have been 
leading the struggle for climate justice for a long time. We 
can add numbers and pressure for action, use additional 
tools and share important perspectives that can help 
build the case for fast but fair action to reduce emissions 
in a manner to that protects the human rights of all.
similar values, and encouraged human rights groups that 
have not engaged in-depth in climate change to join the 
struggle for climate justice. It has mobilized its members 
to participate in key global moments for action, such as 
during the youth strikes or climate protests around major 
international events. It is also mobilizing, campaigning, 
producing human rights-focused outputs, as well as 
human rights education tools, to illustrate the link 
between the climate crisis and human rights to a wider 
public. These will amplify the stories of individuals and 
communities affected by the climate crisis and who are 
driving the battle for climate justice.
Finally, Amnesty will continue to support human rights 
defenders and communities to campaign for a safe 
climate and participate in relevant decision-making 
processes. Building on its work on human rights 
defenders in general, and environmental human rights 
defenders in particular, Amnesty will enhance its work 
in support of all those taking non-violent direct action, 
including civil disobedience, against the climate crisis. 
These include community and grassroots groups, young 
people, Indigenous peoples, minority communities and 
communities discriminated on the basis of work and 
descent. Amnesty will actively stand with them in national 
and international level initiatives, and support them when 
they are criminalized, attacked and publicly smeared.
There is certainly an open question as to what tactics to 
use – are our traditional forms of research, advocacy and 
campaigning sufficient? At the Peoples Summit referred to 
above, an audience survey of participants asked what the 
most important tactics on climate ambition were. These 
were the results from the options provided: 1). Changing 
public opinion (25%); 2). Civil disobedience (19%); 
3). Litigation (17%); 4). Divestment (14%); 5). Mass 
demonstrations (9%); 6) Consumer boycotts (9%); or 7) 
something else (7%). The first, third and fifth are estab-
lished methods for Amnesty, whereas the second is much 
rarer, and the sixth not something Amnesty has ever done. 
We will have to discuss whether our existing methods are 
sufficient, and maybe to deepen them, or whether we are 
well placed to consider new tactics to have more impact.
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Climate change and human rights
change, in fact human rights are more hotly contested 
than climate policy is, and so a human rights approach 
could very well undermine the delicate near-consensus 
on climate policy that it has taken decades to cobble 
together.
The current approach to climate policy
What is that near-consensus on climate policy? The 
current approach to climate change follows a pattern that 
states have used before to negotiate international treaties 
that address environmental challenges. The approach 
can be broken into two stages. In the first stage, states 
learn that an activity that takes place on the territory of 
multiple states (or sometimes in other areas, such as on 
the high seas) causes cross-border harms that cannot 
be fully addressed through national policy. Those harms 
include harms to life, health, and property, and often to 
wildernesses and other natural resources. While a state 
may be able to pass laws that limit the harms caused by 
the activity – pollution, for example – they are reluctant 
to do so because unilateral state regulation imposes 
costs on citizens, while producing benefits that are partly 
enjoyed by foreigners in other countries. In the second 
stage, states negotiate a treaty with other states. The 
treaty imposes obligations on all the states, requiring 
each state to absorb a share of the costs of resolving the 
environmental problem in a mutually acceptable way. The 
most successful example is the Montreal Protocol of 1987, 
an international agreement that led to the reduction of 
emissions that damaged the ozone layer.
The climate change problem has in recent years been 
described as a ‘human rights’ problem rather than simply 
an environmental disaster that threatens humanity. 
However, the human rights perspective contributes little 
to the challenge of combatting climate change, and is 
more likely to cause harm by complicating negotiations 
and provoking a backlash from states that are sensitive 
about human rights claims.
Introduction
Climate change is one of the most difficult challenges 
ever faced by humanity. Yet the world has converged 
on an approach to tackling this problem, and the only 
question is one of mustering the political will. The 
approach is, by now, well known: it involves countries 
committing to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
through international agreements, based on scientific and 
economic estimates of the likely costs of mitigation and 
the benefits from slowing the climatic changes that have 
already begun to plague us. The approach has not, so far, 
relied on human rights law or norms, at least not in any 
recognizable sense. But in recent years, some people have 
argued that climate change is a human rights problem, 
and that any solution must be based on human rights 
principles. Unfortunately, a ‘human rights approach’ to 
climate change, while well-intentioned, is not grounded 
in the law, and is more likely to distract from the effort to 
combat climate change than advance it. Ironically, while 
human rights advocates insist that human rights are 
universally recognized and provide a bedrock normative 
commitment that demands action to mitigate climate 
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For all the complexities, climate change and the interna-
tional efforts to address it have fit this pattern. National- 
level regulation alone will not suffice because of a free-
rider problem: the country that issues climate regulations 
bears all the costs of the regulation and shares the 
benefits with the rest of the world. And such regulations 
may simply shift carbon-emitting industries to foreign 
countries, with the result that global carbon emissions 
remain unaffected. Thus, it was recognized early on that 
international cooperation was necessary, and a series of 
international agreements, culminating in the Paris Agree-
ment, moved the world incrementally in that direction. 
The unusual level of difficulty in reaching international 
agreements reflects the special features of the climate 
change problem, including the high level of uncertainty 
about the amount of harm that climate change will cause; 
the variation in the level of likely harm across countries, 
and hence in the strength of the interests of different 
countries in addressing the problem; the very long time 
horizon; and the high cost of climate mitigation efforts 
because of the ubiquitous role that fossil fuels play in the 
economy of every country. Nonetheless, the international 
consensus seems to be that a framework successfully 
used for the ozone problem – in other words, policy anal-
ysis and international bargaining – should be used for 
climate change as well.
Climate policy and human rights
Against this backdrop, what exactly does the human 
rights perspective add? A survey of recent publications  
– by organizations, commentators, and advocates –  
provides little clarity.1 Below I describe some of the 
claims, suggestions, or implications that I have gleaned 
from this literature. I conclude that the human rights 
perspective contributes little to the challenge of combat-
ting climate change, and is more likely to cause harm by 
complicating negotiations and provoking a backlash from 
states that are sensitive about human rights claims.
1  See, e.g., Amnesty International (2019d); OHCHR (2015); 
UNEP (2015); Knox (2009a).
Two points can be made about this model for addressing 
international environmental harms. First, the interna-
tional effort to reach a treaty is rooted in a prior under-
standing among states that it is in their national interest 
to mitigate the environmental harms. States understand 
their national interests in different ways, but, as a very 
rough approximation, most governments perform either 
a formal or rough cost-benefit analysis, in which they 
compare the benefits from, and costs of, reducing the 
harm. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, states realized 
that as the ozone layer dissipated, the incidence of skin 
cancer and other harms would rise. Yet many industrial 
and other activities emitted ozone-depleting substances, 
and the cost of replacing them would be high. Weighing 
the costs and benefits, countries – initially, and primarily, 
the United States – realized that their citizens would be 
better off if measures were taken to preserve the ozone 
layer. This type of cost-benefit analysis, sometimes called 
‘policy analysis’, takes seriously the well-being of citizens, 
including their interests in environmental quality, health, 
and the goods supplied by the economy.
Second, the treaty itself is the product of bargaining. 
States enter treaty negotiations with a mutual interest in 
mitigating the environmental harm, but a desire to shift 
as much of the burden as possible on other countries. The 
outcome of bargaining will normally reflect the bargaining 
power of states, which may mean that the distribution of 
the ‘surplus’ generated by the treaty (the benefits minus 
the costs) will not necessarily satisfy general notions of 
fairness. The states with the most bargaining power are 
typically (though not always) the wealthiest and most 
powerful states – those on which other states rely. Thus, 
the treaty may not require wealthy states, and even states 
that are responsible for the problem in the first place, to 
comply with ideals of redistributive or corrective justice. 
To be sure, not all treaties are unfair. These ideals might 
play a role in negotiations, and sometimes poor states 
will receive transfers or technical assistance because 
they lack the capacity to comply with the treaty on their 
own. But there is clearly a tension between those ideals, 
which are also reflected in human rights norms, and 
the outcomes that can be expected from great-power 
bargaining.
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international cooperation on climate mitigation respect 
democratic norms of consultation among all ‘stakeholders’ 
– another human rights norm that policy analysis, which is 
resolutely technocratic, usually disregards.
Third, human rights could be a vehicle for legal change. 
Most countries have ratified most of the human rights 
treaties, and many countries have submitted to the 
jurisdiction of international legal institutions that monitor 
or enforce their compliance with those treaties. National 
courts and other national institutions also may implement 
international human rights commitments. If the failure to 
mitigate climate change violates human rights, then vic-
tims of climate change may appeal to these legal bodies, 
which in turn may compel governments to take action.
Problems with the human rights approach  
to climate policy
There are problems that are specific to each of these ap-
proaches, and there are problems common to all of them. 
Let me start with the first. While it may seem harmless to 
redescribe the climate change problem so that it is a ‘hu-
man rights’ problem rather than simply an environmental 
disaster that threatens humanity, the truth is the opposite. 
Once the scientific uncertainties are surmounted, everyone 
understands that rising sea levels, the spread of pests, 
melting glaciers, and all the other environmental harms 
caused by climate change spell significant trouble and call 
for international cooperation toward a remedy. By contrast, 
the moment that the term ‘human rights’ is invoked, a 
large number of countries are immediately put on guard 
against threats to their sovereignty. Above all, the two 
countries with the biggest economies in the world – the 
United States and China – have made no secret of their 
opposition to human rights obligations that might compel 
them to act against their perceived interests. Without the 
participation of these two countries, an adequate response 
to climate change is not possible.
These countries, and others like them, will not only resist 
the use of human rights language, but, more practically, 
they will worry that if a climate treaty is seen as a vindi-
cation of human rights, or an implementation of human 
First, one might think of the human rights approach as  
no more than a redescription of the existing approach 
to the climate change problem. The policy analysis or 
cost-benefit approach overlaps with the human rights 
perspective in several respects, and so one might see 
the human rights perspective as one that simply recasts 
policy analysis in more vivid or normatively appealing 
terms. In policy analysis, especially as used in interna-
tional relations, human beings are given equal moral 
weight regardless of nationality, status, and wealth. 
These are the core elements of the traditional human 
rights approach as well. Thus, to the extent of this 
overlap, we might understand human rights advocates  
as pointing out that if states cannot agree on an inter-
national programme of climate mitigation, they have 
betrayed their commitments to human rights as well as 
to the ‘national interest’, understood as a more generic 
commitment to the well-being of their citizens. On this 
view, the advantage of the human rights approach is that 
it addresses people who care about human rights and 
directs their attention to climate change, enabling human 
rights organizations to mobilize their members to bring 
pressure on government bodies.
Second, one might see the human rights perspective as 
a way to assert the claims of poorer, more vulnerable, or 
powerless populations. This assertion is the major thrust of 
a document issued by the Office of the High Commissioner 
of Human Rights (OHCHR), which recommends: “Mitigation 
and adaptation efforts that place people at the centre, are 
gender sensitive, and ensure the rights of persons, groups 
and peoples in vulnerable situations, including women, 
children, indigenous peoples and the poor” (OHCHR 2015: 
23). Elsewhere, it argues that: “Equity in climate action 
requires that efforts to mitigate and adapt to the impacts 
of climate change should benefit people in developing 
countries, indigenous peoples, people in vulnerable 
situations, and future generations” (OHCHR  2015: 3-4). 
The OHCHR’s approach thus departs from standard policy 
analysis in two respects. It advocates redistribution of 
wealth from rich to poor and to other vulnerable groups – 
which is normally left out of policy analysis – and from de-
veloped countries to developing countries. The OHCHR and 
other human rights organizations have also insisted that 
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more or less, from the political rights recognized in 
human rights treaties. However, the Chinese government 
is not going to consult the Uighurs who it has placed in 
concentration camps, nor any of its other citizens, for that 
matter, outside the party elite. Nor are other authoritarian 
countries, or the many imperfect democracies that are 
actually controlled by an oligarchic elite. On the other 
side of the problem, human rights organizations need to 
figure out how to reconcile the demand for consultation 
with the fact that many ordinary people do not believe 
that anthropogenic climate change is happening, or is 
a problem, or is best addressed through the elimination 
of fossil fuels; or are hostile to international cooperation 
on principle, or do not trust foreigners.4 Here again, the 
human rights organizations may need to make a choice, or 
at least recognize that there is a choice – about whether 
we should give priority to climate mitigation or human 
rights – rather than pretend that the different areas of 
international cooperation are actually the same.
These tensions create challenges for the ‘name-and-
shame’ approach made famous by Amnesty International, 
which, like the OHCHR, argues that states violate human 
rights both by failing to address climate change and by 
addressing climate change in the wrong way. Amnesty 
International is no doubt correct when it argues that 
“conservation areas or renewable energy projects must 
not be created on the lands of Indigenous peoples without 
consulting them and getting their consent” (Amnesty 
International 2019d). But then Amnesty International 
needs to decide who to shame – the government that does 
nothing about climate change or the government that, in 
its eagerness to address climate change, runs roughshod 
over the rights of indigenous peoples. Of course, it could 
try to do both but there seems to be a practical limit on 
how much naming-and-shaming can be done before it 
loses its effectiveness.
4  While this problem might seem specific to the United States, 
public opinion polls suggest a great deal of climate change 
scepticism around the world – suggesting that democracy might 
be more of a problem for climate mitigation than we would like to 
think. For data on global attitudes on climate change, see Lee et 
al. (2015).
rights commitments, then claims based on those under-
lying human rights will be more difficult to resist. China 
will not make concessions to human rights claims that 
threaten the authoritarian structure of the government, 
the suppression of political and religious freedom, and 
the massive repression of Muslim and ethnic minorities. 
For the United States, there is a deep and apparently 
unshakeable hostility to human rights commitments that 
are seen as threats to the country’s political autonomy. 
Contrary to the claims of human rights advocates, the 
nature and content of human rights are controversial 
– indeed, more controversial, it seems to me, than the 
argument that the world should cooperate to mitigate 
climate change, putting aside the declining minority of 
people who deny that climate change has occurred.2
If all this is true, then the OHCHR’s attempt to leverage 
human rights on behalf of developing countries and 
vulnerable populations threatens the success of climate 
mitigation efforts. The argument that rich countries have 
a moral obligation to help poor countries has been made 
before, and it has never gained traction. The argument 
that rich countries have a moral obligation to carry a 
greater climate mitigation burden relies on numerous 
contestable philosophical premises that are unlikely 
to sway the voters who will need to be convinced.3 The 
OHCHR’s approach effectively takes the difficult but 
manageable problem of international cooperation toward 
climate mitigation and converts it into an impossible, 
never-before-tried programme of redistributing wealth 
across the globe and across generations, all at the 
expense of the countries whose participation is most 
essential, and who have never shown themselves to be 
notably generous. It is hard to imagine a more certain way 
to bring climate cooperation to a halt.
The same point can be made about the OHCHR’s insist-
ence that international cooperation on climate litigation 
respect norms of consultation, which can be derived, 
2  For an interesting effort to put climate change in terms of 
“human security” rather than human rights for just this reason, 
see Adger et al. (2014).
3  For a discussion, see Posner & Weisbach (2010).
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this approach, does no more than restate the premise of 
policy analysis while getting us no closer to a solution.
Second, the legal institutions responsive to human rights 
arguments are too weak to provide any traction against 
climate change. Even at the best of times, international 
legal institutions are unable to coerce, shame, or in any 
other way influence the behavior of countries, except at 
the margins. And, with a new populist-nationalist fervour 
raging across the world, now is hardly the best of times. 
The International Court of Justice rarely has mustered 
the courage to pressure countries to comply with human 
rights; but in any event, most great powers refuse to 
submit to its jurisdiction. The various human rights 
committees, offices, and organizations established by 
the treaty regime are also frequently ineffective. Further, 
having no authority, relevant expertise, or legitimacy for 
directing climate policy, these organizations would be 
unable to influence governments if they tried to.
In many countries, domestic courts also sometimes 
enforce international human rights law (or regional or 
domestic law that overlaps with it). But their record is 
spotty, and in any event, it is hard to see what could 
be accomplished if courts were persuaded that climate 
change is a problem for human rights. Domestic courts 
rarely dictate policy outcomes, and in the handful of 
cases where courts have recognized positive rights, they 
have mostly urged the government to take action rather 
than issuing compulsory orders requiring the government 
to change its policies. National institutions in most coun-
tries already recognize that climate change is a challenge 
that should be addressed through international coopera-
tion and domestic policy. The problem is one of achieving 
international cooperation, which domestic courts are in a 
poor position to solve.
Third, it is not even clear that a human rights approach,  
grounded in existing legal instruments, would require 
states to make climate mitigation a priority. As the OHCHR 
acknowledges, “The rights of children are protected by 
the CRC [Convention on the Rights of the Child] but the 
rights of future generations (in the sense of generations 
yet unborn) are not formally recognised in this or other 
One might argue, at least, that human rights law could 
help push forward climate change mitigation. If states 
are obligated to comply with human rights law, and the 
failure to mitigate climate change results in human rights 
violations, then it seems that we could advance climate 
change mitigation by reminding states of their human 
rights obligations or compelling them to comply with 
them. Individuals and organizations may also be able to 
file complaints with domestic and international courts, 
regulatory bodies, and other forums – and even if they 
do not obtain remedies, these activities will further bring 
attention to climate change and mobilize political support 
for climate change mitigation.
There are several problems with this argument. First, the 
connection between human rights law and the climate 
problem is far from obvious. There is no recognized 
human right to an atmosphere free of carbon emissions, 
thus the human rights argument must be that carbon 
emissions result in human rights violations – for example, 
by resulting in avoidable deaths and other harms. Even 
more creative arguments are possible:
“According to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, ‘everyone has the right to education.’ Article 13 
of the ICESCR elaborates upon this right, guaranteeing 
to all persons, free, compulsory primary education and 
calling on States to progressively realize free secondary 
education for all. However, the impacts of climate 
change and the exigencies which it creates threaten the 
ability of States to expend maximum available resources 
for the progressive realization of the right to education 
and can press children into the labour pool prema-
turely.” (OHCHR 2015: 19)
But no court, government, or other legal authority would 
accept such an argument, as it implies that all govern-
ment resource decisions – all decisions to spend money 
on X rather than Y – are limited by international treaties, 
since spending money on X could always mean failure to 
spend money on education, health care, old-age pensions, 
and all the other rights guaranteed by the treaties. If the 
failure of governments to curb carbon emissions violate 
human rights in this way, then so do all failures to curb 
all forms of serious pollution. Human rights thinking, on 
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major human rights instruments” (OHCHR 2015: 24). 
Never mind; the OHCHR insists that a climate treaty is 
required by ‘intergenerational equity’ without explaining 
what intergenerational equity requires or how it can be 
derived from human rights law. Under existing law, there 
is no basis for criticizing a country that says it will refuse 
to take climate mitigation efforts because, inspired by the 
CRC, it needs to spend money to save the lives of existing 
children instead of the non-lives of not-yet existing 
children.
A way forward
But this last point does suggest a way that human rights 
law could be of use in the coming battle with climate 
change. From time to time, a government might be 
tempted to engage in human rights abuses in the course 
of responding to the challenges posed by climate change. 
The most obvious danger on the horizon is the coerced 
transfer of populations from low-lying areas to higher 
ground, or to make way for massive new green-energy 
projects or untried geoengineering schemes. China’s 
Three Gorges Dam provides a cautionary tale. While not 
motivated by climate mitigation, the dam is the type 
of project that a world bent on eliminating reliance on 
fossil fuels might undertake in increasing numbers. The 
dam project displaced more than a million people and 
caused significant harm to the environment – raising 
protests from human rights organizations (Human Rights 
Watch 1995). Amnesty International might have had this 
concern in mind when it invoked the rights of indigenous 
peoples: once states commit to climate mitigation, the 
natural constituency of the human rights organizations 
will comprise vulnerable individuals whose rights may be 
steamrolled by a panicking or over-aggressive government 
rather than the vast majority for whose benefit the climate 
mitigation projects are undertaken. As an early warning 
system for drawing the world’s attention to climate miti-
gation projects that go too far, human rights might play 
a role. That is not the role that its advocates have called 
for, but it seems like a role that the human rights regime 
might be able to play.
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Jane McAdam & Sanjula Weerasinghe * 
Climate change and human movement
These corrective statements highlight the complexity of 
movement linked to climate change, and why evidence-
based research is critical. This essay discusses the 
evidence and available tools to address human move-
ment related to the adverse effects of climate change. In 
doing so, it offers insights into associated human rights 
implications. While human rights actors have recognized 
the immediate and longer-term implications of climate 
change on the enjoyment of human rights as a key 
challenge, including in the context of human movement, 
there is scope for a deeper engagement in order to foster 
rights-based policies and practical solutions. 
Types and magnitude of human movement 
The adverse effects of climate change are already 
influencing people’s options and decisions on movement. 
They may contribute to displacement (forced movement), 
migration (voluntary movement) and decisions to relocate 
as households or communities (which can be forced or 
voluntary, depending on the circumstances).1 
*  The authors would like to thank the Research Council of 
Norway (Project No 235638) for supporting this work.
1  ‘Relocation’ here refers to a planned process in which 
people voluntarily move, or are forced to move, away from their 
homes or places of temporary residence, are settled in a new 
location within their own or another state, and are provided with 
the conditions for rebuilding their lives. Planned relocation is 
carried out under the authority of the state, and is undertaken to 
protect persons from risks and impacts related to disasters and 
environmental change in the context of sea level rise. This has 
been adapted from Brookings Institution et al. (2015).
This essay discusses the evidence and available tools to 
address human movement linked to the adverse effects of 
climate change. In doing so, it offers insights into associ-
ated human rights implications. While human rights actors 
have recognized the immediate and longer-term implica-
tions of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights 
as a key challenge, including in the context of human 
movement, there is scope for a deeper engagement in order 
to foster rights-based policies and practical solutions. 
Introduction 
In public discourse and narratives on climate change and 
human movement, misconceptions abound. Correcting 
these is essential if suitable legal and policy frameworks 
are to be developed. At the outset, the following baselines 
need to be appreciated. First, climate change does not 
on its own cause the movement of people, but rather 
interacts with (and exacerbates) existing triggers. In 
particular, climate change impacts on the frequency and/
or severity of certain disasters, such as extreme weather 
events. Secondly, most movement associated with climate 
change occurs within countries, not across international 
borders. When cross-border movement does occur, people 
will generally remain within their own region. Thirdly, the 
term ‘climate refugee’ is legally flawed, although refugee 
law may have some relevance when people are displaced. 
Fourthly, long before island nations are inundated by 
rising seas, depleted water resources will render them 
uninhabitable. Finally, many people may need assistance 
to move, and some may not move at all – whether by 
choice or inability. 
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disaster-related deaths occurred in the top 30 countries 
listed in the Fragile States Index (Peters & Budimir 2016). 
IDMC’s 2018 data also explain an overlap of conflict and 
disasters which displaced people in a number of countries 
such as Afghanistan, Nigeria and Somalia (IDMC 2019a). 
These dynamics underline another important factor: 
displacement, migration or relocation associated with 
climate change is multi-causal. Stressors such as weak 
governance, resource scarcity, environmen tal sensitivity 
and demographic changes; individual vulnerabilities 
associated with age, gender, civil and political status and 
socio-economic well-being; and other root causes such 
as conflict and violence, impact on people’s resilience, 
affecting whether they remain in situ (and in what condi-
tion), are displaced, or can migrate elsewhere. 
This is why climate change is sometimes described in 
narratives and public discourse as a ‘threat multiplier’, 
and why the scale of climate change-related movement 
is difficult to measure. It also partly accounts for why 
policy development in this area has been incremental. 
However, with expanding knowledge and a growing pool 
of actors willing to engage with the phenomenon, there is 
now a clearer normative framework and more robust tools 
in place for averting, minimizing and addressing climate 
change-related mobility. 
Normative developments 
The IPCC first identified the potential impacts of climate 
change on human movement in 1990 (IPCC 1990; IPCC 
1997). Following its 2007 assessment report, which rein-
forced its impacts on mobility, empirical research on the 
connection between climate change and human movement 
expanded (Hegerl et al. 2007; IPCC 2007). The adoption of 
paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Adaptation Framework in 
2010, whereby states parties to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognized 
“climate change induced displacement, migration and 
planned relocation” as elements to be addressed within 
the framework of climate change adaptation, was pivotal 
(UNFCCC 2011). It explicitly acknowledged the impacts of 
climate change on human mobility and became a catalyst 
for action (see McAdam 2014). 
The full magnitude of movement associated with climate 
change is unknown, although the evidence base is much 
richer than it was just a decade ago. Since 2008, the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has 
compiled data on internal displacement linked to sudden-
onset disasters (such as storms, cyclones, floods, wildfires, 
extreme temperatures and landslides). In 2018, of 17.2 
million new disaster-related displacements, 16.1 million 
were associated with weather-related disasters (IDMC 
2019a: 7). Over the past eleven years, disasters triggered 
265 million internal displacements, which was an average 
of 24 million new displacements per year – and three 
times the figure for conflict and violence (IDMC 2019b: 
5-6).2 These figures are, however, an underestimate since 
they fail to capture displacement linked to slower-onset 
disasters (such as droughts, sea level rise, and desertifi-
cation) (IDMC 2019a: v).3
Attribution and causality 
To fully appreciate the evidence, it is crucial to recognize 
that weather-related natural hazards that trigger disas-
ters cannot easily be attributed solely to climate change.4 
What is known is that in 2018, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reinforced its earlier 
findings on the intensity and frequency of climate and 
weather extremes, which have increased in the past and 
are predicted to continue.5 This means the magnitude of 
adversity arising from storms, floods, droughts and heat-
waves will rise as climate change continues. The same is 
true for sea level rise.6 
There is also a tendency to view sudden- and slow-onset 
disasters in isolation. Yet, between 2004 and 2014, roughly 
34 per cent of disaster-affected people and 58 per cent of 
2  In 2018, 61 per cent of new internal displacement was 
caused by disasters compared to 39 per cent by conflict (IDMC 
2019a: 6).
3  Note, however, that some drought-related displacement is 
captured in the 2018 global figures. 
4  See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine (2016) and Otto et al. (2014). 
5  See e.g. IPCC (2018b) and Hoegh-Guldberg et al. (2018).
6  On human rights impacts of sea level rise see e.g. McAdam  
et al. (2016). See also OHCHR (2018).
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The Task Force on Displacement (TFD), established in 
2015 under the UNFCCC, was accordingly tasked with 
developing recommendations to avert and minimize, as 
well as address, displacement related to the adverse 
impacts of climate change. Similarly, the International 
Law Commission’s 2016 Draft articles on the protection of 
persons in the event of disasters, which explicitly address 
human mobility, detail the scope and content of states’ 
duties in the context of sudden and slow-onset disasters 
with respect to preventive and remedial actions. 
Since the adoption of the Protection Agenda, coordinated 
efforts (including through the Platform on Disaster 
Displacement (PDD), the Nansen Initiative’s successor) 
have been undertaken to frame and secure acknowledge-
ment of the diverse dimensions of climate change-related 
mobility in pivotal global processes and instruments.7 
Concerted efforts to ensure states and other stakeholders 
have the requisite tools to implement recommendations 
has been another central focus. 
One example is the UN General Assembly-endorsed Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, which 
contains language on human mobility and measures 
related to displacement, evacuation and relocation in the 
context of strengthening disaster risk governance, invest-
ing in resilience and enhancing preparedness. The Frame-
work recognizes displacement as one common, devastat-
ing consequence of disasters and notes that managing 
disaster risk aims to protect people, their property, health, 
livelihoods and assets, while promoting and protecting 
all human rights. In May 2019, the UN Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNDRR) published a Words into Action 
guide, which offers practical guidance to governments on 
integrating human mobility into DRR strategies.
Movement within countries
Moving people away from harm is an important measure 
7  For details, see McAdam (2016); Global Compact on 
Refugees, UN Doc: A/73/12 (2 August 2018); Global Compact for 
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Doc: A/RES/73/195 (19 
December 2018).
Even so, it was the Nansen Initiative and its Agenda for the 
Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the context 
of Disasters and Climate Change (Protection Agenda) that 
paved the way for a clear and comprehensive plan to ad-
dress human movement (The Nansen Initiative 2015). Prior 
to the Nansen Initiative’s establishment in 2012, scholars, 
practitioners and policymakers had identified normative 
gaps but concerted efforts to address them had faltered (see 
McAdam 2014).  The Protection Agenda sets out a toolkit for 
responding coherently to climate change-related mobility, 
underpinned by the recognition that multi-disciplinary and 
multi-sectoral actions are needed at the local, national, 
regional and international levels.
The Protection Agenda was developed through political, 
strategic and technical efforts that engaged states and 
other stakeholders across regions, and it was endorsed by 
109 state delegations in October 2015. It encompasses 
humanitarian dimensions, but also disaster risk reduction 
(DRR), climate change adaptation (CCA) and sustainable 
development, in efforts to avert and minimize unsafe and 
involuntary movements and to respond to displacement 
within and across international borders when it does occur. 
Three key priorities are to: (1) collect data and enhance 
knowledge (particularly on cross-border disaster displace-
ment); (2) enhance the use of humanitarian protection 
measures for cross-border disaster displaced persons; and 
(3) strengthen the management of disaster displacement 
risk in countries of origin. 
The centrality of proactive efforts in countries of origin, 
and not simply remedial measures in destination countries, 
is reflected in the Protection Agenda’s priorities. In this 
respect, the third priority encompasses four interventions: 
(1) integrating human mobility within DRR, CCA and rele-
vant development processes; (2) facilitating migration with 
dignity; (3) improving the use of planned relocation; and 
(4) ensuring that the needs of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) are effectively addressed in domestic laws and 
policies. This envisages that human rights consequences 
could potentially be minimized if involuntary and unsafe 
movements are averted. Displacement also undermines 
development gains and frustrates the sustainable develop-
ment agenda. 
Changing perspectives on human rights
Climate Change, Justice and Human Rights
Climate change and human movement 
30
why it is often considered an option of last resort. Due 
regard must be had to procedural safeguards (including 
access to information, in-depth consultation and partici-
pation), financing and planning, and expert guidance has 
been developed to try to ensure these and human rights 
protections are safeguarded.10  
Through the state-led Migrants in Countries in Crisis 
(MICIC) Initiative, states, intergovernmental organ-
izations, private sector actors and civil society have 
developed guidance, practices and tools to address the 
protection needs of migrants displaced in a range of 
contexts, including by disasters. They cover needs from 
the period prior to departure, through to the emergency 
response phase and finally to return.11  
In all of these situations, the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement remain the most authoritative 
and overarching normative framework on the protection 
of IDPs, including those displaced by the impacts of 
disasters. They reflect international human rights and 
humanitarian law and cover all stages of flight. 
Movement across international borders
Cross-border movements have been the subject of exten-
sive policy and scholarly debate, partly due to recognition 
of a normative gap for addressing admission, status and 
rights.12 Concerns about the legal lacunae for so-called 
‘climate refugees’ stimulated calls to expand the 1951 
Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
adopt a new protocol to it, or create a whole new treaty. 
However, states are reticent to develop new international 
legal standards and many legal experts believe such 
efforts are premature. In this context, one of the Protec-
tion Agenda’s three priorities recommended enhanced use 
of ‘humanitarian protection measures’, exceptional migra-
tion categories or other special protection measures to 
assist people displaced in the context of climate change.
10  See Brookings Institution et al. (2015); UNHCR et al. (2017);  
CCCM Cluster (2014). 
11  For more on the initiative, its guidance and tools see  
https://micicinitiative.iom.int/. 
12  For further elaboration of these points, see McAdam (2012).
to reduce mortality and injury in the face of imminent risk 
and when other DRR and CCA actions to reduce exposure 
and vulnerability are inadequate. Indeed, international 
human rights law imposes duties on states to undertake 
certain actions to protect the right to life (inter alia) from 
risks emanating from natural hazards. Substantive and 
procedural duties are engaged, such as the obligation to 
take regulatory measures and to provide sufficient informa-
tion. In essence, the duty is one of conduct to “take appro-
priate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their 
jurisdiction”, not one of result (ECtHR 2008: para 128).8 
In practice, this may mean providing people with warnings, 
options to leave, safe areas to move to, and assistance and 
protection while displaced. This strategy proved vital in 
May 2019 when the Indian government evacuated over 1.2 
million people in less than 48 hours from the worst cyclones 
to hit India in over twenty years. While storm surges, 
powerful winds and flooding ravaged infrastructure, loss of 
life was minimized (see e.g. Dora & Padhee 2019). 
The international community has conceded that preventa-
tive or remedial relocation (that is, in the aftermath of 
displacement) may be necessary from places that present 
risks from landslides, flooding, storm surges and the like, 
or which are likely to become inhabitable due to water, 
ecosystem or livelihood depletion or inundation from sea 
level rise (Republic of Fiji 2018).9 Increasingly, communi-
ties are themselves making decisions to relocate to avoid 
the adverse effects of climate change and environmental 
degradation. 
When an evacuation or relocation occurs, a range of human 
rights are implicated in the actions and choices of states 
and other actors. Past experiences demonstrate that 
relocation can entail disruptions to livelihoods, income, 
socio-economic networks and cultural heritage, which is 
8  See also Burson et al. (2018).
9  See also International Law Association (2018) Resolution 
6/2018 and accompanying Sydney Declaration of Principles 
on the Protection of Persons Displaced in the Context of Sea 
Level Rise. Available at: https://environmentalmigration.iom.
int/sites/default/files/ILAResolution_6_2018_SeaLevelRise_
SydneyDeclaration.pdf.
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In situations where disasters combined with conflict 
or violence, states in Africa and Latin America have 
recognized refugee status on the basis of broader 
criteria explicit in definitions in regional instruments. For 
instance, neighbouring states granted refugee status to 
Somalis who fled in the context of drought, conflict and 
famine in 2011 (see e.g. UNHCR 2018). As noted earlier, 
there is a tendency to view disasters in isolation. Yet, 
in many countries and regions, disasters overlap with 
conflict and/or violence, such as in Nigeria, South Sudan, 
Afghanistan, Iraq and parts of Central America.  
At present, international human rights law also offers 
limited opportunities. It prevents states from sending 
people to places where they face a real risk of being 
arbitrarily deprived of their lives or being subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment. Certainly, at some 
point, on the basis of cumulative impacts (such as where 
fresh drinking water is unavailable, crops cannot grow, 
and people are at risk of repeated displacement), the 
harm could amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. 
However, timing will be relevant, including the potential 
for mitigating factors to intervene to limit exposure and 
severity of harm.15 
In this context, states have often used discretionary 
measures to permit people to remain, or to be admitted, in 
the aftermath of disasters. Underpinned by humanitarian 
considerations, some states have issued special human-
itarian visas, generally for temporary stays, with options 
for disaster-affected individuals to apply before departure 
or upon arrival. For instance, Brazil granted humani-
tarian visas to Haitians following the 2010 earthquake. 
Other states have permitted non-citizens present on their 
territory to stay after a disaster has struck. For instance, 
New Zealand offered temporary visas to Nepalis who 
could not return after the 2015 earthquake. Occasionally, 
states have also evacuated people across international 
borders, but mostly for medical reasons. While most of the 
measures described above have been wholly discretionary, 
some have had a legislative basis (such as Temporary 
15 See Anderson et al. (2019) and Teitiota v New Zealand,  
UN doc: CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (24 October 2019).
To be recognized as a refugee under the Refugee Conven-
tion, a person must demonstrate a “well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion” (Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
1951: art 1). Scholars and decision-makers have recog-
nized that in limited circumstances, this definition may be 
applicable to claims from people fleeing disasters or other 
adverse effects linked to climate change. For instance, 
if, in the aftermath of a disaster, a government withheld 
humanitarian aid due to a person’s political opinion or 
ethnicity, this could amount to Convention-based perse-
cution. In general, however, the Refugee Convention has 
been considered an inappropriate normative framework on 
account of:
– difficulties in demonstrating discriminatory human 
agency and in identifying the so-called ‘agent of 
persecution’;
– difficulties in demonstrating the requisite nexus to a 
Convention ground; 
– arguments that governments may be willing and/or 
able to provide protection;
– inaccurate conceptions of disasters as ‘natural’ events 
arising from forces of nature, and conceptions of 
disasters and adverse effects of climate change as 
inflicting indiscriminate harm.
Recent jurisprudence from New Zealand has offered some 
insights into where and how refugee law might apply.13 
Some scholars have also put forward salient arguments 
for a deeper examination of the Refugee Convention’s 
potential,14 seeking to dispel the common perception of 
disasters as purely ‘natural’ phenomena. Disasters are 
also social phenomena which can exacerbate existing 
patterns of discrimination and marginalization. This lens 
provides new insights into differential experiences and 
risks of harm that may be based on ethnicity, gender or 
other grounds.  
13  AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413; AC (Tuvalu) [2014] 
NZIPT 800517-520.
14  See e.g. Scott (2016); note also UNHCR (2018).
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Migration (Migration Compact) and the Global Compact 
on Refugees (Refugee Compact).17 Although not legally 
binding, they reflect political commitments by states to 
which they will be held to account in regular high-level 
reviews. 
The Migration Compact reflects an express commitment  
by states to address the challenges of climate change- 
related mobility. The text underscores the three priorities  
identified in the Protection Agenda and addresses 
displacement, migration and relocation within and across 
borders. Notably, it recognizes the significance of regular 
migration pathways (such as those discussed above) for 
offering safe options for affected people, including as a 
way to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change.
Unlike the Migration Compact, the Refugee Compact 
does not contain specific commitments on climate 
change-related movement. However, it does acknowledge 
displacement in the context of disasters, environmental 
degradation and the adverse effects of climate change, 
including the importance of preparedness and DRR, the 
need for coordinated operational responses, and the role 
of multiple protection options. In particular, paragraph 61 
notes that states must determine the status of those on 
their territory “in accordance with their applicable inter-
national and regional obligations, in a way which avoids 
protection gaps”. 
Conclusion
Human movement linked to the adverse impacts of 
climate change is likely to increase, but frameworks and 
tools exist to prevent some movement where possible, and 
to manage it where not. Concerted efforts are needed to 
ensure these interrelated approaches are implemented 
robustly to avert, minimize and address displacement 
linked to climate change. Most people do not want to 
17  Global Compact on Refugees, UN Doc: A/73/12 (2018); 
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Doc: 
A/RES/73/195. For analysis, see the special issue: ‘The 2018 
Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration’ (2018) International 
Journal of Refugee Law 30(4), particularly the article by Walter 
Kälin.
Protected Status in the United States). Some countries in 
Central and South America have sought to create more 
systematic responses by producing non-binding regional 
guidelines, identifying effective practices.16
States have also used regular migration law categories 
(such as labour, family, education or tourism) to support 
entry and stay. Authorities have expedited processes, 
waived or relaxed substantive requirements, and used 
their discretion to grant visas to disaster-affected people 
who apply through these more general migration chan-
nels. Such measures can offer a more predictable legal 
status and, potentially, a path to a permanent solution. 
These types of migration law and policy-based measures 
are a vital component of efforts to develop sustainable 
approaches. As Anote Tong, former President of Kiribati, 
stated: “If we train our people and they become skilled, 
then they would migrate with dignity and on merit, they 
would not be people running away from something. They 
would be migrating, relocating as people with skills  
as members of communities they go into, even leaders,  
I hope” (Walsh 2017).
Temporary labour migration schemes, which can support 
livelihood diversification, have also been used to support 
people living in precarious conditions. For instance, 
Australia and New Zealand have seasonal employment 
schemes targeting Pacific island countries significantly 
affected by climate change (although that is not the  
stated rationale for the programmes). Regional or bilat-
eral free movement agreements can also enable disaster- 
affected people to travel safely across borders, and in 
that sense can be a form of ‘migration as adaptation’. 
Global compacts on migration and refugees 
The knowledge and awareness amassed over the past 
decade on climate change-related movement is evident in 
two instruments adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
2018: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
16  See e.g. The Nansen Initiative (2016) and CSM & 
International Organization for Migration (2018).
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leave their homes, and most want to return as soon as 
possible if they are uprooted. Yet, some are also coming 
to the realization that moving away from their homes 
may become inevitable for their long-term security. To 
safeguard these choices and provide dignified options, 
the multi-pronged preventative and remedial approaches 
discussed in this essay must become part of preparatory 
processes at all levels of governance. 
In his June 2019 report to the Human Rights Council, 
the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights urged the human rights community to engage 
robustly and systematically to help create transformative 
responses to climate change (UNHRC 2019). The human 
rights framework offers an established set of standards 
against which to assess both risk and proposed policy 
responses. In this context, a central role for human 
rights actors is to determine how to “translate States’ 
obligations in a way that more clearly engages with [the 
available] policymaking choices” (UNHRC 2019: para 71) 
so as to foster sustainable and rights-attuned solutions. 
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Barbara Oomen
Subnational authorities and climate change
is important to distinguish between subnational authori-
ties that are more-than-willing, those that are willing and 
those that are less-than-willing to meet the global goals 
in this field. In each of these cases, international law has 
a specific role to play. Before turning to this, however, it is 
important to take a closer look at how subnational author-
ities have come to play an ever-larger role in combating 
climate change and thus protecting human rights.  
Global challenges, local action
Tiny hamlets amongst wide stretches of agricultural land, 
global cities with monorails amongst skyscrapers, tribal 
areas in which people live close to nature, regions and 
states that encompass both and everything in between 
– the term subnational authorities encompasses a wide 
range of actors like cities, local governments, municipal-
ities and regions (Bäckstrand et al. 2017). The common 
denominator is that these are authorities other than the 
nation state, that hold public power within a certain terri-
tory. They do not hold functional authority, as is the case 
with for instance water boards or transport authorities. 
Neither are they non-state actors, such as businesses 
or civil society. This, however, is where the commonality 
ends. The public power concerned can be allocated via 
decentralization or devolution, or exist simply because it 
concerns a federal state. It can also range from seem-
ingly mundane features, such as garbage collection and 
zoning, to far-fetching constitutional and fiscal powers 
which all impact differently the ability to respect, protect 
and fulfill human rights in times of climate change. In 
addition, resources and needs in this area differ vastly.
Today’s world abounds with ‘frontier cities’ seeking to 
explicitly assert responsibility for international human 
rights law, even – and especially – where the state parties 
concerned do not take their international obligations as 
seriously. They can add to the effectiveness, but also to 
the legitimacy and the appropriateness of climate action.  
International (human rights) law has a key role to play in 
supporting their efforts. There are, however, risks involved 
in a focus upon local action. 
Introduction
In May 2019 Heidelberg declared a ‘climate emergency’, 
as did hundreds of other local authorities in dozens of 
countries – including New York, Vancouver and Naples. 
In the German town, this led to, amongst others, a focus 
on electrical buses, reconsidering building projects and 
supporting food saving projects. Heidelberg forms but one 
example of how local and regional authorities are taking 
the lead in climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Small wonder that such subnational authorities show up 
in addressing the causes and consequences of climate 
change: they do not only have a lot to lose with global 
warming, but also a great deal to contribute. If address-
ing climate change and its human rights implications is 
about having ‘all hands on deck’, subnational authorities 
are powerful partners to have on board. They can add to 
the effectiveness, but also to the legitimacy and the ap-
propriateness of climate action. In this essay, I will argue 
that international (human rights) law has a key role to 
play in supporting their efforts, and that human rights or-
ganizations should support this. In setting out this role, it 
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overlapping membership and partnerships with interna-
tional organizations and businesses (Acuto 2013).  
These TMNs often unite global cities that have the power 
and the resources to participate in them (Lee 2013). This 
does not apply to smaller places, where it will often be 
the region, a province or – in a federal context – the state 
to undertake climate action. In Canada, for instance, 
provinces set their own climate plans, which means that 
British Columbia focuses on introducing a carbon tax 
and Alberta regulates industrial emissions. In the United 
States, similarly, California and Hawaii passed State Bills 
committing to 100 per cent clean energy by 2045, Colo-
rado focused on clean cars, New Jersey passed a Clean 
Energy Act focusing on wind energy and Illinois vowed to 
boost solar capacity by 2000 per cent (Zukowski 2018).
Next to all the focus on the activities of cities, trans-
national municipal networks and regions in combating 
climate change, there is relatively little scholarly attention 
for the activities of smaller towns in rural areas. Still, 
it is clear that all types of subnational authorities are 
often prepared to go much further than the nation state 
in combating climate change. Let us briefly consider how 
this contributes to the process of mitigation and adap-
tion, and thus also to protection of the rights at stake. 
The subnational contribution
When US President Trump pulled out of the Paris 
Agreement, stating that he represented the citizens of 
“Pittsburgh, not Paris”, the Pittsburgh mayor Peduto 
replied with a tweet stating that his town would follow 
the Paris Agreement, “for our people, for our economy 
& for the future” (Aust 2018). Such local commitment 
can contribute to reaching global goals as formulated in 
Paris, in three different ways: by adding to their effec-
tiveness, their legitimacy and their appropriateness. Let’s 
briefly consider each of these contributions.
– Effectiveness: subnational authorities can make a 
key contribution to keeping global warming under 1.5 
degree Celsius, if only because cities are responsible 
for an estimated 75 per cent of global CO2 emissions. A 
2018 report calculated the impact that all pledges ‘to go 
Amongst this collection of highly diverse actors, cities hold 
a special role (Aust 2015). They are home to more than 
half of the world’s population, but are also often threat-
ened directly. Seaside cities like Ghuangzou, New Orleans, 
Mumbai and Osaka, for instance, all run the risk of being 
flooded by 2100 if emissions are not reduced (Cassidy 
2018). It is not surprising that New York, after hurricane 
Sandy demonstrated the city’s vulnerability in 2012, 
passed a far-reaching Climate Mobilization Act in 2019 
(Kaufman 2019). Coastal towns aside, cities in general 
account for 60 to 80 per cent of both energy consumption 
and global CO2 emissions, and as such are as much part 
of the problem as they can be part of the solution. 
Such urban solutions come in a wide variety of forms. The 
C40 climate network lists 14.000 examples of city climate 
action (C40 2018). Among them is San Francisco’s move 
towards zero waste via recycling and composting. Addis 
Ababa’s focus on low carbon building designs. Sydney’s 
investment in green links connecting all city parks. 
London limiting access to its central business district. 
Buenos Aires offering free led lights. Milan and Shenzhen 
changing all their municipal transport to zero emission 
buses. Accra closing down illegal waste dump sites and 
Dubai participating in the adaptation academy. And so 
on, and so forth. 
The fact that all these examples are shared within a city 
network is not coincidental. If cities are taking the lead 
in addressing climate change, they are doing so together 
(Kern & Bulkeley 2009). The Global Covenant of Mayors 
for Climate and Energy, for instance, brings together 
nearly 10.000 signatories in 59 countries which commit 
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 40 per cent by 
2030, and to drawing up a sustainable action and energy 
plan. The C40 network unites some of the largest cities 
in the world, with the Paris Agreement as its normative 
basis. ICLEI, local governments for sustainability, is 
another mayor network, that helps over 1750 local and 
regional governments in developing pathways to lowering 
emissions, enhancing biodiversity and strengthening 
circularity and resilience in an equitable manner. These 
are only three of the hundreds of Transnational Municipal 
Networks (TMNs) at play in climate governance, often with 
Changing perspectives on human rights
Climate Change, Justice and Human Rights
Subnational authorities and climate change
37
domains that can impact climate change – from garbage 
collection, housing and zoning to fiscal and foreign poli-
cies. What, here, is the role of international law? 
The role of international human rights law
Climate change concerns human rights: not only because 
of the human right to a clean environment but also 
because the consequences of global warming affect 
a wide variety of civil, political, social, economic and 
cultural rights – starting with the right to life. In addition, 
the above makes clear that subnational authorities, in 
practice, have a role to play in protecting the rights of 
those who live on their territories. A question, however, 
is what the role of the law, and international law in 
particular, is and should be in assisting subnational 
authorities in this process. 
Here, it is important to recognize how international 
law, traditionally, does not address the human rights 
responsibilities of local and regional authorities, leaving 
the internal allocation of such responsibilities up to the 
state parties (Oomen & Baumgartel 2018a; Nicola 2012). 
Take the landmark environmental law case of Öneryildiz 
v. Turkey (ECHR 30/11/2004), in which the European 
Court of Human Rights recognized how allowing people 
to build a dwelling on a rubbish tip in Istanbul, resulting 
in the death of nine people after a methane explosion, 
violated the positive obligations that comes with the 
right to life. Even if Istanbul had primary liability here, 
Turkey was held responsible for the violation of art. 2 of 
the Convention. Turkey, after all, is party to the European 
Convention of Human Rights and thus the sole party to be 
held responsible for its violation – the local government 
is merely considered part of the state. A consequence of 
such thinking in terms of a ‘black box of national sover-
eignty’ is that local authorities seeking to address human 
rights violations by the nation state have not received 
standing in front of international and European courts 
(Oomen & Baumgartel 2018a; Nicola 2012).
Still, today’s world abounds with ‘frontier cities’ seeking 
to explicitly assert responsibility for international human 
rights law, even – and especially – where the state 
the extra mile’ made by cities could have, including the 
9149 cities and municipalities, and 245 regions in 128 
countries that made such a pledge, covering one fifth 
of the world’s population. Of course, not all causes of 
emissions fall under the legislative jurisdiction of these 
authorities. But if all these places alone would keep their 
promises in fields that they can influence, this, together 
with business commitments made, would go one third of 
the way in meeting the Paris goals (Data Driven Yale et 
al. 2018). Even if this is not enough, it does provide an 
important addition.
– Legitimacy: combating climate change is not only about 
technological fixes and regulatory action, but also about 
public support. Climate leadership by mayors and local 
politicians can play a key role in overcoming political 
divides and disengagement. Consider the bipartisan 
coalition of Climate Mayors in the US. The Democratic 
mayor Walsh from Boston emphasized that: “We see the 
impacts of climate change every day in the streets and 
homes of our cities – the extreme heat, flooding, and 
increasing health issues. It’s our responsibility to act, and 
I’m proud to stand among the growing number of Climate 
Mayors fighting for our residents.” At the time, his 
Republican colleague mayor Tomás Regalado of Miami put 
it this way: “We believe that the city of Miami is ground 
zero for climate change and sea level rise. Now, more than 
ever, we are undeterred and will vigorously pursue our 
commitment to this fight. This is not just about ‘the here 
and now,’ but for generations to come.” Such rhetoric can 
add to the support for climate action as something that is 
not imposed from Paris but from Pittsburgh, and does not 
concern faraway places and concerns, but the lives of all 
of us here and now. 
– Appropriateness: one of the key challenges in 
combating climate change is the complexity of its causes 
and the vast array of potential ways to address them. The 
best fit will differ from sunny suburb to monumental town 
to tribal community. A strong role for subnational author-
ities allows for a focus on those measures that form an 
optimal fit with the people, place and purpose. 
In all this, subnational authorities differ from other 
entities (civil society, businesses) because they often hold 
formal responsibilities, under the national constition, for 
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help develop and invoke international and regional law 
directly, not only in national cases but also in interna-
tional and regional courts and in front of treaty moni-
toring bodies. Offering recourse to such entities, could 
thus strengthen human rights law, for instance in relation 
to climate change.
– The willing subnational authorities could be consid-
ered those that take a less confrontational perspective, 
but that do seek to enforce existing international human 
rights law and environmental law. The challenge, here, 
often lies in deciding what is the best course of action, 
ensuring stakeholder participation and implementing the 
proposed changes. Here, membership of transnational 
municipal networks can play an important role in sharing 
best practices, deciding on the discourse to employ, 
setting common standards and ensuring access to 
funding (Oomen et al. 2018b). The Global Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol for Cities, for instance, is an emissions meas-
urement standard developed by the C40, ICLEI, and World 
Resources Institute (WRI) together with the World Bank 
and UN-Habitat, to which countries sign up voluntarily 
(Gordon & Johnson 2018). A major challenge here is how 
to also offer this type of support to smaller places and 
rural areas, that often do not have the resources to partic-
ipate in these transnational networks.
– For the less than willing subnational authorities, 
explication of their autonomous international human 
rights responsibilities could also be important. Take 
the case of Saskatchewan, in Canada, as a province 
characterized by inaction. Here, the Canadian government 
won a case concerning the constitutionality of an Act 
enabling taxation of greenhouse gases (Court of Appeal 
for Saskatchewan 2019). The ability to explicitly refer to 
international legal obligations pertaining to human rights 
would, arguably, have made the case of the Canadian 
government even stronger, as it would have been able to 
argue that even an ‘unwilling’ subnational authority like 
Saskatchewan is still bound to international treaties such 
as the Paris Agreement. It is for this reason that interna-
tional and regional human rights organizations increas-
ingly seek to explicitly set out the human rights responsi-
bilities of local authorities, for instance in discussing the 
possibility of UN Guidelines (UNHRC 2015).
parties concerned do not take their international obli-
gations as seriously (Oomen et al. 2016). They declare 
themselves to be human rights cities, often committing to 
one specific set of rights. They also rally around concepts 
like ‘the right to the city’, recognizing Harvey’s classic 
concept in local ordinances but also ensuring its inclusion 
in global agenda’s, like UN Habitat (Cohen 2018). Inter-
national and regional organizations, in turn, increasingly 
explicitly focus upon the human rights responsibilities of 
local authorities, with the UN advocating guidelines in 
this field (UNHRC 2015). 
The specific role that international (human rights) law 
has to play in supporting local action to combat climate 
change, very much depends on the type of commitment 
held by subnational authorities. Here, it is useful to 
distinguish three types of authorities: the more than 
willing, the willing and the less than willing. Let us 
consider each separately.
– The more than willing subnational authorities are those 
that do not only seek to lead the way locally, but also 
seek to address the system. They are engaged in global 
and regional agenda and standard setting. At the COP21 
conference, for instance, where the Paris Agreement was 
adopted, there were not only 150 heads of state, but 
also 400 mayors (Tollin 2015). In addition, they are often 
involved in climate litigation against companies and 
against the government. New York, for instance, was one 
of the American municipalities to start a law suit against 
fossil fuels companies like BP and Exxon (Setzer & Byrnes 
2019). In France, the community of Grande-Synthe lodged 
a case against the government for “inaction climatique” 
in response to its feeble action plans (Le Monde 2019). 
At the European level, Paris, Brussels and Madrid filed a 
case calling for the annulment of emissions regulation 
2016/646, calling it a “license to pollute”. Whereas the 
American case was rejected, and the French case awaits 
a decision, the European case was moderately successful: 
not only were cities granted standing in Luxembourg, but 
the European Commission was also ordered to amend the 
legislation (EGC 2018).
This case shows what subnational authorities and the 
people they seek to protect stand to gain if they can 
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Nevertheless, going local holds great promise. After all, 
a large part of meeting the largest global challenge of 
our times, is about both supporting and stimulating local 
action. 
Conclusion
Cities, regions and other subnational entities can 
increasingly be found amongst a coalition of the willing 
in taking bold climate action. This is good news for those 
who inhabit them, and for the world at large. Cities might 
often be the main places generating carbon emissions, 
but can also go a long way in curbing them. Their activi-
ties, often devised in the context of transnational munic-
ipal networks, are however not only effective. They also 
add legitimacy to often polarized discussions, and ensure 
that appropriate measures are taken. Strategically, all 
who care about international human rights, like human 
rights NGOs, are wise to support and strengthen these 
subnational efforts. This can be done, first, by supporting 
efforts to explicate the human rights responsibilities of 
local authorities, such as efforts to establish UN guide-
lines on the role of local government in the promotion and 
protection of human rights (UNHRC 2015). In addition, 
human rights NGOs can support the specific global efforts 
by subnational entities to raise the bar in combating 
climate change. As set out, such efforts often take place 
within the context of transnational municipal networks, 
and human rights NGOs could support efforts to enhance 
access to such networks for all subnational authori-
ties, not merely the megacities that currently dominate 
debates. Locally, human rights NGOs could call on 
willing cities to join such networks, and develop lobbying 
strategies geared towards subnational entities directly 
– for instance by offering information on international 
instruments to organizations that are active locally. 
Combined, such strategies can help strengthen the role 
of subnational entities in combating climate change even 
more. There are, however, risks involved in a focus upon 
local action. Most importantly, it can strengthen existing 
cleavages between more than willing and less than 
willing subnational entities, and the rights of those who 
live there. One way to address this is by means of strategic 
litigation, and a focus on less than willing subnational 
entities and their obligations. In addition, avoiding 
inequality means that a focus on localities should never 
take the place of national and international efforts in this 
field.
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Sara Seck 
Climate change and the human rights responsibilities  
of business enterprises
legal responsibility (Buhmann 2017). The question is 
whether the guidance that emerges will rigorously embed 
business responsibilities to respect human rights at risk 
from climate change, or whether weaker, less effective 
guidance will be all that is available. The answer to this 
question depends on the extent to which human rights 
NGOs choose to actively contribute to these drafting 
processes. 
International scientific consensus is clear that anthro-
pogenic climate emissions, notably those arising from 
industrial activities including changes in land use, are 
key contributors to the climate crisis (IPCC 2018a; IPCC 
2019). As the science has evolved, the link between 
fossil fuel emitters and climate change has begun to be 
clarified, and additional studies of other industry sectors 
will likely emerge. For example, Richard Heede’s 2014 
climate attribution study provided a quantification of 
the historic contributions of ‘carbon-majors’ to climate 
change (Heede 2014). Heede initially classified carbon-
major producers into investor-owned, state-owned, 
and nation state producers of oil, natural gas, coal, 
and cement, concluding that 63 per cent of cumulative 
worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide and methane from 
1854-2010 were attributable to identifiable carbon-ma-
jors (Heede 2014: 229). A subsequent study to which 
Heede contributed distinguishes investor-owned from 
majority state-owned carbon majors (Ekwurtzel et al. 
2017). These studies provide an alternative framework 
to the exclusive focus on state responsibility found in 
traditional public international law (Voigt 2008; Wewer-
inke-Singh 2018). Investigations, inquiries, and litigation 
The causes of climate change and solutions to it are in-
herently tied to non-state actors, including businesses. 
As multinational business enterprises are at the heart of 
global emissions, historical and current, it is vital to un-
derstand how the attribution of climate change impacts 
goes beyond the responsibilities of states. The first 
lawsuits targeting companies have begun. Meanwhile, 
businesses are increasingly focused on sustainability at 
different levels of their organizations, including by en-
dorsement of business responsibilities for human rights. 
What independent responsibilities do business enter-
prises have when they undertake to respect the human 
rights of those who are vulnerable to climate harms?
Introduction
The adoption of the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGPs) by the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2011 has created an oppor-
tunity for the international human rights community to 
clarify how the independent responsibility of business 
enterprises to respect human rights applies to rights 
at risk from climate change (UNHRC 2011; Seck 2017). 
This essay will consider the evolution of international 
understandings of this responsibility at the UNHRC, as 
well as in other international initiatives, some of which 
are multi-stakeholder in nature. A key insight is that 
whether or not human rights NGOs choose to contribute 
to the development of guidance for businesses on 
human rights and climate change, this guidance will 
continue to emerge and inform accepted social norms for 
responsible business conduct, which in turn will inform 
Changing perspectives on human rights
Climate Change, Justice and Human Rights
Climate change and the human rights responsibilities of business enterprises 
42
stakeholders are able to display their climate action 
commitments on the platform, whether cities, subnational 
regions, civil society organizations, or companies and 
investors. Company commitments (of which there are 
currently over 3500) include carbon pricing and renew-
able energy use, while investor commitments (currently 
over 1000) include the issuance of green bonds as part 
of the move to mobilize finance for development that is 
both climate-resilient and low in emissions. There is no 
explicit linkage here between business responsibilities to 
respect human rights and climate action. Nevertheless, 
this initiative represents a further acknowledgement that 
businesses, including the investor community, have a key 
role to play in global climate action. 
2014 IBA Climate Justice Report
The first international initiative of note to consider how 
the business responsibility to respect rights might apply 
in the climate change context is the July 2014 report by 
the International Bar Association (IBA), entitled Achieving 
Justice in an era of Climate Disruption (IBA 2014). The 
overarching aim of the report is to shift climate change 
considerations from science and economics to equity 
and human rights. A section is dedicated to corporate 
responsibility and climate justice, where it is argued that 
there is a need for states to agree on consistent stand-
ards with which to regulate corporations, while increasing 
the ability of businesses to self-regulate (IBA 2014: 148; 
Seck & Slattery 2015). The IBA report recommends that 
businesses adopt the UNGPs, and also that the OHCHR 
develop a model for an internal corporate policy on 
human rights and climate change (IBA 2014: 148-9). This 
model policy would require a three step commitment and 
appears loosely modelled on the responsibility to respect 
in the UNGPs: first, the adoption of a policy stipulating 
measures to prevent or mitigate climate impacts linked to 
operations; second, the implementation of a due diligence 
process to “identify, prevent, mitigate, and account” for 
“actual climate change impacts” which must then be 
translated “into active efforts to minimise or reverse” 
impacts; and, third, implementation of “remediation 
processes that allow for open communication with stake-
holders most affected by the corporation’s operations” 
targeting investor-owned carbon majors have begun to 
proliferate (Greenpeace Southeast Asia & Philippine Rural 
Reconstruction Movement 2015; The Permanent Peoples’ 
Tribunal 2018; Ganguly et al. 2018), some of which have 
been inspired at least in part by the Heede research, as 
well as by the businesses’ responsibility to respect human 
rights (BHR), the second of three pillars in the 2011 
UNGPs. In addition, various international initiatives have 
attempted to clarify the content of the responsibility of 
businesses to respect human rights in relation to climate 
change.
2007 Caring for Climate
The idea that businesses should play a role in climate 
action has been promoted by the United Nations since at 
least 2007, when the UN Global Compact, together with 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFC-
CC) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), launched 
the Caring for Climate initiative in order to mobilize 
business leaders to climate action. CEO signatories to the 
Caring for Climate Statement acknowledge that responsi-
ble business behaviour includes climate action, by playing 
a “leading role in deploying low-carbon technologies, 
increasing energy efficiency, reducing carbon emissions, 
and [...] assisting society to adapt to those changes in the 
climate which are now unavoidable” (Caring for Climate 
2007). Current participants contribute to the development 
and sharing of practical solutions in workstreams focused 
on carbon pricing, science-based targets, climate adap-
tation, as well as on how to responsibly engage in climate 
policy. However, the idea that climate change might have 
human rights dimensions that should inform business 
responsibilities is not evident in this initiative. 
2014 NAZCA
The launching in 2014 of the portal for Global Climate 
Action prior to the negotiations of the Paris Agreement 
represents another important moment. An initiative of 
UN Climate Change together with Peru and France in 
the lead-up to the Paris Agreement, the NAZCA platform 
reflects the reality that all sectors of society must take 
ambitious action to address climate change. Non-party 
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that businesses must “be accountable for their climate 
impacts and participate responsibly in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation efforts with full respect for 
human rights”. Yet while the Key Messages claim that the 
fostering of policy coherence is important for all climate 
action, only consideration 8 addresses the role of busi-
ness, while the other nine considerations focus exclusively 
on the role of states. 
Consideration 8 further clarifies that it is critical that 
businesses comply with their responsibilities when states 
adopt market-based or private financing approaches to 
climate change in accordance with international climate 
law. Yet there is a lack of clarity as to the role of busi-
ness where a state has chosen not to incorporate private 
financing or market-based approaches to climate change, 
or the approaches adopted are clearly inadequate. As the 
business responsibility is independent of the state duty, 
the failure of a state or states to take their climate obli-
gations seriously should not be used as an excuse for irre-
sponsible business conduct (UNHRC 2011: Commentary 
to Principle 11). Moreover, there is no direction as to how, 
where, and to whom businesses should take responsibility 
for the remediation of climate harms. While the OHCHR’s 
endorsement of the UNGPs in the Key Messages is a step 
in the right direction, it is far less developed than the 
work of the IBA, and the limited guidance given is not 
obviously consistent with the UNGPs. The OHCHR should 
revisit the Key Messages with input from human rights 
NGOs, and provide more fulsome guidance for businesses 
that at a minimum aligns with the UNGPs. 
2015 Oslo Principles
In the same year as the OHCHR submission, a group of 
legal experts attempted to grapple in more detail with the 
responsibilities of businesses and states in relation to 
climate change, resulting in the “Oslo Principles on Global 
Obligations to Reduce Climate Change” (EGGCO 2015). 
The Oslo Principles focus only on climate mitigation, and 
claim that the primary legal responsibility to urgently re-
spond to climate change rests with states and enterprises; 
however, ‘enterprises’ is not defined. This legal responsi-
bility is said to arise from a duty of humanity as guardians 
(IBA 2014: 148-9). Measures adopted “must include due 
diligence of corporate projects, including the environ-
mental practices of the company’s affiliates, and as far 
as is reasonably practicable, its major contractors and 
suppliers” (IBA 2014: 148). Further guidance is provided 
on translating awareness into active efforts:
“The corporation should consider measures it can 
implement to assist in achieving the objective of 
limiting global warming to no more than a 2°C increase. 
The corporation’s goal should be to implement the most 
advanced available technology to minimise its carbon 
footprint. In situations where negative impact on the 
environment is unavoidable given current technology or 
if the cost of such technology is prohibitive, the corpo-
ration bears responsibility for corresponding mitigation 
and remediation” (IBA 2014: 149).
The IBA recommendations could be critiqued as not fully 
in accordance with Principle 13 of the UNGPs, given that 
in some circumstances the negative impact of a project 
on human rights may be so severe that the project simply 
should not proceed (Seck 2017: 19). Nevertheless, the 
overall recommendations are a key contribution, although 
the OHCHR has not yet developed a model policy for BHR 
and climate change. This is unfortunate, as a BHR and 
climate change compliant model internal corporate policy 
could serve to inform legal advice given to business 
clients who are committed to tackling their contributions 
to climate change, but are unsure how to proceed. While 
some business law firms are stepping forward to provide 
advice (Zampas & Elgie 2019), a model corporate policy 
developed with active input from human rights NGOs 
could play an important role in guiding climate respon-
sible corporate practice. 
2015 OHCHR Key Messages
In November 2015, the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) developed Key Messages 
on climate change which also informed a submission 
to the COP 21 negotiations of the Paris Agreement 
(OHCHR 2015). Consideration 8 (“To protect human 
rights from business harms”) endorses the UNGPs, and 
highlights that “businesses are also duty-bearers” and 
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not satisfied with this result, and undertook a subsequent 
drafting initiative.  
2016 Climate report
In 2016, the Special Rapporteur on human rights and 
the environment prepared an important report on climate 
change and human rights which considers how the 
obligations of states with regard to environmental human 
rights should be understood to apply in the climate con-
text. Only brief reference is made to businesses: “corpora-
tions themselves have a responsibility to respect human 
rights” and all “three pillars of the normative framework 
for business and human rights apply to all environmental 
human rights abuses, including impairments of human 
rights in relation to climate change” (UNHRC 2016: 
66). This is not surprising given the lack of detail in the 
OHCHR’s 2015 Key Messages with regard to business 
responsibilities, and reinforces the sense that the OHCHR, 
perhaps with input from human rights NGOs, should 
undertake a more in-depth study of this issue.
2018 CESCR Committee
The October 2018 statement on climate change by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CE-
SCR) specifically identifies the independent responsibility 
of businesses to comply with human rights, stating that:  
“Complying with human rights in the context of climate 
change is a duty of both State and non-State actors. 
This requires respecting human rights, by refraining 
from the adoption of measures that could worsen 
climate change; protecting human rights, by effectively 
regulating private actors to ensure that their actions do 
not worsen climate change; and fulfilling human rights, 
by the adoption of policies that can channel modes of 
production and consumption towards a more environ-
mentally sustainable pathway. Corporate entities are 
expected to respect Covenant rights regardless of 
whether domestic laws exist or are fully enforced in 
practice [emphasis added]”.3 (CESCR 2018b)
3  The statement refers here to the Committee’s General 
comment No. 24 (2017) on State obligations under the 
of the earth to preserve the biosphere, and reflects the 
precautionary principle as well as existing human rights 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil the basic dignity 
of people as well as the integrity of the biosphere.
Oslo Principles 6-8 provide that both states and enter-
prises have obligations to ensure that global average 
temperature increases remain below a 2 degree Celsius 
threshold. However, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
reduction obligations are qualified by cost, and new 
excessively emitting activities may be indispensable in 
some circumstances. Although the Oslo Principles rely on 
the UNGPs as well as a selection of other international 
normative instruments, the four principles that most 
directly articulate obligations of enterprises do not clearly 
reflect BHR (Seck 2017). Most crucially, they focus on as-
sessment and disclosure of harms to the enterprise itself, 
or its investors, or perhaps customers, rather than harm 
to rights-holders as is clearly required under the Principle 
17 of the UNGPs.1 Oslo Principle 29 and 30 do suggest 
a need to be aware of and reduce the carbon footprint 
and GHG emissions of a proposed project, yet there is no 
suggestion that assessments should seek out alternatives 
with zero emissions, nor is it suggested that the voices of 
those most vulnerable to climate harms should be sought 
for decision-making that respects rights. Moreover, there 
is no mention of the need for businesses to take respon-
sibility to remedy climate harms as would be required 
under Principle 22 of the UNGPs.2 However, as will be seen 
below, some of the drafters of the Oslo Principles were 
1  According to the Commentary to Principle 17: 
“Principle 17 defines the parameters of human rights due 
diligence while Principles 18-21 elaborate its essential 
components. Human rights risks are understood to be the 
business enterprise’s potential adverse human rights impacts. 
Potential impacts should be addressed through prevention 
or mitigation, while actual impacts – those that have already 
occurred – should be a subject for remediation (Principle 22). 
Human rights due diligence can be included within broader 
enterprise risk- management systems, provided that it goes 
beyond simply identifying and managing material risks to the 
company itself, to include risks to rights-holders.” (UNHRC 2011)
2  Principle 22: “Where business enterprises identify that 
they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should 
provide for or cooperate in their remediation through legitimate 
processes” (UNHRC 2011).
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32). The key concern is prevention, and the drafters “do 
not express a view on damages”, suggesting this aligns 
with sources of international environmental law (EGCOE 
2018: 43), a claim that many would contest (Doelle 
& Seck 2019). The Enterprises Principles adopt a per 
capita and carbon budget approach, and so distinguish 
between countries that are “Below Permissible Quantum 
(BPQ)” that are “not (yet) under a general legal obliga-
tion to reduce their GHG-emissions” (EGCOE 2018: 60)4 
and those that are “Above Permissible Quantum (APQ)” 
and “must reduce [their] emissions to the permissible 
quantum ‘within the shortest time feasible’” (EGCOE 
2018: 61). The GHG reduction obligations of enterprises 
are then aligned with those of the country in which they 
operate (Principle 2.1), although countries are given flex-
ibility to allocate enterprise reduction targets differently 
(Principles 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2). This approach aligns with 
distinctions between developed and developing countries 
that are fundamental to the climate regime even as they 
have evolved over time (UNHRC 2016: para. 43, 48). 
Notably, global enterprises are treated separately under 
Principle 5 as emerging trends place “special emphasis 
on the role, responsibilities and obligations of multina-
tional enterprises” and many global enterprises outsource 
production to BPQ countries. Principle 6 further provides 
that controlling enterprises must ensure compliance of 
those under their control.
Enterprises Principles 7-11 focus on mitigation. However, 
the extent of reduction obligations may be limited by cost,  
and the purchase of offsets is acceptable, such as in the 
case of coal-fired power plants. The obligation to reduce 
applies to activities as well as products or services with 
excessive GHG emissions, absent offsets, unless these are 
indispensable in a least developed country context. Prin-
ciples 12-13 provide that if emissions are not reduced, 
offsetting is permitted and a grace period may be contem-
plated. Overall, this appears to be at odds with a human 
rights approach which should allow no grace period, nor 
accept that positive contributions could offset violations 
4  However, if these countries “have accepted reduction 
obligations under the Paris Agreement or a subsequent 
amendment thereof, they are bound to honour their pledges”.
Again, while it is useful to have an acknowledgement of 
business responsibilities to respect human rights in the 
climate change context, it is unfortunate that further de-
tail of what this would mean in practice is not elaborated.
2018 Enterprises Principles
As the drafters of the Oslo Principles could not agree on 
the substance of reduction obligations for enterprises, 
some members subsequently decided to work together 
to draft more concrete obligations for both enterprises 
and investors (EGCOE 2018: 17). The result, released in 
2018, is a report of close to 300 pages entitled Principles 
on Climate Obligations of Enterprises (EGCOE 2018). 
Similar to the Oslo Principles, the Enterprises Principles 
take as a starting point that the “legal maximum” for 
global warming is 2 degrees Celsius, even as the authors 
acknowledge that this “is by no means safe in view of the 
increasing amount and severity of natural disasters the 
world is already experiencing today” (EGCOE 2018: 24). 
Yet, the authors claim that if all countries were to curb 
emissions such that the 2-degree threshold was avoided, 
there would be no need to consider the obligations of 
enterprises (EGCOE 2018: 28). From a human rights 
perspective this is highly arbitrary and creates confusion 
when combined with the independent responsibility of 
businesses to respect human rights. 
The definition of enterprise includes a “business, 
company, firm, venture, organisation, operation, or 
undertaking that is private” unless it “does not carry 
on commercial or industrial activities”, as well as “any 
non-private entity when and to the extent that it carries 
on commercial or industrial activities” (EGCOE 2018: 
1). The Enterprises Principles focus on GHG emissions 
that can be attributed to an enterprise, while observing 
that the methodology for doing so is contested (EGCOE 
2018: 30-36). Here, “emissions from oil exploration, 
extraction and refining [are attributed] to the responsible 
oil company, whereas emissions from combustion in 
an airplane are attributed to the airline” (EGCOE 2018: 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
the context of business activities (CESCR 2017).
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pension funds, insurers and reinsurers, among others. 
Consideration is given to the financial implications of 
failing to adequately consider GHG emissions associated 
with a project or investment, the need to justify investment 
in non-complying enterprises, and the need for investors to 
play an active role in promoting compliance. 
While open to critique especially for failing to consider 
remedy or accountability, the Enterprises Principles adopt 
a nuanced understanding of the nature of the internation-
al actors that include carbon majors. Rather than assum-
ing that all sovereign states and all enterprises based in 
sovereign states are operating on an equal footing and 
bear equal responsibility, the Enterprises Principles make 
a noble effort to grapple with the complexities of common 
but differentiated responsibilities of states, carbon bud-
get allocations between states, poverty, and development. 
The result is unfortunately highly complex, with much 
uncertainty in application, and does not clearly align with 
the UNGPs. It would be informative to learn the views of 
human rights NGOs on the Enterprises Principles, and 
especially their attempt to grapple with the complexity of 
differentiation. This is particularly pertinent in light of the 
latest Heede update in which three state-owned enterpris-
es, Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), Gazprom (Russia), and 
National Iranian Oil Co. (Iran), are placed in the top 5 of 
global greenhouse gas emitters since 1965 (Heede 2019). 
From a human rights perspective, should the climate 
change responsibilities of these state-owned enterprises 
from countries that are classified by the UN as developing 
be the same as US-based investor-owned enterprises 
such as Chevron and ExxonMobil? 
2019 Safe Climate report
The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Environ-
ment, David Boyd, released the Safe Climate report in 
July 2019 for presentation to the UN General Assembly 
in October. This report confirms the existing responsi-
bility of business enterprises to respect human rights as 
they pertain to climate change, specifically stating that 
businesses “must adopt human rights policies, conduct 
human rights due diligence, remedy human rights viola-
tions for which they are responsible, and work to influence 
of human rights. Furthermore, Principle 16 suggests that 
where exceptional circumstances such as natural disas-
ters occur, an enterprise may be exempt from reduction 
targets, yet it is unclear why powerful and well-resourced 
companies that fail to adequately anticipate a natural 
disaster should be exempt, particularly if the extent of 
the disaster is exacerbated by human-induced climate 
change. 
Principle 17 contemplates that enterprises should 
take into account the GHG emissions of their suppliers 
where feasible, suggesting that these emissions are not 
routinely attributed to the enterprise. This may also be out 
of step with a human rights due diligence approach to 
responsibility under Principle 19 of the UNGPs.5 Guidance 
on disclosure, including of stranded assets, is provided in 
Principles 18-23, and goes beyond the Oslo Principles in 
extending those for whom disclosure is made to include 
consumers, the public, and employees.
Principles 8 and 24 provide that enterprises must conduct 
environmental impact assessment of major new facilities 
or expansions, including an assessment of carbon foot-
print, upstream and downstream effects and related miti-
gation opportunities, and potential future climate change 
effects. However, no explicit direction is given on what to 
do with this information, or whether the public should be 
consulted by the enterprise as part of the process (EGCOE 
2018: 193-196). Moreover, consideration of the need for 
the project or alternatives to it that are less carbon inten-
sive does not appear in the text. The Commentary does 
conclude by noting that human rights impact assess-
ments, following the UNGPs, are “progressing rapidly” as 
an additional tool (EGCOE 2018: 198). 
Principles 25-30 consider investors and financiers, includ-
ing the obligations of banks engaged in project finance, 
5  What precisely would be required of human rights due 
diligence in the climate context is unclear, although supply 
chain responsibility for GHGs could be viewed as the exercise of 
leverage across relationships in response to human rights due 
diligence. However, the authors of the Enterprises Principles did 
consider the UNGPs and related OECD guidance when developing 
the scope of this principle and came to a different conclusion.
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and existing tools should be emphasized and leveraged by 
human rights actors to ratchet up existing responsibilities 
of businesses to do their part as organs of society to alle-
viate increasing climate impacts on those who can least 
afford to bear them. Human rights due diligence guidance 
tools are being developed for businesses, perhaps most 
notably by the OECD, yet many fall short of integrating 
human rights responsibilities for climate change, even 
as they provide useful guidance for businesses on other 
related aspects such as stakeholder and rights-holder 
engagement (Seck 2018). This essay has briefly exam-
ined some key examples in the hope of providing ideas to 
inspire climate action today by both human rights actors 
and businesses themselves.
A common refrain from human rights NGOs is scepticism 
over ‘non-binding’ responsible business guidance tools, 
and a preference to devote resources to ‘binding’ solu-
tions such as the business and human rights treaty. Yet 
it is crucial that human rights NGOs not ignore the emer-
gence of business guidance tools in the climate context 
(and others) for many reasons. First, even if a ‘binding’ 
business and human rights treaty were negotiated that 
provided the potential for future effective corporate 
accountability, a treaty is only effective if a sufficient 
number of key states ratify and then implement it. The 
record of effective treaty implementation in the interna-
tional environmental liability context is poor, and a quick 
glance at the climate regime should give even the most 
enthusiastic treaty endorsers reason to pause. If it has 
proven so difficult to reach effective agreement among 
states as to their own climate commitments, even before 
ratcheting them up to the necessary level to avoid climate 
crisis, how likely is it that a business and human rights 
treaty will ever be able to effectively address climate 
accountability?
Second, with regard to climate change, the time to enable 
preventative action is now. An increasing number of 
businesses are seeking guidance on how to be climate 
responsible actors, yet the human rights community has 
for the most part utterly failed to meaningfully engage in 
efforts to develop useful tools. Particularly at this moment 
in history, with the United States poised to withdraw from 
other actors to respect human rights where relationships 
of leverage exist” (OHCHR 2019b: para 71). Moreover, 
the Safe Climate report elaborates that the business 
responsibility includes the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions from activities, products, and services, while 
minimizing emissions from suppliers, and ensuring those 
impacted by business climate harms can access remedies 
(OHCHR 2019b: para 72). Notably, the Safe Climate 
report relies on the Enterprises Principles for these 
insights (OHCHR 2019b: note 90; Seck & Benjamin 2019). 
Beyond this, the Safe Climate report also provides that 
businesses should support public policies designed to 
effectively address climate harms, rather than opposing 
them (OHCHR 2019b: para 72). 
These two paragraphs in the Safe Climate report that elab-
orate briefly upon the meaning of business responsibilities 
to respect human rights at risk from climate change, and 
the need for businesses to support state climate policy, 
provide the most elaborate OHCHR analysis to date on 
point. It is notable that the Safe Climate report relies on 
both the UNGPs and the Enterprises Principles. It is to be 
hoped that further clarity will emerge from the OHCHR, and 
from human rights NGOs, so that businesses that seek to 
address the climate and human rights impacts of their 
operations have access to meaningful guidance.
Conclusions
The human dimensions of climate change are increas-
ingly in the news, as the world grapples with the ongoing 
failure of many states to effectively decrease greenhouse 
gas emissions so as to avoid climate crisis. The inde-
pendent responsibility of businesses to respect human 
rights under the UNGPs provides a frequently overlooked 
and often misunderstood tool that must be called into 
play to prevent and remedy climate injustice. It is crucial 
that the independent responsibility of businesses to 
respect human rights, including those impacted by 
climate change, be taken seriously. Failure to do so 
inadvertently propagates the message that business 
conduct that contributes to the violation of human 
rights, including those associated with climate crisis, is 
acceptable in the absence of state regulation. It is not, 
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the Paris Agreement on climate change, it is crucial that 
non-state actors, perhaps especially powerful transna-
tional businesses, are encouraged and enabled to take 
meaningful human rights-respecting climate action, 
rather than wait for state action that may never come. The 
human rights community must step up, engage, critique, 
and guide, rather than ignore the potential of climate 
responsible business conduct as a vital preventative tool 
that can be mobilized now.
At the time of writing, the Working Group on Business and 
Human Rights has promised to develop an information 
note on BHR and climate change, to be released in 2020 
(OHCHR 2020). This is a crucially important opportunity to 
provide clarity on the meaning of human rights respecting 
business conduct in a time of climate crisis.
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Sabin Centre (Columbia University) and the Grantham 
Institute (London School of Economics). These cases 
preponderantly involve states (e.g. citizens suing govern-
ments), with only three involving non-state actors only 
(e.g. citizens suing corporations). 
This focus on states is to be expected, given that under 
human rights law the main duty-holder is the state. As 
discussed elsewhere in this volume, in recent years, 
human rights bodies have done much work to clarify the 
content of states’ human rights obligations in relation to 
climate change. This interpretative work has clearly shown 
that obligations associated with both substantive human 
rights (e.g. the right to life, adequate housing, food, and 
the highest attainable standard of health) and procedural 
human rights (e.g. the right to access to remedies and to 
take part in the conduct of public affairs) take on a specif-
ic character in relation to climate change. Most saliently, 
states have specific obligations to “enable affordable and 
timely access to justice and effective remedies for all, to 
hold states and businesses accountable for fulfilling their 
climate change obligations” (OHCHR 2019b: para 64). 
Even though conventionally greenhouse gas emissions are 
attributed to states, recent studies suggest that a group 
of corporations are historically responsible for the lion’s 
share of global emissions (Ekwurzel et al. 2017; Frumhoff, 
Heede & Oreskes 2015; Heede 2014). After the adoption of 
the Paris Agreement in 2015, many companies announced 
voluntary measures to tackle emissions, but there has 
been a glaring gap between words and action. In fact, 
evidence suggests that many fossil fuel companies have 
Human rights arguments are increasingly being made, 
and human rights remedies increasingly being sought, in 
climate change litigation. While relatively few cases have 
been argued on human rights grounds so far, the trend is 
continuing and accelerating, with some striking results. 
However, human rights remedies offer little, if any, 
compensatory relief for the impacts of climate change, 
and few means to deter further harm. So why use them?
The use of human rights arguments in 
climate change litigation
In recent years, litigants around the world have increas-
ingly tried to push the boundaries of the law by filing test 
cases to prompt state and corporate actors to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, or to obtain redress for the 
impacts of climate change on persons, property, or the 
environment. The use of human rights law as a gap-filler 
to provide remedies where other areas of the law do not 
is not new. It is thus hardly a surprise that human rights 
arguments are increasingly used in climate change litiga-
tion. While relatively few climate cases have been argued 
on human rights grounds so far, the trend is continuing 
and accelerating, with some striking results.
In August 2019 there were 32 human rights cases listed 
in climate change litigation databases curated by the 
*  This piece builds on her contributions to Savaresi & 
Hartmann (2019); Savaresi & Auz (2019); and Savaresi (2019). 
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance 
received from Marisa McVey, Chloe Abbott and Urenmisan 
Afinotan in the preparation of this piece.
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obligation to refrain from causing harm, this would in 
all events merely “treat climate change as a series of 
individual transboundary harms, rather than as a global 
threat to human rights” (Knox 2009b: 211).
So what has changed? In the last few years human rights 
arguments have been increasingly used to prop up those 
based on private or public law, to call for greater state 
and corporate efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Furthermore, applicants have tried to use human rights 
remedies as an avenue to redress personal injury and 
property damage associated with climate change, which 
can be framed in terms of human rights violations. 
The success of human rights arguments depends 
upon whether a victim can substantiate a claim that 
a duty-bearer has failed to comply with human rights 
obligations. Human rights arguments associated with 
climate change can thus be formulated in two main ways: 
applicants may complain that failure to act (e.g. a failure 
to adopt and/or implement climate change legislation) 
has resulted in human rights violations; or, conversely 
that certain actions (e.g. permits or licenses to extract 
fossil fuels or log forests) have led to human rights viola-
tions. The sections below look at how these arguments 
have been used in climate change litigation, starting 
with cases where applicants have used human rights 
arguments to challenge governments and corporations for 
failing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Human rights complaints about failure to 
reduce emissions
Human rights arguments in climate change litigation have 
so far largely been used to support complaints over states’ 
– and, to a more limited extent, corporations’ – failure 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Courts and human 
rights bodies around the world have increasingly been 
asked to consider the human rights implications of states’ 
action (e.g. licenses for oil extraction) (Oslo District Court 
2018) or inaction (e.g. insufficient ambition in targets 
enshrined in law and policy) (The Hague Court of Appeal 
2018). Two landmark decisions taken in 2018 have shown 
how decisive human rights arguments may be.
continued to lobby against climate change action, to 
spread disinformation and to support climate deniers 
(Union of Concerned Scientists 2018). These activities 
have come under increasing scrutiny in light of recent 
developments in international,1 regional2 and national3 
law, which acknowledge corporate responsibilities for 
human rights violations, and impose at least some 
accountability upon corporate actors for these.4 
Most human rights cases concerning climate change 
remain ongoing at the time of writing, and a handful 
have been successful. Yet, this trend is remarkable if one 
considers that, just ten years ago, a report of the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) noted 
that “while climate change has obvious implications for 
the enjoyment of human rights, it is less obvious whether, 
and to what extent, such effects can be qualified as 
human rights violations in a strict legal sense” (OHCHR 
2009: para 70). The report cautioned that it would be 
“virtually impossible to disentangle the complex causal 
relationships” linking emissions to human rights viola-
tions, and that in all events the adverse effects of climate 
change are often projections about future impacts, 
whereas human rights violations are normally estab-
lished after the harm has occurred (OHCHR 2009). These 
caveats were echoed by the future UN Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox, who 
warned that, if there was scope to recognize the negative 
1  See UNHRC (2011) and UNHRC (2014).
2  Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and 
diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups 
(Text with EEA relevance) [2014] OJ L330/1. See also Protocol on 
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol) (adopted 27 June 
2014, not yet entered into force), art 46.
3  See e.g. the UK’s Modern Slavery Act (2015), the French Loi 
n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance 
des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre (‘Loi du 
Vigilance’) and Décret n° 2012-557 du 24 avril 2012 relatif aux 
obligations de transparence des entreprises en matière sociale et 
environnementale. 
4  See e.g. ICSID (2016) Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas 
Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/26, Award of 8 December, 
2016; The UK Supreme Court (2019) Vedanta Resources PLC and 
another v Lungowe and others, Judgement of 10 April, [2019] 
UKSC 20. 
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was dismissed in 2019 because of lack of standing but 
is currently under appeal. The People’s climate case is 
nevertheless significant, in that it challenges a package 
of climate legislation, arguing that implementation would 
lead to human rights breaches, not only of EU citizens, 
but also of those residing outside the EU. 
Far from “treating climate change as a series of indi-
vidual transboundary harms”, therefore, applicants in the 
cases above are arguing that climate change should be 
averted because it systematically threatens the enjoyment 
of human rights. These developments show not only that 
human rights arguments are being increasingly deployed, 
but also that demands associated with the protection of 
human rights are becoming bolder, and attempt to sanc-
tion harm that is predicted to happen in the future – and 
thus affect future generations – or occurring outside of 
the bounds of a state’s territory. At the same time, a new 
front in litigation has opened, concerning the impacts of 
climate change. 
Human rights complaints about the impacts 
of climate change
While so far no court has found that particular emissions 
relate causally to adverse climate change impacts for the 
purpose of establishing liability,6 litigants are pushing 
the boundaries of private, public, and administrative law 
to obtain redress for damage to persons, property and/or 
the environment associated with climate change (Peel & 
Osofsky 2018; Setzer & Vanhala 2019). 
It is presently difficult to obtain redress for climate 
change harms. Existing liability schemes scarcely seem fit 
to address harm associated with the impacts of climate 
change. As a matter of scale, climate change is predicted 
to cause unprecedented damage to property, persons and 
the environment. This damage is predictable, but only 
to the extent that we know it will happen, not where and 
when. Thus, extant liability and insurance schemes need 
to be adapted in order to address the complex restorative 
6  See e.g. Saúl Luciano Lliuya v RWE AG (2015), Case No. 2 
0285/15 of the Essen Regional Court, Germany (pending). 
In the first, a group of Colombian youth successfully 
challenged the Colombian government for failure to 
tackle deforestation in the Amazon, thereby breaching 
several human rights enshrined both in the Colombian 
Constitution and in international instruments (Supreme 
Court of Justice of Colombia 2018).5 In the second, the 
Urgenda Foundation and a sizeable group of citizens 
successfully challenged the Dutch government for not 
taking sufficiently ambitious action to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions (The Hague Court of Appeal 2018). While 
the Dutch case had in the first instance been decided 
on the basis of administrative and tort law (The Hague 
District Court 2015), the Court of Appeal set aside a 
restrictive interpretation of victimhood and framed the 
state’s duty of care also with reference to rights enshrined 
in the European Convention on Human Rights – such as 
the right to life and the right to respect for private and 
family life. These victories have encouraged litigants and 
human rights advocates to use similar arguments before 
national courts – for example against the Canadian 
Government (Superior Court of Quebec 2019) – and before 
international human rights bodies – for example against 
Australia (Client Earth 2019). 
These human rights complaints have started to target 
corporations as well. In 2019 civil society organizations 
in France (Notre Affaire à Tous 2019) and the Nether-
lands (Milieudefensie 2019) have asked national courts 
to declare that fossil fuel corporations’ contribution to 
climate change violates human rights law. 
Applicants are also becoming more ambitious. In the 
so-called People’s climate case, applicants from Kenya, 
Fiji, Portugal, Germany, France, Italy, Romania, and the 
Sami youth association Sáminuorra (CURIA 2018), asked 
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) to set aside and 
replace three EU climate law instruments, on the basis 
of human rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. So far, the applicants have failed to persuade 
the CJEU to move beyond its restrictive interpretation 
of the threshold to access judicial review, and the case 
5 Hereinafter Future Generations v. Colombia. 
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black carbon, which affect Athabaskan communities 
within and without Canada’s territory (Earth Justice 
2013). Similarly, following the widespread loss of life and 
harm to property and persons associated with increasingly 
extreme weather events, civil society organizations asked 
the Philippines Human Rights Commission to investigate 
the responsibility of the world’s largest corporate emitters 
– so called Carbon Majors – for human rights violations, 
or threats thereof, resulting from the impacts of climate 
change (Greenpeace 2015). 
These complaints provide an opportunity to see whether 
the arguments made in 2009 by the OHCHR on the justi-
ciability of human rights violations associated with the 
impacts of climate change still stand. For example, should 
the Philippines Human Rights Commission find that the 
Carbon Majors’ are responsible for human rights violations 
resulting from the impacts of climate change, this would 
be a primer and could have repercussions on the use of 
human rights arguments in ongoing climate change liti-
gation against the Carbon Majors elsewhere. As mentioned 
above, in 2019 Friends of the Earth (Netherlands), six 
NGOs and around 400 citizens sued Shell for breaches of 
the duty of care associated with its contribution to climate 
change and its continued investments in fossil fuels. Simi-
lar to Urgenda, the applicants have relied, amongst others, 
on the right to life and the right to respect for private and 
family life, home and correspondence recognized by the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
The outcome of the Carbon Majors inquiry may therefore 
resonate well beyond the Philippines. For the time being, 
the inquiry has already set a significant precedent, by 
showing that a national human rights institution may look 
into the responsibility of corporate actors headquartered 
outside of the territory of state. The inquiry may further-
more establish that corporations may be held responsible 
for human rights violations associated with the impacts 
of climate change and even open the way to compensation 
through subsequent legal action, thus marking another 
milestone in climate change litigation worldwide.
and distributive justice considerations associated with the 
impacts of climate change. Before this happens, human 
rights arguments may be used to fill the gap.
Human rights remedies are not designed to specifically 
redress environmental damage. They have, nevertheless, 
historically been used as an avenue to address personal 
and property harm associated with various forms of 
pollution or environmental degradation, especially where 
no other remedies are available (Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights 2010; Council of Europe 2012). In 
general, human rights are helpful because they are widely 
recognized in both international and national law, as a set 
of basic rights and freedoms that belong to every person. 
The obligations associated with the protection of human 
rights may be enforced both nationally and internationally 
against states and – to some extent – non-state actors, 
and, in certain circumstances, in an extraterritorial 
context. The issue is, therefore, to establish when and 
how they can be used in relation to the impacts of climate 
change. 
As recounted above, in 2009 the OHCHR specifically 
cautioned that qualifying the effects of climate change 
as human rights violations poses a series of technical 
obstacles, concerning the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
human rights complaints associated with the impacts of 
climate change; how to attribute responsibility in terms 
of causality, retrospectivity, and apportionment; and what 
may be regarded as adequate remedies for human rights 
violations associated with the impacts of climate change 
(OHCHR 2009: para 69-70). Yet, recent litigation indicates 
that these obstacles may not be insurmountable.
The historical contribution of state and non-state actors 
to greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change is 
increasingly well documented, and advances in scientific 
knowledge are making it easier to trace causal connections 
between particular emissions and the resulting harms 
(UNHRC 2016: para 36-37). For example, the Athabaskan 
people have petitioned the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, arguing that Canada has breached its 
human rights obligations by causing significant adverse 
impacts in the Artic, by failing to regulate emissions of 
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caused to their lands, water and livelihood (Friends of the 
Earth International 2019), in spite of multiple court victo-
ries before national, regional and international tribunals.7
Human rights law is no replacement for effective legis-
lation concerning climate change, and human rights 
remedies are no replacement for tort-like liability for 
climate change impacts. There are dangers too, associ-
ated with clashes between human rights claims, that may 
be relied upon to protect a quality of life that imposes 
unacceptable climate costs on society (Pedersen 2011). 
For example, human rights arguments have been used 
to resist the establishment of wind farms (Peeters & 
Schomerus 2014; Peeters & Nóbrega 2014), highlighting 
the potentially complex, layered, conflicting claims when 
it comes to the protection of different human rights.8
Yet, past experience suggests that successful human 
rights complaints can help to bring about a change in 
attitude by courts and lawmakers. By highlighting prin-
ciples of universality and non-discrimination, the rights 
of future generations and of those living outside a state’s 
territory, human rights arguments in public interest 
litigation can contribute to engendering a momentum to 
deal with one of the most intractable challenges yet to 
face humankind.
The viability of public interest litigation reliant on human 
rights arguments depends on both legal and social 
variables (Anderson 1998: 21). It requires that standing 
rules be interpreted in a way to enable individuals or 
groups to be heard, and that the judiciary is independent 
and sympathetic. Under human rights law, victims are 
7  Such as Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company 
Nig. Ltd. and 2 others Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05; Shell Pet. Dev. 
Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Isaiah (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.723)168; Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Anor v Nigeria (2001) 
AHRLR 60, Africa Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Communication 155/96; The Bodo Community v. Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (2015) EWHC HT-2015-
000241.
8  See Fägerskiöld v Sweden, European Court of Human Rights, 
Application no. 37664/04, Decision as to Admissibility; and, 
Vecbaštika and Others v Latvia, European Court of Human Rights 
Application no. 52499/11 (pending). 
The limitations of human rights
As the examples above show, human rights law argu-
ments are playing an increasingly prominent role in 
climate change litigation. For lack of better remedies, 
human rights arguments are being used to supplement 
regulatory action and change state and corporate actors’ 
behaviour, and to help address the complex restorative 
and distributive justice questions associated with climate 
change.
This is, however, an area where human rights law also 
presents clear limitations. Human rights law typically 
provides declaratory relief to name and shame human 
rights abusers, but this makes little difference if it is not 
followed by action to prevent further harm and to remedy 
the harm caused. The Urgenda case provides a hopeful 
example of how litigation may be used to put pressure 
on the government to take legislative action on climate 
change. Future Generations v. Colombia, however, clearly 
shows how human rights remedies offer limited means 
to deter further harm: in spite of their much acclaimed 
court victory, the applicants have failed to halt forest loss 
in Colombia, which has reportedly continued unabated 
(Ardilla Sierra 2019). 
In the Carbon Majors inquiry, the powers of the Philip-
pines Human Rights Commission rest with the domestic 
authorities’ limited powers to affect the future behaviour 
of the Carbon Majors. But even the enforcement of court 
judgements is not to be taken for granted, and the history 
of human rights law is full of pyrrhic victories, especially 
in the environmental context (Gilbert 2018). For almost 
forty years (350.org 2019), coal power plants in the 
Mugla region of Turkey have continued to severely affect 
the quality of life for local inhabitants (Climate Action 
Network 2018),  despite the recognition of widespread 
human rights abuses, including by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR 2005). Similarly, victims of severe 
human rights abuses associated with oil extraction in the 
Niger Delta are still awaiting for remediation of the harm 
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international level, human rights bodies may be system-
atically used as institutionalized pathways to monitor and 
sanction human rights violations associated with climate 
change and the implementation of climate change 
response measures. Before national courts, human rights 
arguments may be used to put pressure on state and 
corporate actors, to increase ambition on climate change 
and to redress harm caused by climate change. 
Ultimately, human rights are no silver bullet and there are 
limits to their capacity to redress human rights abuses 
associated with climate change and to address their root 
causes. Human rights law is nevertheless an impor-
tant complement to climate change law, as it currently 
stands. As Humphreys noted already in 2008, human 
rights continue to “occupy much of the space of justice 
discourse and therefore represent an ‘essential term of 
reference’ to address justice and equity questions in the 
context of climate change” (Humphreys 2009: 45). One 
just has to be aware of their limitations. 
normally saddled with a less stringent burden of proof, 
when compared, for example, with tort law.9 Applicants 
in Urgenda and Future Generations v. Colombia have 
convinced courts to expose governmental inaction, and to 
order states to do more to tackle climate change. These 
decisions relied on a novel approach to the interpretation 
of human rights vis-à-vis climate change law obligations. 
Using human rights law has also enabled petitioners to 
formulate complaints, such as those in the Carbon Majors 
inquiry, which would have not been possible by making 
resort to tort law. 
So far, some significant milestones have been achieved 
and the boundaries of the law have already been shifted. 
Human rights arguments have been used not only to 
complain about actual harm, but also about future harms, 
caused by states, as well as by corporate actors, and even 
in an extraterritorial context. We have therefore already 
gone a long way, compared with where we were only ten 
years ago, when the OHCHR report made its first assess-
ment of the state of play. 
The successes achieved thus far are likely to continue 
to inspire others to use human rights arguments to put 
pressure on state and corporate actors, both to increase 
ambition in combating climate change and to redress 
harm caused by its impacts. The outcome of pending 
complaints may further embolden applicants or suggest 
new avenues to test the full potential of human rights 
arguments. The advantages of taking a human rights 
approach to the matter of climate change are, eminently, 
that it translates climate change concerns in terms of 
obligations owed directly to individuals; and, relatedly, 
that it provides access to remedies that may not other-
wise be available. 
Much more could be done going forward. Most saliently, 
human rights law may provide access to remedies at 
the domestic and, potentially, at the international level 
to complain about breaches of human rights associated 
with climate change. Both at the national and at the 
9  See e.g. Tătar v. Romania, App No 67021/01 (ECtHR 5 July 
2007) [107]-[124].
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Stephen Humphreys 
Delayed and denied: climate inequity  
and human rights
global economy capable of conjuring a technological 
escape from our climate constraints (think of the ‘Green 
New Deal’) – and even were such a vision feasible – the 
spread of a liberal global market has, with contemporary 
climate realities, lost the sheen of inevitability acquired 
at the close of the cold war. There are real stakes. 
“History,” writes Malm (2018:11), “has sprung alive”, as 
the carbon consumption of the past – the immediate past 
flowing by us, as well as its centuries-long tail – deter-
mines the future in ways that are both intractable and 
unpredictable. 
Climate change makes the future both intractable and 
unpredictable because the cumulation of burned carbon 
over past centuries builds in an atmospheric effect the 
extent of which will only be felt and appreciated in future, 
with the passage of time. There is, in other words, a delay 
between the cause – the consumption of fossil fuels 
(primarily) – and the effect – the storms, heatwaves, 
droughts, floods, rising seas and sinking islands, whose 
frequency and intensity will, on every account, increase, 
even as their precise timing and location will remain 
largely unknowable. There is delay built into climate 
change, and it is a delay that is, moreover, inhuman – in 
that it is not subject to human intent, unresponsive to 
human time-management, and unconcerned with human 
expectations and human pain. History reawakens as a 
process of change-in-time where the stakes of change 
remain up for contest. However, unlike the high modern 
period with which Malm contrasts the present, in climate 
change the contest is not (or not obviously – but I will 
pick this up below) between competing ideas about law, 
The delay between the causes of climate change and its 
effects creates a space within which denial and injustice 
have flourished. Climate law relies on ‘equity’ to address 
climate injustice: this may be buttressed by human rights, 
resurgent in the face of increasingly daily violations. 
The bubble of delay
In his recent book, The Progress of this Storm, Andreas 
Malm claims that the felt reality of climate change has 
reawakened a sense that we are living-in-time. By ‘time’ 
he is not referring to daily or seasonal cycles, but to lines 
of putative historical progress. As the last century ended, 
it was plausible to consider that history had, in a sense, 
come to a halt. Market liberalism had apparently won the 
centuries-long battle of ideas and was installing itself 
across the globe. Relatedly, perhaps, human rights too (in 
a trajectory that accelerated with the founding of Amnesty 
International in 1961) were becoming a dominant 
language of justice across the world. The relationship 
between these two forces – human rights and market 
liberalism – was perhaps not initially very clear: were 
market ‘freedoms’ consonant with human rights or did 
they constitute a threat (Moyn 2014)?
On Malm’s telling, climate change reawakens the cate-
gory of time precisely because we no longer know what 
our destination is. Whether we approved of it or not, we 
appear no longer to be secure in a universal vision of a 
market machine that metabolizes the world’s resources 
ad infinitum. Even if some, possibly most, contemporary 
climate narratives cling to the vision of an expanding 
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connection between the wind we are sowing today – 
the extraordinarily destructive seeds of our everyday 
lives – and the hurricanes we will certainly reap, feels 
blurry, loose, deniable. It hasn’t happened yet: it might 
not happen at all. Or: in the temporal gap between 
cause and effect, we might figure out how to avert the 
effects altogether. In its starkest form, this fantasy is 
the dream of geoengineering – but it can be tracked in 
every narrative proposing technological fixes to climate 
change, and these today include all available scenarios in 
which global warming peaks at 1.5°C above preindustrial 
temperatures (see Rogelj et al. 2018). The delay, in short, 
has become our lifeline of denial, allowing us to believe in 
potential futures which do not and will not exist. Igno-
rance breeds inaction. 
Responses delayed, responsibility denied
At some level, it will have been clear, I am invoking the 
old adage ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. It is no 
longer controversial that climate change brings about 
grave harms and injustices, and that many of these are 
best understood as human rights violations. People are 
losing their lives, homes and livelihoods due to storms 
whose frequency and force would have been vanish-
ingly unlikely were it not for manmade climate change.2 
Climate change already brings water scarcity and food 
insecurity for hundreds of thousands of persons; health 
is threatened, homes are lost, the less well-off every-
where are more vulnerable than the well-heeled.3 Climate 
change greatly increases the likelihood of conflict and is 
already triggering mass movements of people from its 
related impacts. All this is set to get much worse. 
2  See the testimony by Myles Allen at the proceedings of the 
Philippines Commission on Human Rights National Enquiry 
on Climate Change, hearings held at the London School of 
Economics, 6-7 November 2018. Available at: http://www.lse.
ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/event/inquiry/.
3  See the various reports of the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, especially those of the 
Special Procedures on Health, Housing, Children’s Rights, 
Extreme Poverty, and the Environment. Available at: https://
www.ohchr.org/en/issues/hrandclimatechange/pages/
hrclimatechangeindex.aspx. 
economy and government; it is rather a contest between 
competing interpretations of the nature of the delay itself. 
What is unfolding? How quickly? Where? With what 
effect? Can it be stopped? 
The bubble of denial
In this knowledge-contest over the nature of the delay, 
there are a spectrum of views, some of which are charac-
terizable as denialist. But denialism is not exhausted by 
the plaintive and, in fact, dwindling claim that climate 
change is not ‘real’. Rather degrees of denialism run 
throughout the entire climate experience – if by ‘denial’ 
we mean an unwillingness to face the truths serially 
put before us by the practitioners of the ‘best available 
science’.1 In conditions of climate change our daily lives 
involve constant exercises in denial, requiring us to ignore 
both the myriad small contributions we ourselves make to 
the problem through our everyday choices and activities 
and the sheer scale of the mounting pain these choices 
of ours are building towards. We are in denial both about 
how much has to be done to check the advancing tide of 
heat, and about how little is actually being done. We are 
in denial about the vanishingly tiny likelihood that we can 
retain our lifestyles and global ‘growth’, just as we are in 
denial about the huge costs to be borne to avoid the far 
greater costs climate change will otherwise exact. We are 
in denial about our personal and collective responsibility, 
in high-emitting countries, for the havoc wreaked and 
lives and livelihoods lost in vulnerable countries. We are 
in denial about our past, which has brought us to this 
impasse, our present, in which we continue to fail to 
address it, and our future, which is bleaker than we are 
ready to imagine. We are in denial about the fact that 
our laws and governments are not working for us – for 
the many of us who have and will suffer climate change 
without having contributed much to it – and we are in 
denial about our power to make them do better. 
All this denial is also, or appears to be, enmeshed in 
delay. In the bubble of delay, the incontrovertible causal 
1  The term is from the Paris Agreement, Article 14(a).
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in – indeed a superior form of – justice, a vital means to 
compensate for the flawed generality of law when applied 
to particular cases, through the exercise of discernment 
or discretion on the part of an arbitrator or judge. The 
Greek term epikieia translates as ‘decent’ or ‘fitting’ – 
and Aristotle extols the ‘equitable man’ who exercises 
equity in daily life – through letting go of legal rights, for 
example, in the interests of empathy or harmony (Aristotle 
1939). The point is equity involves not insisting on the 
letter of the law. As Cicero would later put it, equity is 
a recognition of the potential for harm in overly literal 
legal interpretation: summum ius summa iniuria – the 
more law the more harm (Shanske 2005). On its face, this 
early tradition does not appear promising for a theory or 
practice of human rights. But it clearly holds within itself 
a kernel of sympathy for the individual human which will 
blossom in time. 
This kernel finds some fruition in the Roman law tradition, 
where equity (aequum; aequitas) provided a channel 
for what would gradually become known as natural law 
principles – notions of fairness and equality that direct 
lawmakers and adjudicators to ensure basic equalities 
under law (Schiavone 2012). There are no slaves under 
natural law, the Roman jurist Ulpian famously wrote 
around CE 200; slavery is an institution of the positive 
law of nations (Mommsen et al. 1985). In a powerful 
tradition running through late Roman law (‘law is the 
art of the equitable and the good’),4 and into medieval 
scholasticism (‘equity is justice tempered by sweet 
mercy’),5 equity becomes a marker of how law is to be 
done, presuming an underlying universal equality between 
the subjects of law, a technique for bridging the positive 
law to something that would (later again) be termed 
natural justice. Indeed ‘equity’ tells us what this kind of 
justice might mean for law: equality, non-discrimination, 
fairness. Something that is ‘due’ each person regardless 
of status or wealth – something universal and prior to 
the social or political. And so by the time it is revived in 
4  Ulpian, quoted in Mommsen et al. (1985).
5  The glossarist Hostiensis, in an oft-quoted definition, 
reworked by Jean Gerson and Christopher St. Germain. See 
Rueger (1982).
The question of delay therefore has to do not only with the 
space of responsibility within which climate harms take 
place, but also with the time of redress for the extensive 
human rights violations to which climate change is 
now giving rise. The two are presumably related. Does it 
matter for ‘climate justice’ that climate harms appear 
in what I have called the ‘bubble of delay’ – that they 
were not, for example, pre-empted, given that they were 
predicted far in advance? Does it matter whether ‘redress’ 
for these harms come later rather than sooner and by 
how much – or perhaps the question should rather be: is 
it possible to expedite redress? It is, after all, a simple 
matter to observe that the longer we put off effective 
climate action, the worse the human rights consequences 
are. It is less simple to identify the frame within which 
climate action is persistently deferred and to relate this 
to the available frameworks of justice and redress that 
characterize ‘human rights’ in our usual understanding 
of the term. Quibbles over ‘responsibility’, as a matter of 
science, stand to delay redress, as a matter of law. Indeed 
that is, presumably, the point.
Equity, justice, human rights
For my title I have chosen the term ‘climate inequity’ 
rather than ‘climate injustice’ (or, indeed, ‘climate 
justice’) because ‘equity’ is a term of art in climate law 
(appearing in both the UNFCCC and in the Paris Agree-
ment) whereas ‘justice’ is not. Neither term is trans-
parent, and the particular tradition that joins ‘equity’ to 
‘justice’ (deriving from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics) 
does not easily encompass the many strands of thought 
and political activism that exist today under the banner 
of ‘climate justice’. Further, in my title, I have linked 
‘climate inequity’ to human rights. The consonance of 
these two terms – equity and human rights – may appear 
self-evident, but in fact in the vast literature on the legal 
principle of ‘equity’, very little mention is made of human 
rights. If the intuition that human rights are relevant to 
climate equity is correct, it needs to be shown rather than 
presumed.
So what is equity? Most accounts begin with Aristotle 
(2012), for whom equity (epikieia) is an essential element 
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91). But over time, “laws, like swords, came to be used 
against those who made them... Thus the law became 
anything or nothing at the courtesy of great men and 
bended by them like a twig” such that “laws upon laws 
do bridle the people and run counter to their end”. Law, 
which ought to be the guarantor of freedom, has, in 17th 
century England, succumbed, says Warr, to power: it must 
be “reduced to its original space which is the protection 
of the poor against the mighty” (Sedley & Kaplan 1992: 
92). Equity plays a starring role in Warr’s writings, as 
“the divine principle”, which is the “clear reason and 
understanding of all things”. “Reason,” Warr adds, “is 
the measure of all just laws” and the “proper fountain of 
good and righteous laws, a spirit of understanding big 
with freedom, and having a single respect for people’s 
rights”. When equity is restored to law, Warr says “we 
shall all then stand on even ground, in a perfect level, 
co-ordination and parity (…) This is the fall of worldly 
interests” (Sedley & Kaplan 1992: 33-4). Warr’s work is 
a reminder that today’s delay-and-denial is not merely a 
question of science, but is also, in fact, one of law and 
governance: who should the law serve and how?
For its time, this is less eclectic than it may sound 
today: in the contemporary writings of Francisco Suárez, 
Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes – the great theorists 
of natural rights – equity will repeatedly appear, often 
obliquely, as the ultimate backstop of a natural law, asso-
ciated with the superarching justice and reason of God. 
Warr’s particular association of equity and rights was 
shared by his contemporary radicals Gerrard Winstanley 
and Samuel Rutherford, both of whom find ‘equity’ as 
the essential element in a law that underpins ‘rights’ 
that were not themselves codified.7 This association was 
in fact the culmination of the centuries-long emergence 
of natural right principles in medieval legal writing, 
where ‘natural equity’ provided the conceptual means to 
judge the ‘rightness’ of positive law (Tierney 1997: esp. 
131-169).
7  See Rutherford’s Lex Rex (1644) and Winstanley’s The Law 
of Freedom in a Platform (1652). 
medieval canon law, equity has become a principle of 
compassion, of regard for the vulnerable, a proximation of 
God’s own justice and mercy, and one carrying real force 
(Lefebvre 1963). 
It is shortly after this point, as the medieval worldview 
goes into decline as Europe encroaches on the world, that 
we might begin to associate equity with rights – natural 
rights, in their nascent early modern articulation. This 
may be understood in part as a humanist embrace of the 
principle of equity as a kind of ‘natural justice’, while 
reacting against its medieval association with mercy. 
As Martha Nussbaum points out, people can be treated 
equitably without invoking mercy (Nussbaum 1993): 
indeed the whole point of natural or human rights is they 
do not engage mercy: they provide a floor of basic terms 
of respect due to all without distinction as of right. The 
line would appear to run from Jean Gerson – the medieval 
French scholar credited by Richard Tuck with the earliest 
articulation of the notion of natural individual rights (Tuck 
1979) – through the English common lawyer Christopher 
St. Germain, whose 1530 textbook was for centuries the 
principal English authority on equity (see Rueger 1982), 
and into the heady ferment of the English civil war period 
of the mid-17th century (see Fortier 2005: 159-179). There 
among the radical activists and pamphleteers exist many 
rights- and equity-based arguments for root-and-branch 
law reform, confronting the injustice of an increasingly 
absolutist monarchy with regular invocations of inter- 
related principles: equity, reason, justice, conscience, 
natural law and right. These terms recur in many writers 
of the time, sewn closely together in many cases, such as 
the Calvinist John Warr (Hill 1975: 269-276). 
For Warr – to choose one example from an extensive group 
– the gap between the positive law and natural justice 
was stark and critical.6 “At the foundation of govern-
ments,” he wrote in his Laws of England, “justice was in 
men before it came to be in laws” (Sedley & Kaplan 1992: 
6  Others invoking this family of terms include Samuel 
Rutherford, John Harrington, the Levellers William Walwyne and 
Richard Overton, and the Digger Gerrard Winstanley as well as 
many anonymous pamphleteers. 
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The roots of climate justice
Given the richness, longevity and durability of the 
premodern concept of ‘equity’, perhaps it is unsuprising 
that the notion it provides of a direct channel to ‘justice’, 
beyond law, is alive and well, and indeed retains a 
powerful hold on the collective imagination. This ancient 
idea certainly lies at the heart of debates about climate 
equity today. Equity is, for example, the guiding principle 
behind the Stern Review’s controversial choice of a low 
discount rate, enabling its famous and influential state-
ment that it would cost less to deal with climate change 
now than in future (Stern 2006). The point there was to 
avoid what I called above the bubble of delay – and there-
fore the associated harms – altogether. Equity reappears 
in discussions today over the carbon budget and nation-
ally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, 
in discussions over the institutional architecture of 
REDD+, of the CDM, and of carbon markets. In each case, 
its work is to recognize the differential contribution of 
different actors and to provide some protection for the 
most vulnerable: justice tempered by sweet mercy… 
And here it is perhaps easy – given the prehistory I have 
sketched above – to see how this resurgent notion of 
equity in climate law might latch very easily onto the idea 
of human rights, itself a curiously natural law phenom-
enon in a positive-law-oriented world (law, we might 
say, as the art of the equitable and the good). On most 
tellings, modern human rights have emerged and imposed 
themselves on the world as a response to a broad range 
of felt physical (from Greek physis, ‘nature’) inequities 
over time: slavery, torture, genocide. An appeal to human 
rights proposes we accept their intuitive appeal to 
justice and grounds this acceptance in the existence of a 
broadly accepted list of internationally recognized rights, 
themselves forged in a visceral response to the horrors of 
the second world war, and since subjected to significant 
testing and interpretation. 
Across their long histories, then, both equity and human 
rights share a secret debt to natural law, and a yearning 
assumption, within that context, of radical universal 
equality. But however intuitive this connection may 
But if this story is right, what then happened to the 
association between equity and right? Around the same 
time Warr was writing, Thomas Hobbes took a similar set 
of associations in a very different direction, placing equity 
above a sovereign who is answerable to God alone. The 
sovereign, in exercising his right of judgement, may apply 
mercy grounded in equity, but he is famously not account-
able to the people on the use of this power. The English 
Chancery court was an in-principle locus of the exercise 
of this sovereign authority – in its origins, the site of the 
king’s conscience. This view had been recently confirmed 
in the pivotal 1616 Earl of Oxford case, in which it was 
held – following an argument on these lines put forward 
by the Stuart King James I himself – that the Court of 
Equity took precedence over the common law courts 
(Fortier 1998; Ibbetson 2014). In both James I’s argument 
and Hobbes’s, equity is associated with natural rights – 
but these are not necessarily ‘human rights’, rather they 
comprise or presume the ‘natural’ higher (or retained) 
right of the sovereign (Cooper 2014; Tuck 1992). For 
Hobbes, of course, natural individual rights are precisely 
those which, with the rest of natural law, must be given 
up in the making of a social contract to preserve peace by 
vesting power in a (rights-retaining) sovereign.
Hobbes was to win this war of ideas, at least insofar as 
the radical power of equity was buttoned up behind the 
veil of sovereignty. In England, equity disappeared into 
the Chancery. By the early 19th century, equity referred to 
a collection of relatively random, though rigid, prac-
tices in various discrete areas of law, without any clear 
unifying theme (except perhaps as means to avoid taxes) 
other than their co-existence within the Chancery’s former 
jurisdiction, as F.W. Maitland tartly observed (2011). By 
the late 20th century, through the ever-innovating vehicle 
of the trust, equity law concepts were driving a global 
financialization implicated in the financial crash of 2008 
(Worthington 2009). The contemporary common law notion 
of equity has little on its face to offer either climate 
justice or human rights. By contrast, the much older root 
tradition which gave rise to it now seems more relevant 
than ever: equity as a concrete vehicle for righting felt 
injustice. 
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states ‘owes’ compensation for harms in other states has 
been vigorously refuted. Unlike climate science denialism, 
this legal and ethical denialism is not marginal – it does 
not struggle for respectability – it is much rather main-
stream (though far from universal). The debates never-
theless follow a similar trajectory: what is self-evident 
to some is hotly contested by others, and those contesta-
tions, while pitched as politically or ethically impartial, 
nevertheless look to be normative or crypto-normative. 
The blockage in reaching common principles for action 
results in a blockage on action; the principal beneficiaries 
of this delay in acting are those who stand to lose most 
from effective action: the purveyors of fossil capitalism. 
The result is the entrenchment of delay. Denial reinforcing 
delay. Delay denying justice. 
Tides rising: human rights?
It is here that human rights may appear to supplement 
equity today. For human rights harms that were once 
speculative and predicted have now become real and 
palpable. It is the case, as I write in 2019, that with the 
surging instances of concrete climate-related human 
rights violations, courts and quasi-judicial human rights 
bodies are being petitioned – and hundreds, indeed 
thousands, of actors are embarking on the long road to 
seek redress through the courts. These cases are not so 
far meeting with much success, but someday they might, 
some of them at least. And courts are not the only locus of 
surging discontent with the state of our existing law. As 
the swell of felt injustice grows into a tide, so the delay 
itself fuels a growing tsunami of ‘justice denied’, and 
for each cupful of ‘justice’ acknowledged in the courts 
another ocean of denial rises close behind.8 
The emerging law of climate equity cannot and will 
not by itself bridge the expansive sea between climate 
justice, however we conceive it, and a law that remains 
fundamentally supportive of the pollutive and distributive 
effects of climate change. Rather it seems we must await 
8  On November 6, 2019, for example, two English High Court 
judges ruled that a blanket police ban on Extinction Rebellion 
protests was unlawful ([2019] EWHC 2957 (Admin)). 
appear, it is rarely made explicitly today. Climate law 
refers to ‘equity’ but not justice, and the single reference 
to human rights (in the Preamble to the Paris Agreement) 
clarifies little. Climate equity has generally been inter-
preted to refer to the relative distribution of the costs and 
benefits of climate policy options between ‘developed’ 
and ‘developing’ countries (Okereke 2010). This inter-
pretation of ‘equity’ is due to the particular context in 
which the term arose in the original UNFCCC text of 1992 
– devised, as is well known, to circumvent entrenched 
political blockage and achieve climate agreement (Grubb 
& Paterson 1992). In recent writings on equity we begin 
to find explicit mention of human rights (Fleurbaey et al. 
2014; OHCHR 2015; Allen et al. 2018). But the concepts 
are closely connected in a much broader literature. 
A grounding element of this notion of equity is ‘historical 
responsibility’. States have ‘differential’ responsibility 
to address climate change, on a widely held reading, 
because they have not all contributed equally to the 
problem in the first place. There are, on one hand, states 
(and not just states) that are largely responsible for 
having caused the problem and, on the other, states (and, 
again, not just states) who are or will be affected by it 
though they have contributed little to it. The historical 
delay between long-term emissions from some and future 
effects for others is, in short, central to the notion of 
climate equity. And by corollary, equity is conceived as a 
means of redressing the injustice implicit in that delay 
– coupled with the broader fact that the world’s poorer 
postcolonial countries continue to suffer the effects of the 
trajectory that brought prosperity to the ‘great powers’. 
Climate injustice, on this reading, arrives on top of, and 
is intimately connected with, a longer historical delay, the 
egregious injustices of colonialism and the slow progress 
in surmounting them (Humphreys 2014). 
Unsurprisingly, this entire edifice of remedial equity is 
itself frequently and repeatedly denied. The existence 
and relevance of historical responsibility has never been 
accepted by the United States delegates to the UNFCCC, 
for example. The notion that developed and developing 
country blocks have or should have differentiable obliga-
tions remains contentious and the idea that one group of 
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the rise of the drowning tide to trigger the desperate fury 
of self-proclaimed rights by those of us – humans – in 
whom they have been invested and are being violated. 
For this has been the history of human rights. As with 
the English civil war and the aftermath of the second 
world war, the sheer scale of felt injustice heads towards 
a visceral level, triggering a radical response. So when 
Greta Thunberg calls for equity in climate action, as she 
did in New York in September 2019 (Milman 2019), she is 
speaking the language of climate law, but it is through 
the register of human rights that we must hear her. 
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Elizabeth Dirth *
What about the people that already live there?  
Intersections of climate change and social justice
question, ‘what about the people that already live there?’, 
could be asked about various regions, various peoples 
with various circumstances and relationships to the 
climate crisis, to illuminate why climate change is not 
just an environmental crisis, but a human one. Climate 
change, both in terms of its impacts and the work we 
undertake to deal with it, is happening in a world already 
populated with diverse groups, a world with pre-existing 
inequalities, with challenges to human rights, with 
already scarce resources, with tensions, misunderstand-
ings and power struggles. In the same way you would not 
diagnose a patient without understanding their medical 
history, solutions to climate change need a contextualized 
and nuanced approach. There is a risk that new diseases 
can exacerbate existing conditions, and the same is true 
for climate change. There is a risk that treatment for 
one illness can actually worsen another, and the same is 
true for climate change. However, in the same way that 
treatment can address multiple problems at once, climate 
solutions have the possibility to address both climate 
change and social justice challenges together too.
This essay will explore the tension between climate 
change and social justice concerns, reflecting specifi-
cally on the history of this tension before elaborating on 
three examples. Narratives around climate change have 
changed drastically in the last couple of decades, and 
the problem has been significantly reframed from being 
narrowly defined as an environmental problem to a broad-
er view incorporating a range of social, economic and 
political aspects. While this is a step forward in terms 
of understanding the complexities of the interlinkages 
Climate change, both in terms of its impacts and the 
work we undertake to deal with it, is happening in a 
world already populated with diverse groups, a world with 
pre-existing inequalities and challenges to human rights. 
As such solutions to climate change need a contextualized 
and nuanced approach, and while mainstreaming 
considerations of climate change in the context of human 
rights is an important first step, we need to go one step 
further and talk about justice. 
Introduction
In July 2019 a friend who works in medical research 
showed me an article about how and where we could 
increase tree cover globally to help solve climate change. 
He was pleased at finding something to share with me 
about my work that offered, what he understood to be, 
a positive and easy solution to a challenge we often 
discussed, and he explained the article optimistically. 
When he finished, I hesitated to respond, unsure whether 
to share his optimism or my honest reflection… and even-
tually I asked: and what about the people that already 
live there? He was stunned. “I’ve never thought of that 
before,” he reacted. And just like that, his rose-tinted 
optimistic lens cracked and human reality burst in.
This casual and light-hearted exchange between friends 
points to the core of the challenge at the intersection of 
social justice issues and climate change. This simple 
*  The author wrote this piece during a Fellowship at the 
Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies.
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tension between pursuits of human development for poor 
and vulnerable communities (and what comes with this 
development, such as access to energy and infrastructure 
projects) and the imperative of mitigating climate change 
(Agarwal & Narain 1991). This tension influenced political 
decisions, such as those made in 1992 within the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, where coun-
tries were divided by their wealth to allow for emissions 
to increase in order to enable human development in 
some places, while prescribing that they need to be cut in 
others. Since the 1990s until very recently, influenced by 
the creation of different standards for different countries, 
among many other things, the assumption remained 
that pursuing human and economic development and 
dealing with climate change were incompatible and even 
in conflict with one another. Broadly, the argument went 
that in order to improve well-being, emissions need to 
increase first, and we have to have space for this before 
we can expect action against climate change. In this 
line of argumentation, discussing limiting emissions 
inherently also meant limiting human development, which 
is not only a threat to a number of human rights but also 
unjust for poor and vulnerable people around the world. 
While this is the origin of the tension between human 
development, social justice and climate change, it is now 
becoming widely recognized that this tension comes from 
a very narrow understanding of both development and 
mitigating climate change (Trebeck & Williams 2019).
More recently, our understanding of social justice and 
climate change has expanded and changed parallel to the 
expansion of our knowledge about the urgency of climate 
change and realizations about the imperative of adapting 
to it. Terms such as ‘climate justice’ have been introduced 
to capture new nuances. Pursuing climate justice refers 
to addressing the injustice that those who have done the 
least to cause climate change will be the first to experi-
ence the impacts, are often the most vulnerable and will 
experience the worst impacts (Mary Robinson Foundation 
2013). While this term has come to encapsulate many 
aspects of this injustice, there are two central pillars. 
First, there is the concern about the devastating impacts 
of climate change on vulnerable communities and the 
need to consider adaptation, compensation, and losses 
between climate change, social justice, human rights and 
human development, this also presents new challenges. 
Even in the context of an expanding understanding of 
climate and justice intersections and synergies, many 
human rights organizations still fail to see the link 
between climate change and human rights frameworks. 
Additionally, in this process a new focus on the link 
between concepts of justice and climate change has also 
helped to illuminate a core challenge: that there is a huge 
diversity in how people all over the world understand and 
experience justice or injustice (Sikor 2013; Dirth et al. 
2020). The three examples I highlight demonstrate these 
complexities by focusing on three important tensions: a 
story about Malawi will show how impacts of climate-re-
lated disasters can exacerbate already existing and 
historically entrenched injustices; a story about forest 
management in South America will show how sometimes 
even seemingly simple solutions may also contribute to 
local injustices; and a story about the energy transition 
in Europe will show how injustices resulting from climate 
change affect not only the Global South but vulnerable 
people everywhere.
In the face of these new and diverse challenges resulting 
from climate change and how we deal with them, perhaps 
utilizing a human rights framework does not go far 
enough to understand the injustices caused or exac-
erbated by climate change. While many human rights 
institutions have already identified ways in which climate 
change threatens human rights (Commonwealth Forum 
of National Human Rights Institutions 2015), perhaps the 
scale of the threat from the climate crisis on human well-
being extends beyond our current understanding of human 
rights. While mainstreaming considerations of climate 
change in the context of human rights is an important 
first step, we need to go one step further and talk about 
justice.
A historical tension
For decades, human and economic development and 
mitigating climate change were described as being in 
conflict with one another. This often manifested itself in a 
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But perhaps the fundamental problem is that climate 
change poses a challenge to the core of the human rights 
framework: no human right can exist outside of a climate 
system safely habitable for humans. The deeply existen-
tial nature of the climate crisis exposes the assumptions 
behind a human rights approach which neglects basic 
human needs.
Fundamental to this whole discussion then is the differ-
ence between justice and human rights. While human 
rights are codified in somewhat universally agreed docu-
ments and there are a number of concrete and specific 
institutions and legal frameworks to enforce them, justice 
is defined differently everywhere. For some, a just way of 
dealing with climate change is the average greater good, 
with acceptance of some inevitable hardship. For some, 
a socially just way of dealing with climate change is 
compensation from wealthy countries or regions to those 
who are experiencing greater devastation and vulner-
ability. For some, justice also entails justice for their 
natural surroundings and the non-human as an inherent 
part of how justice is understood for their community. And 
for some, justice for future generations is the central idea. 
The fact that justice is a word with fluid and dynamic 
meanings, means that it has come to incorporate envi-
ronmental needs, struggles and climate injustice in a way 
that human rights narratives and groups have struggled 
with.
Climate-related disasters and 
neo-colonialism
One of the most important justice challenges of climate  
change is that contribution to climate change has 
happened unevenly across the world and over time. There 
are immense debates in academic, political, social and 
economic spheres about who should take responsibility for 
climate change, the damage it causes to livelihoods and 
well-being, and how to hold those accountable for past 
or future damage. This is perhaps the most commonly 
discussed injustice resulting from climate change, with 
many recent examples of climate-related disasters all 
around the world, ranging from cyclones Idai and Kenneth 
striking the south-eastern coast of Africa, to water 
and damages which are spread disproportionately to 
affect the world’s poorest and most vulnerable. Second, 
there is the concern about climate action focusing too 
much on limiting emissions everywhere and the negative 
consequences for human development, instead of consid-
ering ways in which the fight against climate change can 
present opportunities for people’s well-being.
The term climate justice helped to reframe the conversa-
tion about climate change to incorporate concerns about 
human well-being, rather than to see a conflict between 
the two. Meanwhile, the human rights community has 
been slow to participate in these discussions. Why is this?
One possible explanation is that even though the conver-
sation has changed in many places, many still perceive a 
conflict between realizing social justice and addressing 
climate change, and they worry that action on climate 
change means that the pursuit of human rights may 
suffer. This is a valid concern, as understanding nuanced 
interlinkages does not mean this has translated to policy- 
making and implementation. Bad practice still prevails 
on both sides of this debate: communities are still being 
forcibly relocated for renewable energy production, like 
hydropower, and development corporation agencies still 
fund new coal or fossil fuel-based energy projects.
Another possible explanation is that the lack of inter-
action stems from the fact that there is no mention of 
environmental conditions in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. New frameworks and interpretations have 
been developed which build on this, making connections 
to environmental rights clearer and stronger (UNHRC 
2018). In addition, progress on litigation has also helped, 
as scores of court cases around the world about environ-
mental harms have been won using clauses about a 
‘right to life’, or environmental rights where they do 
exists. These cases draw important connections between 
human rights and basic human needs like water and air. 
However, much more of this litigation is needed in relation 
to climate change in order to more deeply ingrain this 
integral relationship.
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amount that twelve people in the United Kingdom use in 
a year. For me, these events were a clear illustration of 
social justice and climate change intersections which 
exacerbate vulnerability and worsen human conditions.
The experience of this vulnerability is something difficult 
to put into words. There is, first of all, loss. In the most 
affected areas people were killed, lost their entire liveli-
hood or their loved ones, which is hard to imagine if you 
haven’t experienced it yourself. For the rest of the country, 
the feeling that your access to water, your ability to cook 
food, your connectivity to loved ones, your entire life 
hinges on such a delicate system, is a feeling of vulnera-
bility that is all-encompassing.
Vulnerability also goes beyond physical human needs to 
impact ability to work, or go to school or university. In a 
world where many believe that opportunities from digital 
technology, communication and access to education 
are levelling the playing field in a globally competitive 
economy, we forget that these disasters do not strike 
evenly, and nor are we evenly able to be resilient to them. 
It is a kind of double inequality that when your school is 
washed away every couple of years, or three months of 
the year in the dry season you can’t access what many 
globally consider to be basic technologies for learning or 
professional communication, climate change is exacer-
bating structural inequalities in the global economy, and 
through its uneven impact further entrenches inequality 
of education and training, new industries and wealth.
This is also psychologically traumatic: this kind of 
vulnerability comes with a reminder that you exist within 
a system that you can’t control, whether that be climate 
and weather, or energy, or wealth. All the while, the most 
expensive hotels kept running normally using generator 
systems so that international business people or travel-
lers didn’t experience this devastation. In the face of this 
trauma, lucky Malawian families had three to six hours 
of electricity a day, but visitors could still have reliable 
wifi and pizza at their hotel. The practices of personal and 
community resilience that result from this kind of vulner-
ability are awe-inspiring. Often, research about building 
resilience as a social response to climate change focuses 
scarcity in Chennai and Zimbabwe, to record-breaking 
heatwaves in Europe, to enormous wildfires in almost ev-
ery region of the world. While there is inconclusive science 
about how many extreme weather events can be directly or 
solely attributed to climate change, when we consider the 
human impact, it is less important what percentage of 
causality we can decisively conclude, than that we know 
with certainty that as a result of climate change these 
events will be more frequent, more extreme and more 
deadly. It is no longer just about tensions between climate 
mitigation and human development. Climate justice is 
now also about sustaining life itself.
In early spring 2019 I was in Malawi for a partnership 
project focused on empowering young people to take 
action on climate change. While I was there, the country 
was struck by a series of devastating extreme weather 
events, which came at the end of their normal, intense, 
rainy season. While cyclones Kenneth and Idai had a 
larger impact where they first made landfall, in Mozam-
bique, they also ravaged already vulnerable areas in 
Malawi. A country where only around 12 per cent of the 
population has access to electricity and whose carbon 
footprint ranks 181st globally, lost over sixty lives from 
these climate-related disasters, with thousands injured; 
almost 100,000 people were displaced (OCHA 2019b; 
World Bank 2019). In the region as a whole, over 750 
people were killed with over 200,000 displaced. In the 
week following the storm, the government used its emer-
gency procedure for energy provisions. A country whose 
electricity is almost entirely generated by hydropower, 
struggles with consistency of energy supply both during 
extreme storm events, because of the debris build-up at 
the hydropower stations, as well as during the dry season 
from lack of water flowing through the rivers. During these 
times, the government manages energy use and distrib-
utes energy for a few hours per day across the different 
regions. Most of the time, people don’t know when they’re 
going to have power or for how long. It turns on, for a few 
hours for your region’s quota, and then turns off and turns 
on somewhere else. During the recovery periods from these 
storms, which lasted several weeks, the electricity avail-
able for the entire country of 18 million people - people 
suffering from a crisis they didn’t cause - was the same 
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More than ‘the lungs of the world’
The world’s eyes turned toward the Amazon rainforest in 
late August and early September 2019. However, the fires 
which caught the media’s attention are just the tip of the 
iceberg into understanding the complex socio-economic 
relationship with the forest in many regions in South 
America. The response of much of the media to say “the 
lungs of the earth are on fire” only recognizes the value of 
the forest in producing oxygen and its role in combatting 
climate change, but not its social, cultural or human 
value. The Amazon region is first and foremost a home. 
A technocratic and natural science-based approach to 
climate change often implies that energy technology, 
innovation and nature-based solutions, such as tree 
planting, are ‘silver bullets’ for the climate crisis. In the 
case of the Amazon, this perspective is used in adopting 
an optimistically toned narrative that we can solve 
climate change simply by planting more trees.
There is and has been a long-standing challenge of 
deforestation everywhere around the world: there is no 
region which has not experienced deforestation at some 
point in its history. Currently, a lot of attention and focus 
is on the deforestation in South America, even before the 
fires of 2019 captured the public’s attention. Deforest-
ation in this region presents not only a challenge in the 
context of climate change, but also for essential biodiver-
sity and fragile ecosystem health. There have been many 
attempts to solve this through programmes which foster 
international investment in regions suffering deforest-
ation and biodiversity loss; these range from carbon 
offsetting initiatives that are simply about tree-planting, 
to initiatives which foster social, economic and environ-
mental outcomes.1
 Often, the basic tenant of such programmes is that 
1  REDD+ and REDD are two of the most well-known examples. 
(REDD is an earlier version of REDD+.) REDD+ is a mechanism 
developed by the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change to support reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks in developing countries.
on adaptation techniques, either social or technical, and 
the daily need for psychological resilience as an essential 
pillar of dealing with human devastation resulting from 
the climate crisis is overlooked. Psychological resilience 
in this context requires more than planning ahead, 
adaptation strategies or disaster relief; at its core it is an 
acceptance that this injustice is your reality.
The final element in this story is the historical context: 
Malawi is one of the most vulnerable and least developed 
countries in the world, and a contributing factor to this is 
its history under colonialism. Under the rule of the British 
Empire, Malawi was perceived as not having any useful 
resources, and so infrastructure development lagged 
behind other British colonies in the region, such as Kenya 
and Uganda (Mwakasungura & Miller 2015). Not only was 
it exploited and oppressed in the past, but it still lacks 
infrastructure to meet basic human needs, which makes 
the country incredible vulnerable to extreme weather 
events. In some sense, Malawi’s experience with climate 
change can be seen as a continuum of injustice beginning 
with colonialization by the British Empire up to the UK 
government’s current failure to acknowledge its historic 
responsibility for climate change, and its failure to take 
action both in its own mitigation and in its funding 
contribution to implementation beyond its borders in a 
way proportionate to the country’s contribution to climate 
change. In this story climate change is an injustice multi-
plier and its nuances expand beyond human development 
and disaster vulnerability to encompass long-entrenched 
wealth hierarchies, colonial legacies and neo-colonialism.
East Africa is one of several regions around the world 
that is particularly vulnerable to climate impacts because 
of a number of overlapping socio-economic challenges 
and historically entrenched injustices. While what is 
happening there is the very definition of climate injustice, 
is it also a threat to human rights? Most clearly, extreme 
events and disasters are a threat to life. They also 
threaten the right to housing or food. But the injustices 
related to climate change here don’t fit very easily in this 
framework, as the scope of the injustice goes beyond what 
looking at this disaster through a human rights frame-
work can convey.
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question of who benefits and how. Many argue that the 
injection of financial resources that comes with these 
programmes enables forest communities to support 
themselves in socio-economic activity in their home 
culture and region, which can operate in parallel or even 
support healthy forests and ecosystems. This also helps 
shift the narrative from forest communities being victims, 
to them being empowered and included participants in 
development of their regions and communities (Schroeder 
& González 2019). However, interestingly, much of the 
research on the example of REDD+ actually points to 
stronger social and economic outcomes than environ-
mental ones (Schroeder & González 2019), indicating that 
perhaps this work supports the realization of some human 
rights such as employment and community development. 
However, there is still a crucial challenge around relation-
ships created and entrenched through these programmes, 
as they continue to reflect global inequalities and injus-
tices in wealth and power distribution.
There has been significant criticism about the role of 
gatekeepers, intermediaries, and the power of funding 
institutions in these processes (Dawson et al. 2018). 
Whether this criticism is directed at regional or national 
actors siphoning off funds meant for local communities 
delivering the projects, or at the power exercised by 
funders in goal-setting and decision-making, or at the 
lack of full and meaningful participation of the commu-
nity, there are certainly injustices in these processes. 
Crucially, there is often accountability up to interna-
tional bodies or external funding sources, but a lack of 
accountability at the local level (Dawson et al. 2018). This 
dynamic further entrenches global hierarchies, inequality 
and neo-colonialist attitudes. 
The romanticized ideal of replanting the Amazon is often 
a vision of nature which neglects the human element and 
the people who live there. In addition, such programmes 
give the illusion to Western, high-consumption countries 
and lifestyles that it’s possible to adequately compensate 
for the emissions from a flight or a coal-power station, 
by planting trees. Many participating in reforestation or 
forest protection programmes may be wedged in between 
the burden of compensating for the emissions of wealthy 
countries (as well as businesses or individuals) that 
emit a lot of carbon can pay for offsets or compensation 
in the form of tree-planting or forest and ecosystem 
management programmes in other regions of the world. 
The idea is that these programmes have positive impacts 
by sequestering carbon, combatting deforestation and 
promoting ecosystem health, as well as boost local 
economic development by supporting the livelihoods of 
people living in these regions. This is a very rosy picture, 
and unfortunately, it fundamentally oversimplifies the 
challenges faced and neglects the social justice aspects 
of the locality in which they work.
There is first the problematic relationship that makes 
up the structural core of the idea: that industrialized 
countries can compensate for their emissions by paying 
for tree-planting in more economically vulnerable regions; 
this is unequal at its core. Many industrialized countries 
cleared their forests long ago to make space for agricul-
ture, industry and housing. That many now pay others 
to protect their forests in lieu of industrial development, 
cuts to the core of the tension between climate change 
and human development. Agreements that developing 
countries should have space for their emissions to grow 
to allow for human development, are at risk of being 
undermined by the economic incentives which might 
discourage any change or new socio-economic activities 
in forested regions. Additionally, many countries contrib-
uting financially to programmes such as REDD+ are also 
home to companies which contribute to deforestation: 
there is the painful irony that, for example, USAID pays 
for programmes which combat damage from American 
companies. In this way, forests and forest communities 
have become a new battleground for domestic disputes, 
conflicting ideologies, lack of adequate regulation 
and lack of policy coherence of other countries. Even 
with financial resources as part of the transaction, the 
expectation that a poorer region acts on behalf of a richer 
seems fundamentally unjust.
A closer look at whether these programmes contribute 
to the realization of human rights and social justice is 
helpful for understanding the complexity behind this 
climate action ‘silver bullet’. First, there is the important 
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threat to their well-being and community livelihood. This 
transition has immense potential to offer new opportuni-
ties, economic renewal and improved well-being, but this 
needs to be an intentional policy of all actors in these 
regions, local government, national government as well 
as the private sector, in order for this transition to be a 
positive one for all.
In addition to this lived experience, the way in which the 
narrative of experts about these regions in transition has 
developed, often takes on a condescending and belittling 
tone. For example, in Germany, the Lusatia region has 
been coined a ‘social experiment’, evoking the image of a 
cage full of lab mice rather than of a broader community 
struggling with reimagining its cultural identity, and 
lacking the support to do so. Research on the perspective 
of coal operators has confirmed what is also clear in 
their public communications: that fossil fuel intensive 
industries publicly emphasize human concerns, such as 
employment, career development, local economies, et 
cetera, while the green transition emphasizes C02, envi-
ronmental conditions, et cetera (Bosch & Schwarz 2019). A 
technocratic approach to the energy transition and climate 
change as a whole may be expected, as climate science 
developed out of the physical and natural sciences. 
However, this approach is undermining the success of the 
renewable energy transition in industrialized regions. In 
the long run, a technocratic approach to the energy transi-
tion could be detrimental to the goal of a net-zero economy 
because it has the potential to neglect the human element 
and exacerbate social injustices in doing so.
The concerns of people living in post-industrial areas in 
Europe are well-grounded in our current understanding 
of human rights. They justifiably can see that their right 
to work, their support systems, their right to choose their 
own development and their community’s development 
are threatened. In addition to being grounded in human 
rights, the process may also seem unfair and unjust. It 
has only been very recently that many countries around 
Europe have begun to prioritize involving communities 
in decision-making, and especially those who experience 
pain and turmoil from the transition. The transition is not 
only consciously perceived as a threat to people’s way of 
people and nations, changing local socio-economic 
developments, neo-imperialist power structures and new 
forms of hierarchy to adhere to, threats from large-scale 
business developments and a changing climate. In this 
example it is not only the impacts of a changing climate 
that threatens social justice, it is also how we try to solve 
it with ‘silver bullets’ without considering the human 
impact. 
A just transition
Finally, I’d like to turn to a different type of example: 
an example of how climate change mitigation policies 
and practices can also exacerbate social injustices in 
industrialized regions in Europe. In many regions across 
Europe, the production of fossil fuels has been the corner-
stone of the local economy for over a century. A number of 
intersecting and overlapping structural transformations, 
such as the radical change to a more global economy, 
resulted in a changing geography of industrial centres 
and networks. This economic transformation over the past 
forty years has left many previously industrial regions 
socially and economically deprived, with none of the tools 
necessary for pursuing improved human well-being in 
21st century Europe, and no opportunity for any form of 
economic renewal. Regions which once homed, housed, 
fed, and supported populations through heavy industry, 
coal mining and the oil and gas industry have, over the 
past forty years, seen their economic backbone systemat-
ically undermined and dismantled. This happened either 
through trade policy, a private sector policy of profit over 
people, or as a result of environmental regulation and the 
shift to a zero carbon economy. It can be seen again and 
again in regions like Lusatia (Germany), Scotland, South 
Wales, Appalachia (US) and many more, where the transi-
tion out of heavy industry and away from a carbon-based 
economy into a green economy is not creating opportuni-
ties for economic renewal and is ultimately exacerbating 
social injustices (Sheldon et al. 2018). While we should 
absolutely be celebrating the closure of coal plants, the 
decommissioning of oil rigs and the process of divestment 
from fossil fuels, for the people that have lived in these 
places for generations, climate change mitigation and the 
net-zero transition can be an injustice multiplier and a 
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This process of abstraction and aggregation allows us to 
forget that in addition to being contributed to unevenly, 
climate change will be experienced unevenly (Raworth 
2012). Looking behind the models and projections at what 
it means to develop a new hydropower plant needed to 
meet a global emissions target, or a reforestation project, 
or more generally at the acceptance of a 2 degree target 
being a global temperature upper limit, we come face 
to face with the injustice of climate change both in its 
impacts and in how we deal with it. Under every scenario 
some will struggle. The first step we have to take to 
minimizing this struggle is to acknowledge it. We have to 
be explicit about what climate change, and addressing it, 
means for individual communities all around the world, 
and we are only beginning to understand in full detail 
what this entails.
The second preliminary challenge to addressing climate 
change and social justice together is that, within the 
context of human rights and much research and policy on 
social justice challenges, the current dominant paradigm 
is often only one side of the story: that of European phil-
osophical traditions. In some sense this normative domi-
nance is also a kind of meta-injustice, because it may 
mean that even in the pursuit of justice, we place some 
value systems and cultural norms above others. Which 
value systems tend to dominate also aligns with which 
economies and political systems tend to dominate and 
have dominated throughout history. How can we begin to 
understand social injustices caused by climate change 
if we do not understand what is being considered an 
injustice in a certain context? A human rights framework 
does not allow for this kind of contextual understanding 
of climate change and social justice. Ultimately, climate 
change action guided by a locally relevant, context-sen-
sitive and people-focused approach has the potential to 
pursue social justice at the same time as securing human 
well-being in the face of this existential crisis.
While it is an important step in this process to see 
pursuing justice and tackling climate change as mutually 
beneficial and not conflicting ideas, this is not enough. 
We must also design policies and programmes in a way 
that allows them to be mutually beneficial. Over and over 
life, but also perhaps both consciously or unconsciously, 
as a threat to their identity.
A human rights framework without environmental rights 
could actually be utilized in this example to argue against 
a sustainability transition. When the human rights frame-
work treats environmental conditions as an externality, 
the same way industry has treated environmental impact 
as an externality for decades, it may be time to more fully 
incorporate environmental rights into human rights.
What would it mean to have socially just 
solutions to climate change?
Before we can think about what it would mean to have 
socially just solutions to climate change, it’s important 
to address an important problem underlying all of this: 
abstraction. One of the reasons why a technocratic 
approach has been so successful is because it’s easy 
to understand on its surface. However, often implied 
underneath this approach, whether in climate models 
or reforestation proposals, is a concept of justice which 
looks at the average of the human condition, and 
allows for, and accepts, some amount of devastation, 
catastrophe and loss. To put it bluntly, many models 
accept a certain amount of human lives lost. Perhaps one 
of the reasons this is palatable, is that this loss is often 
not ‘close to home’ to those doing this research.
This abstraction has allowed us to skim over communities 
that are getting exploited or threatened in this process, 
or look past those that are losing their economic stability 
and potentially their identity in the post-fossil-fuel 
transition because we are still pursuing the greater good 
(Moreno et al. 2015). We don’t talk about this assump-
tion very often because it is confrontational, but to really 
address the social justice challenges of climate change 
it needs to be explicit: the way we have approached 
climate science for decades erases and devalues millions 
of people around the world. On many occasions it allows 
for some of their stories, their histories, their livelihoods, 
their well-being to be sacrificed… and often that ‘some’ 
is already vulnerable, exploited or threatened by other 
injustices.
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again, I have heard the argument that “we shouldn’t 
burden decarbonization policies with concerns for social 
justice and inequality”. However, policies which consider 
inequality as a burden for decarbonization will inevitably 
catalyse a backlash to climate action: the French gilet 
jaune protest movement is the perfect example of this. 
We often make policies with an inadequate understanding 
of their impact on different socio-economic groups and 
the way they might contribute, positively or negatively, 
to social justice: climate policy is no exception to this 
trend… yet. There was absolutely an alternative to the tax 
which caused the gilet jaune movement. An alternative 
where not only the unequal impacts of this policy would 
be considered, but additional steps could have been taken 
to address inequalities at the same time. This is not yet 
the norm, but we have to start working this way. And that 
means embracing this intersection in policies, research, 
programmes and implementation and governance 
processes, rather than criticizing it.
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Anna Schoemakers 
The climate crisis and new justice movements. 
Supporting a new generation of climate activists
United States. Mass protests also took place in Australia, 
with 150,000 participants spread over fifty locations. 
Young people in Japan, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Hong 
Kong and New Zealand also skipped lessons and joined 
the protests. And it didn’t stop there. The Youth Strikes for 
Climate movement is not centrally organized, so keeping 
track of the fast growing number of regular strikes is diffi-
cult, but many are registering on FridaysForFuture.org. 
For me, as a climate activist working at Greenpeace 
Netherlands, the sudden and largely spontaneous rise of 
young people worldwide who refuse to accept the dire lack 
of effective action against global heating is without a 
doubt the most encouraging development of recent years. 
It inspires us all. 
When I saw the photo of the Swedish 16-year-old Greta 
Thunberg together with acclaimed conservationist 
Jane Goodall at the World Economic Forum in Davos, it 
brought tears to my eyes. Goodall is 84, and must be 
very concerned about the world she is leaving behind. 
Hopefully, Greta and all these other wonderful youngsters 
represent a glimmer of hope for her, so that she thinks: 
you see, a new era is coming.
This is what Greta had to say to the global elite, gathered 
in Davos: “Some people say that the climate crisis is 
something that we all have created. But that is not true 
– because if everyone is guilty, then no one is to blame. 
And someone is to blame. Some people, some companies, 
some decision-makers in particular have known exactly 
what priceless values they have been sacrificing to make 
Issues related to the climate crisis are mobilizing people 
around the world to demand action, justice, and a voice 
in international responses to the crisis. Recently, youth 
movements have – largely spontaneously – appeared, 
organizing school strikes and marches, and demanding 
political change to secure their future. This essay asserts 
that almost all human rights are threatened by climate 
change and therefore argues for a human rights agenda 
to make sure climate solutions serve people. That is why 
major global players in the field of climate and human 
rights – such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace – 
should work together and engage with the young activists. 
“By providing this new generation of climate defenders 
with practical knowledge, skills and support, we can 
strengthen their worldwide impact.”
Introduction
“Think we should be at school? Today’s climate strike is 
the biggest lesson of all.” This was the headline above 
an article in The Guardian of 15 March, 2019 (Thunberg 
et al. 2019). In it, European school students Greta in 
Sweden, Anna and Holly in the UK, Luisa in Germany, Kyra, 
Anuna and Adélaïde in Belgium, and Alexandria in the US 
explained why they intended to continue the school strikes 
they had started a few months earlier. 
On that same day, the largest youth-led protest in history 
took place: an estimated 1.6 million students in 300 
cities worldwide walked out of school to march for climate 
action. Three school students organized the major Strike 
for Climate campaign in more than 200 locations in the 
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land and destroy the rainforest. Please” (Greenpeace NL 
2019).
A few weeks after the first global school strike, in 
mid-April, indigenous communities from all over Brazil 
gathered in the capital, Brasilia, to protest against the 
violation of their rights. For Greenpeace, this was the 
moment to put the Karipuna in the spotlight and call 
for international solidarity. Out of solidarity with these 
protectors of the Amazon forest, we stood in front of 
Brazilian embassies in eleven countries with the message: 
Save the Amazon. 
People are part of nature, and we cannot create a green 
and peaceful world if it is not fair and just. We strive to 
uphold the rights of those most impacted by the effects 
of climate change and environmental degradation – 
including indigenous peoples, women, children, people 
living in poverty, workers and environmental defenders. As 
a global organization, Greenpeace can offer the Karipuna 
and other courageous peoples who protect the Amazon 
the platform they deserve. Because in the end, their fight 
against loggers is also our fight to end the climate crisis. 
And it’s essentially not different from the fight of the 
thousands of school strikers in other parts of the world. 
Climate justice
Every person has the right to a safe and healthy environ-
ment – as well as the right to life, health, food, and an 
adequate standard of living. The climate crisis poses a 
grave threat to these rights. When talking about ‘climate 
justice’, for the last two decades the debate has concen-
trated on the protection of poor people in countries most 
affected by drought, flooding and the disappearance of 
species. The young climate movement takes a broader 
view. And they are quite right! They see effects of climate 
change all around them. Affecting not only the poor, but 
also the more prosperous. Megacities suffer from extreme 
temperatures and a lack of clean air and water. Going to 
school, for example, becomes difficult. 
As the window of time available to us to make a differ-
ence narrows, we must find ways to ensure lasting global 
unimaginable amounts of money, and I think many of you 
here today belong to that group of people” (Germanos 
2019). This is not very different from the way we at 
Greenpeace see it: we think that the historically unfair 
distribution of rights, power and land is at the basis of 
the climate crisis. Giving people back their rights and 
land will reduce the power of major polluters.
Save the Amazon
As much as I enjoy seeing the courage and dedication 
of all these young people and their refreshing ways of 
campaigning, I also think of 26-year-old Andre Karipuna. 
Like Greta and all the others, Andre is a young leader and 
climate defender. He lives in the Brazilian Amazon state of 
Rondônia, together with the 57 other remaining Karipuna. 
In 1998, 152,000 hectares of unspoiled Amazon forest 
were transferred to them. But the Brazilian government of 
the current President Jair Bolsonaro wants to sacrifice the 
Amazon for quick profits. Looters and logging companies 
are already penetrating the nature reserve of the Karipuna. 
Those who resist must fear for their lives. However, the 
Karipuna are not giving up, and will continue to protect 
their forest against invaders – for as long as they can. 
Andre has taken up this battle. Unlike his parents, he and 
other young Karipuna went to school and speak Portuguese 
– but they still live in a part of their original territory. 
The Amazon is the largest rainforest in the world. It plays 
a crucial role in our climate. This unique nature area 
actually stores around 100 billion tons of carbon. That is 
thirteen times the annual worldwide emissions from fossil 
fuels. Huge amounts of CO2 that would otherwise heat 
our planet. We cannot afford to lose this rainforest, and 
protection is therefore in the interest of us all.
Like Greta, André Karipuna tries to get as much inter-
national attention for his fight as possible. This was his 
message to the UN in New York and the UN Human Rights 
Committee in Geneva: “We want to fight to protect nature, 
but we no longer know what to do against the current 
serious threats. That’s why I call on the world: help 
protect my people and stop the companies that steal our 
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countries around the world, according to a recent report 
(although three quarters of the recorded cases were filed 
in the United States) (Setzer & Byrnes 2019). The case of 
the citizens’ platform Urgenda against the government of 
the Netherlands is among the most prominent ones.1 
In solidarity with the inspiring people and communities of 
the climate justice movement, and in response to requests 
to assist in creating people-powered climate cases, 
Greenpeace Philippines assisted in the creation of the 
People’s Guide. This is a resource on how to hold govern-
ments accountable for its climate inaction. Drawing 
on the efforts of allies, this guide is a non-exhaustive 
document that provides ideas for community members, 
NGOs, and public interest lawyers on how to build cases 
that address the climate crisis from a human rights 
perspective. It also showcases and celebrates the many 
phenomenal landmark cases (several of them successful) 
that are being brought all over the world. Ultimately, the 
People’s Guide shows that communities made vulnerable 
by the climate crisis can create real environmental, polit-
ical and social transformations using strategic litigation 
to demand a better future (see Greenpeace 2018).
Campaigning and political action
Of course, climate litigation is not a perfect catch-all 
solution. Court cases take time, which is a problem 
because time is running out. Other forms of activism are 
needed as urgently as going to court. 
Putting the climate crisis at the top of the political 
agenda is just the first step, argues Sara Blazevic, the 
co-founder and managing director of the American, 
youth-led Sunrise Movement (Harkness 2019). This 
political action organization, founded in 2017, advocates 
political action on climate change. The group organized a 
sit-in in the office of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House 
and the most powerful woman in American politics, which 
brought Sunrise its first significant press coverage. 
1  For more information on the case, see Urgenda (2019) 
change. The answer is climate justice, a term which 
unites a growing global movement based on the belief 
that people have a right to a stable climate and deserve 
protection from the dangers of hazardous climate change 
(see Greenpeace 2019). Climate justice tackles the 
climate crisis and the violation of human rights simulta-
neously.
In this broad view, climate change already has an impact 
on a number of human rights: from the right to school, 
work, access to clean water and the overall right to a 
healthy and clean environment. In addition to being 
protected under international human rights law, they are 
mostly also recognized by national constitutions and laws, 
but not guaranteed. 
Using the law, a growing number of communities are 
taking legal action to secure their human rights and hold 
governments and fossil fuel companies accountable. 
Climate justice matters because today’s generation is 
the last generation that can take steps to avoid the worst 
impacts of climate change. Governments and fossil 
fuel companies are being made to listen and respond, 
as people from young to old, and from city-dwellers to 
farmers, are standing up and taking action.
People have rights. States have duties. Companies have 
responsibilities. That’s why we need to raise our voices for 
climate justice.
Some have already succeeded, as in Colombia, where 
the Supreme Court of Justice ruled in favour of 25 young 
people. They argued that the government violated human 
rights by permitting deforestation in the Amazon, which 
in turn contributes to the climate crisis (Dejusticia 2018). 
This was a ground-breaking decision recognizing the 
Amazon Basin as a subject of rights for the first time. 
In the meantime, litigants from all cases are using all 
tools available, both in the courts of law and in the courts 
of public opinion. Change is palpable, and mobilization 
and litigation go hand-in-hand. In recent years a climate 
justice movement has boomed across the world. Climate 
change lawsuits have been launched in at least 28 
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“In the 1970s, in the early years of Greenpeace and 
other new ecology movements, we thought that ecolog-
ical change would be simple, that once people under-
stood the threats, they would demand change (...) We 
probably underestimated the challenge of overcoming 
our deep, evolutionary bias for short-term thinking. We 
may have underestimated the status quo – corporate 
elite, bankers, politicians, and even common citizens 
dependent upon the economic system – attachment to 
the old patterns of consumption and growth.” (Weyler 
2019)
The new social movements, Weyler argues, are blowing 
up these social logjams. The timeline of catastrophe has 
grown too short. People now feel the threat to their own 
lives and appear willing to make sacrifices for long-term 
survival. 
Is the recent global mobilization by young people on 
the issues of climate and human rights really the game 
changer we hope it will be? Will it end up as significant 
as the anti-war, civil rights and gay rights movements, all 
social movements in which young people played decisive 
roles? I think the answer is yes. If every movement needs 
a constant reason to stand up for their (our) rights, then 
this movement will stay and have a long-term effect. 
How it will develop is, however, hard to predict. Can we 
expect these movements to harden, to radicalize? Being 
a peaceful movement is one of the main principles of 
#FridaysForFuture. But it is difficult to predict what will 
happen if their protests are ignored, results fail and 
frustration grows.
Look for example at Extinction Rebellion (XR), which 
was launched as recently as October 2018 by a group 
of activists from the campaign group Rising Up! Citing 
inspiration from grassroots movements such as Occupy, 
Gandhi’s Satyagraha, the suffragettes, Martin Luther 
King and others in the civil rights movement, Extinction 
Rebellion wants to rally support worldwide around a 
common sense of urgency to tackle climate breakdown. 
A number of activists in the movement accept arrest and 
imprisonment, similar to the mass arrest tactics of the 
Sunrise is building the power of youth to urge the country 
to take the climate crisis seriously while reclaiming 
democracy. “We need to transform our entire economy 
to prevent [the climate crisis] and we also have an 
incredible opportunity to create millions of good jobs and 
actually increase equity and justice in this country in the 
process,” Blazevic said. “Sunrise is protesting to bring 
the crisis to the forefront of the minds of every American 
and bring the urgency of those fires, floods and droughts 
we hear the plaintiffs talk about from our television 
screens to our politicians’ scripts.” (Martinez 2019)
Also consider what 29-year-old Representative Alexandria  
Ocasio-Cortez of New York – who has long aligned herself 
with the Sunrise Movement – has achieved in just a 
few months in office. The youngest woman ever elected 
to the US Congress has moved the terms of the climate 
debate significantly by pushing a broad set of climate and 
equality goals. 
Under the banner of a Green New Deal, she and her 
fellow-activists aim to drastically reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions in order to avoid the worst consequences 
of climate change (Kurtzleben 2019). They also seek 
to address problems such as economic inequality and 
racial injustice by prioritizing historically disenfranchised 
communities. With her approach, Ocasio-Cortez forced 
the climate issue to the forefront of the 2020 Democratic 
primary, pressuring candidates to lay out their own plans 
to address the effects of rising temperatures. In a sign of 
grassroots pressure, centrist candidates such as former 
Vice-President Joe Biden and former Representative Beto 
O’Rourke both promised not to accept donations from the 
fossil fuel industry (as they had in the past). O’Rourke 
singled out youth activists for helping push him on the 
issue, saying: “Thank you for your advocacy and leader-
ship” (Herndon 2019).
Game changer
In a recent column Rex Weyler, co-founder of Greenpeace 
International in 1979, reflected on the roots of activism, 
environmentalism, and Greenpeace’s past, present, and 
future. 
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How can ‘regular’ activists support this  
new generation?
In a Manifesto published in The Guardian, a large group 
of influential individuals including Naomi Klein, Noam 
Chomsky, Kumi Naidoo (former Executive Director of 
Greenpeace International, and the then Secretary-General 
of Amnesty International), and Jennifer Morgan (Interna-
tional Director of Greenpeace), called for a general strike 
on 20 September 2019 as the start of the Global Week 
for Future, “at the request of the young people who have 
been staging school strikes around the world” (Klein et al. 
2019). On that day, they announced, “we’re walking out 
of our workplaces and homes to spend the day demanding 
action on the climate crisis, the greatest existential 
threat that all of us face. (…) The clear idea behind this 
Manifesto is that adults should not be comfortable letting 
school children carry all the weight here. These kids 
need our support.” It also shows that the protests of this 
movement resonate with an environmental and a human 
rights organization. 
My expectation is that this new generation gives hope and 
its members stay strongly connected with each other all 
over the world. I hope that when they come to choose their 
higher education or work, they will be given the opportu-
nity to choose to be part of the solution, not part of the 
problem. At the University of Amsterdam, it is possible to 
get your degree in Future Planet Studies. The young leaders 
in the Amazon study law so that they can better protect 
themselves. Greenpeace, together with other civil society 
organizations, has put together a curriculum based on 
their needs, so that they study law, but also learn about 
sustainability, and how to develop alternative solutions. 
This is part of the role Greenpeace International sees for 
itself. In our recent Three Year Strategic Plan, 2018-
2020, it is stated as our goal that we will be sought out 
by allies to help solve problems, build capacity, maintain 
forward momentum, and share skills and latest prac-
tices. Our reputation in the ‘movement’ will be that of a 
risk-taking, innovative, effective, collaborative, diverse 
and inclusive organization. We will be the place where 
changemakers want to be.
British anti-war group Committee of 100 in 1961. On the 
eve of international Rebellion Day, 15 April, XR activists 
occupied part of the International Criminal Court in The 
Hague as well as the Parliament’s Lower House in the 
UK, forming human chains before being arrested. Similar 
actions were organized in many cities worldwide. 
Andrew Winston, who advises some of the world’s leading 
companies on how they can navigate and profit from 
environmental and social challenges, argues that we are 
in the middle of a major realignment of values around 
climate. “It’s now unacceptable to young activists and the 
millions of people they inspire, to espouse climate denial 
or play the ‘let’s go slow’ card. They don’t appreciate 
being handed a disaster movie for them to live with for 70 
to 80 years.” (Winston 2019)
No organization can avoid value shifts, says Winston, the 
author of bestsellers like The Big Pivot and Green to Gold. 
Executives of many companies do increasingly seem to 
be moving toward action on climate change, he acknowl-
edges, with public pronouncements to cut their own emis-
sions or buy renewable energy becoming the norm in large 
companies. But that isn’t enough. The new generation of 
customers and employees demands far more. “It may just 
take the youngest Americans to get companies to take 
a real and public stand for aggressive global action on 
climate change; after all, if they don’t, they risk getting 
out of step with an entire generation of employees and 
customers,” Winston says.
The young climate defenders are very clear about the 
values they stand for. Of course, the majority of them 
come from Western countries (although the number of 
participants from non-Western countries is steadily 
growing). But the movement shows one big wave of 
solidarity with the most impacted communities worldwide, 
and demonstrates a willingness to change, to commonly 
transform our ways of living. The young activists feel a 
common greater good, which is a future on a safe planet. 
It really touched me when I saw all the self-made protest 
signs on the streets: “There’s no planet B”; “Less meat, 
less heat”; “Like the oceans, we rise”. 
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Conclusion
Amnesty International and Greenpeace are two major 
global players in the fields of climate and human rights, 
with national and local offices or departments. We can 
– and, in my opinion, we must – bring our strengths 
together, and give all we have. In each hotspot, we can 
also work together with, and for the benefit of, grassroots 
organizations and local activists. Providing them with 
practical knowledge, skills and support and the courage 
to scale up will be an excellent way of strengthening a 
worldwide movement of young climate defenders.
And this is my message to them: Keep going strong!  
We’re proud of you!
As Greenpeace Netherlands, we support the young Dutch 
climate activists where we can. After an unexpectedly 
large number of more than 10,000 students travelled to 
The Hague to demonstrate and participate in a national 
school strike in February this year, Prime Minister Mark 
Rutte invited the leaders to meet him and talk about their 
demands (although he only agreed to do this outside of 
school time!). At their request, we helped them to prepare 
for that meeting. 
The new climate activists are in the lead, there can be 
no doubt about that. Sharing is caring, but let’s not take 
over. Greenpeace facilitates the movement wherever 
needed, gives time, shares experiences, and amplifies its 
call to action. During the school strikes, we also handed 
over our social media channels so that the climate 
activists were able to let their voices be heard through 
a channel with a pre-existing larger audience. A more 
serious task is to publicly support (and therewith protect) 
young people that speak truth to power, and who directly 
blame the CEOs of big fossil fuel companies for ruining 
their future. Criticasters are being unreasonably hard 
on them, sometimes in a very personal way. Professional 
activists have a role to stand up and provide fact-based 
backup. 
These new movements of climate defenders see human 
rights and the environment as inherently connected; for 
them, there’s no distinction. What does this mean for 
more specialized organizations such as Amnesty Interna-
tional or Greenpeace? Is the dichotomy between human 
rights and environmental organizations unavoidably 
shrinking, and could they best merge in the near future? 
I don’t think this is the way to go. The power of organiza-
tions such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International is 
largely based on their substantive expertise. That is too 
valuable to give up lightly. Progressive organizations and 
individuals need each other, and we need to support each 
other’s causes. We do this best by fulfilling our own role. 
But we should listen carefully to new activists, learn from 
their approach and, where possible, jump over our own 
shadow.
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Bridget Lewis 
Human rights and intergenerational climate justice
cases lack adequate financial and other resources to 
respond adequately to the problem. It was in recognition 
of this fact that the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) adopted the concept 
of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) into 
the climate change regime. The concept was explained 
in the Rio Declaration, adopted at the same meeting of 
nation states: “The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit 
of sustainable development in view of the pressures their 
societies place on the global environment and of the tech-
nologies and financial resources they command” (UNCED 
1992: principle 7), and it has become a cornerstone of 
international efforts to combat climate change (UNFCCC 
1992: art 3; Kyoto Protocol 1997: art 10; Paris Agreement 
2015: art 2.2).
Despite this legal commitment, the reality of climate 
injustice persists and has inspired strong advocacy from 
some states, especially Small Island Developing States 
in the Pacific, to encourage wealthy nations to deliver 
on their emissions-reductions commitments. Recently, 
the Pacific Islands Development Forum (2019: para 
1) adopted the Nadi Declaration which, in its opening 
paragraph, expresses “deep concern about the lack of 
comprehension, ambition, or commitment shown by 
developed nations of the world regarding the impending 
grave consequences that the current and ongoing 
Climate Crisis poses for vulnerable Pacific Small Island 
Developing States (PSIDS), which contribute negligible 
amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to this human-
caused global problem.”
Climate change poses an unprecedented threat to human 
rights and many of those who will suffer most from its 
effects have contributed least to its causes. This injustice 
is epitomized in the case of future generations, whose 
ability to enjoy fundamental human rights is at risk from 
our past and current actions. How should human rights 
law respond to this intergenerational climate injustice?
Introduction
The wide-ranging and serious human rights implications 
of climate change are by now well-understood. We know 
that increasing temperatures, rising sea levels and 
severe weather are already impacting on human rights 
relating to basic needs like food, water and housing, 
as well as the right to health and even the right to life 
(HRC 2019; UNHRC 2016; OHCHR 2009). The impacts of 
climate change on communities, particularly indigenous 
communities, have serious implications for rights to self-
deter mination, to utilize natural resources and maintain 
connections to land, and to practice and pass on culture 
and language. There are also human rights concerns 
attached to our responses to climate change, pointing 
to the need to safeguard human rights as we implement 
adaptation strategies and transition to renewable energy 
and a green economy (Lewis 2015; Pedersen 2011). 
The differential impact of these effects on the Global 
South is rightly understood as a serious injustice. Those 
nations and communities that face some of the most 
serious consequences are frequently among the lowest 
contributors of greenhouse gas emissions and in many 
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rapid action to significantly reduce emissions, these 
impacts may be severe, even catastrophic. Furthermore, 
future generations may find themselves locked into 
adaptation or mitigation strategies that we choose to 
implement, for example geoengineering projects or other 
technologies, but they are obviously unable to partici-
pate in the debate around those choices or to grant their 
consent to any negative side effects. 
Given that future generations have not contributed to 
greenhouse gas emissions and have no say in how we 
choose to combat global warming, limiting their ability 
to enjoy their human rights and forcing them to deal with 
the consequences of our actions represents intergenera-
tional injustice. To some degree, any action which might 
have long-term environmental, economic or social conse-
quences presents a risk of intergenerational injustice. The 
magnitude, diversity and complexity of climate change 
makes it the paramount challenge of our time, however. 
It demands urgent action to address its intergenerational 
impacts, while at the same time it exposes the limitations 
of existing human rights frameworks in protecting future 
generations’ rights. 
Intergenerational justice in the climate 
regime
The international community has acknowledged the 
problem of intergenerational injustice in its legal 
responses to climate change, but only in a limited and 
arguably ineffectual fashion. The Paris Agreement (2015) 
refers to intergenerational equity in one of its preambular 
paragraphs:
“Acknowledging that climate change is a common 
concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking 
action to address climate change, respect, promote and 
consider their respective obligations on human rights, 
the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, 
local communities, migrants, children, persons with 
disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and 
the right to development, as well as gender equality, 
empowerment of women and intergenerational equity” 
(Preambular paragraph 11). 
Until recently, the focus of climate justice campaigns has 
been more on this dimension of intra-generational justice 
– the need to seek an equitable distribution of burdens 
among developed and developing nations and, to a lesser 
extent, among communities within nations. Attention 
has started to turn, however, towards the challenges of 
intergenerational justice, as we gain a better appreciation 
of the realities of the climate crisis. 
Understanding intergenerational climate 
justice
In simple terms, intergenerational justice can be defined 
as an equitable distribution of benefits and burdens 
across generations. It is closely related to the concept of 
intergenerational equity, famously articulated by Edith 
Brown Weiss (1989; 2008), who argued that present 
generations must leave the planet in no worse condition 
than when they received it, to ensure that future genera-
tions have equitable options, quality and access when it 
comes to natural and cultural resources. 
The intergenerational injustice of climate change flows 
from the fact that the human rights impacts of climate 
change will continue into the future, affecting generations 
as yet unborn, and forcing them to deal with the conse-
quences of our current and past emissions. To minimize 
the most serious future effects of climate change, states 
need to keep global warming to 1.5°C or below, which is 
the ambition articulated in the 2015 Paris Agreement (art 
2.1(a); IPCC 2018b). On current trajectories, however, we 
are expected to overshoot the internationally agreed limit 
of keeping warming to ‘well-below’ 2°C (Paris Agreement 
2015: art 2.1a), let alone 1.5°C.
Even if we ceased all greenhouse gas emissions now, 
future generations would still experience some degree of 
climate change due to committed warming – that is, the 
inevitable warming of the planet caused by the lifespan 
of the CO2 that has already been emitted and the thermal 
inertia of the oceans (IPCC 2018b: sec A2; Mauritsen & 
Pincus 2017). So future generations are already locked 
into a degree of global warming and the human rights 
impacts that come along with it, and unless states take 
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Rowling 2015). Other reports indicated that developed 
states took a hard line against human rights in retaliation 
to developing states’ strong demands for a meaningful 
loss and damage mechanism (Vidal & Vaughan 2015). 
There had been strong advocacy during the negotiating 
process for the Agreement to meaningfully recognize 
the human rights consequences of climate change but, 
despite more explicit references in some of the early 
drafts, all that remained in the final text was the wording 
of preambular paragraph 11 noted above: “Parties 
should ... respect, promote and consider their respective 
obligations on human rights.” This presents the question, 
considered in the next section, of whether (and to what 
extent) states already owe obligations towards future 
generations under human rights law which might be 
captured by the Paris approach. 
Can the human rights framework promote 
intergenerational justice?
Given the reality that future generations will be affected 
by climate change in ways that will limit their human 
rights, do human rights laws or principles offer any 
potential for correcting this intergenerational injustice?  
From a theoretical perspective, there is debate within the 
fields of moral and political philosophy about whether it 
is appropriate to speak of future generations possessing 
rights. Some scholars have argued that human rights can 
only be possessed by actual persons, and not by persons 
who do not yet exist (e.g. Macklin 1981: 152). This reflects 
what is sometimes called the ‘right-bearer contempo-
raneity requirement’ (Gosseries 2008: 456). Derek Parfit 
(1984: 351ff.) famously argued that we cannot owe obli-
gations towards future generations because our actions 
today not only determine the conditions in which future 
generations will live, but also the identities of future 
persons: were we to act differently, those future gener-
ations would not come into existence. This ‘non-identity 
problem’ suggests that current generations do not 
possess duties in relation to future generations, and 
future generations cannot therefore be said to possess 
rights. 
The next paragraph refers to climate justice more directly, 
but only to the extent that it notes “the importance for 
some of the concept of ‘climate justice’” (Paris Agreement 
2015: preambular paragraph 12). The Preamble of the 
Agreement is not considered to be legally binding, and 
given that intergenerational equity is only mentioned 
as one among many principles which states ought to 
consider, these references are hardly likely to demand 
strong action from states to safeguard the rights of future 
generations. 
Interestingly, earlier drafts of the Paris text had included 
more explicit references. A draft of article 2, which sets 
out the purposes of the Agreement, had initially included 
options for language explaining that states should 
address climate change “for the benefit of present and 
future generations” (Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) 2015a: sec C, art 
2.2). At a later negotiation, this text was removed and 
an alternative proposed that ‘intergenerational equity’ 
be included as one of the principles which states would 
be required to consider in implementing their obligations 
(ADP 2015b). 
The reference to intergenerational equity in the operative 
part of the Agreement was ultimately removed from the 
final text, however. What remained (in addition to the 
preambular reference noted above) was a reworded ver-
sion of article 2.2, which reads: “This agreement will be 
implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capa-
bilities, in the light of different national circumstances.” 
This arguably shifted the focus away from intergenera-
tional equity and more towards intra-generational equity 
and the need to strike a fair balance between members of 
current generations.
A similar process of watering down occurred with the 
coverage of human rights in the Paris Agreement. A 
number of states, including the United States, Norway 
and Australia, reportedly raised concerns that including 
explicit references to human rights in the operative text 
would dilute the purpose of the Agreement or create 
potential for legal liability (Rajamani 2018: 244-245; 
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respect requires that states refrain from taking actions 
which impinge upon the enjoyment of human rights. This 
duty could be interpreted through the lens of intergen-
erational equity to require that, at a minimum, states 
do not act to undermine the ability of future generations 
(at least their own future citizens) to enjoy their rights. 
With respect to climate change, the duty to respect would 
demand that action be taken to transition to zero net 
emissions as quickly as possible, while at the same time 
minimizing the negative human rights consequences of 
mitigation and adaptation policies (Lewis 2018). The 
duty to protect would impose similar obligations with 
respect to regulating the actions of private actors, like 
corporations. The duty to fulfil human rights is somewhat 
more problematic when applied to future generations, as 
it’s not entirely clear what future generations will require 
in order to enjoy their human rights, or how far into 
the future states are expected to provide for. Arguably, 
however, it obliges states to establish and maintain 
general conditions which lay the best foundation for 
the enjoyment of human rights in the future, including 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and addressing the 
causes of vulnerability.  
A major challenge in better protecting the rights of future 
generations in the context of climate change is the ques-
tion of how to balance the rights of future and present 
generations. Recognizing the rights of future generations 
does nothing to supplant states’ obligations to present 
generations, and the need to fulfil human rights in the 
short term might justify some limitation of rights for 
future people. Certainly, it might be difficult to prove that 
a state is in violation of its human rights obligations 
towards future generations where it acts in the name of 
fulfilling more urgent needs.  
However, we shouldn’t assume that the rights of present 
and future generations necessarily conflict. Philip Alston, 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty 
and Human Rights, has recently articulated the links 
between poverty and climate change, noting that the 
world’s poorest people are the most vulnerable to the 
human rights impacts of climate change, and that on 
current trajectories climate change threatens to force 
However, these approaches fail to capture the intuitive 
sense that we should care about the consequences 
of our actions, particularly when we know that those 
consequences will be negative, and that we have a moral 
obligation to act in the interests of future generations. 
A preferable approach is based on ‘interest’ theories of 
human rights, which posit that human rights represent 
fundamental interests which are important enough to 
create obligations for others (e.g. Raz 1986; Feinberg 
1971, 1981; Caney 2006). Following this approach, 
we can easily appreciate that future generations have 
interests, and so it is rational to say that they possess 
(or at least will possess) human rights. Importantly, such 
an approach confirms that we owe corresponding duties 
with respect to future generations’ rights. It makes no 
difference that we cannot know the identities of these 
future people, because the rights and duties flow from 
their interest-ownership and “that is all that is necessary 
to certify the coherence of present talk about their rights” 
(Feinberg 1971: 147). 
So it’s theoretically possible to conceive of current duties 
which correspond to future generations’ human rights, 
but are those rights and duties presently enshrined in 
human rights law and principles? Unfortunately, future 
generations are not identified specifically as beneficiaries 
of human rights under international law or under most 
domestic applications of that law. Most conventional 
interpretations of the major human rights treaties 
suggest that states only owe obligations to their citizens 
and to persons under their jurisdiction (e.g. ICCPR 1966: 
art 2; ECHR 1950: art 1), which would seem to exclude 
persons not yet born. There are some arguments in favour 
of extending to states an obligation to cooperate inter-
nationally for the fulfilment of human rights, especially 
economic, social and cultural rights (CESCR 2017), but 
this too would normally be limited to members of current 
generations.   
Another issue is how states’ substantive obligations 
should be defined in relation to future generations. 
Under international human rights law, states typically 
owe duties to respect, protect and fulfil human rights 
(commonly known as the tripartite duties). The duty to 
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respect would be defining the extent of future-focused 
obligations and the point at which future generations’ 
interests are considered too remote to trigger current 
responsibility. However, it may be possible to develop 
standards of foreseeability or causal contribution that 
would help define the obligations with more precision. 
Another option is to expand rules of legal standing to 
enable claims to be brought on behalf of future persons. 
This could be done through the creation of a dedicated 
‘guardian’ or other institution which can represent future 
generations in legal actions and advocate for their 
interests (González-Ricoy & Gosseries 2016). An ambi-
tious proposal along these lines was presented at the Rio 
+20 conference in 2012 calling for the creation of a High 
Commissioner for Future Generations within the United 
Nations framework (Ward 2012). While the proposal 
ultimately did not proceed, work continues at national and 
regional levels to create institutions which would work for 
the benefit of future generations.  
Human rights principles have potential to contribute 
to such proposals, even if they are situated outside the 
conventional human rights framework. For instance, 
human rights provide a language for us to articulate the 
nature of harms facing future generations, encompassing 
a broad range of impacts from fundamental needs 
through to economic, social and cultural rights. Thinking 
of these impacts in terms of human rights also helps to 
put them on a more even playing field with more imme-
diate concerns, potentially facilitating a better balancing 
of benefits and burdens across generations. In this 
way human rights could work as a principled basis for 
resolving conflicts between current and future interests. 
The normative and moral force of human rights might also 
help to combat the causes and effects of ‘short-termism’ 
– our tendency to prioritize more immediate outcomes over 
longer-term interests (Mackenzie 2016) – by encouraging 
greater consideration of future generations.
Adopting these changes may be challenging, particularly 
within international human rights law, where modifying 
existing treaties or creating new ones is dependent on the 
political will of states. But even without these reforms, we 
many millions more people into poverty (UNHRC 2019). 
Further, as Edith Brown Weiss has explained, it’s not 
reasonable to expect that people will care about future 
generations’ interests if their own basic needs are not 
being met (Brown Weiss 2008: 618). Addressing poverty 
and development today and ensuring a just transition to 
a green economy are therefore imperative in protecting 
human rights in the future.  
One of the other major drawbacks of the current human 
rights framework is its claims-based approach to enforce-
ment. Climate change does not fit the typical model for a 
human rights violation, which typically requires proof that 
a government’s action or inaction has caused a particular 
human rights interference for a specific right-bearer 
(OHCHR 2009; Bodansky 2014; Pedersen 2010; Knox 
2009b). The cumulative, transnational and long-term 
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions create challenges 
for proving that a particular state’s conduct has caused 
a given interference with human rights. This is a problem 
where human rights effects are already materializing; 
it is even more challenging when the consequences are 
predicted to manifest at some time in the future.
The way forward
For these reasons, the existing human rights architecture 
will struggle on its own to address the intergenerational 
injustice of climate change. We need both a rethinking of 
our obligations towards future generations and creative 
ways of enforcing those obligations. As noted above, a 
key area requiring attention is expanding the scope of 
states’ duties beyond conventional notions of territory 
and jurisdiction. One option is to broaden our under-
standing of what it means to be under the jurisdiction of 
a state, so that where the exercise of a state’s jurisdiction 
produces negative human rights effects, human rights 
duties are activated. This approach has been advocated 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in a recent 
Advisory Opinion in relation to extra-territorial obligations 
(2017), and could potentially be applied to extend states’ 
obligations both geographically and temporally, so that 
they owe obligations to future generations both within 
and beyond their territories. A challenge to jurists in this 
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are starting to see human rights language and princi-
ples being employed in litigation which addresses the 
intergenerational impacts of climate change. For example, 
in the United States a group of young people are pursuing 
legal action against the federal government alleging that 
its failure to tackle climate change represents a violation 
of their constitutional rights (Juliana v United States 
2016). Outside the legal system, young people around the 
world are harnessing the power of human rights language 
to demand stronger action from governments and high-
light the seriousness of intergenerational climate injus-
tice (e.g. ‘Fridays for Future’). Just recently, a group of 
young people, including members of the Fridays for Future 
movement, have launched a claim under the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child alleging that five states 
have violated their human rights by failing to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with their Paris 
obligations (Sacchi & Others v Argentina, Brazil, France, 
Germany & Turkey 2019). The case will test the ability of 
existing human rights infrastructure to deal with climate 
change-related human rights issues and will be watched 
closely by those interested in advancing intergenerational 
climate justice.
In taking this creative and courageous action, younger 
generations are demanding that we recognize that climate 
change will have drastic effects within their lifetimes. We 
cannot only think of climate change as a future problem, 
however. Around the world we are already seeing grave 
human rights impacts caused by climate change, as 
severe storms, droughts, bushfires and floods destroy 
homes, livelihoods and lives. We must work to address 
intergenerational climate injustice in parallel with urgent 
action on current threats, recognizing that the best way 
to protect the rights of future generations is to take 
strong action now. Continuing on the same path risks 
locking future generations into a life of limited rights and 
opportunities, when it is within our power to leave them a 
world where the full range of human rights can be enjoyed 
by everyone.  
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The enjoyment of human rights will be both directly and indirectly affected by climate change. Common examples are sea 
level rise, temperature increases, and extreme weather events affecting the rights to health, food, water and life amongst 
others. These effects will not be felt equally: the more vulnerable segments of the global population will be hit hardest. 
As the worlds of climate crisis activism and human rights protection become increasingly intertwined, their value for and 
impact upon one another deserve closer inspection. The language, policies and (campaigning) strategies around climate 
change and human rights are still in development, leading to new insights, (re)definitions, and new challenges for human 
rights and environmental activists. The essays in this volume discuss the opportunities, threats and difficulties at the nexus 
of human rights and climate change and examine the concept of climate justice as well as recent human rights approaches 
to climate change issues in specific policy areas, such as migration, subnational authorities and strategic litigation.
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